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In the United States, the national judiciary plays a vital role in the creation, 
maintenance, and transformation of political orders.  Political parties, the institutions 
primarily responsible for the operation of a political order, tend to be large and 
heterogeneous.  This heterogeneity creates disjunction within the party and threatens 
to undermine partisan unity.  In order to hold power over an extended period of time, 
parties-in-power must diffuse their intra-party tension.  This dissertation explores the 
phenomena of parties using courts to diffuse intra-party tension by displacing highly 
divisive issues onto the national judiciary.  This exploration reveals a pattern whereby 
the dominant wing of the party-in-power consistently secures its preferences through 
the courts to the detriment of minority wing preferences.  To elucidate this pattern, 
three different political orders are examined.  First, the Republican political order is 
examined to reveal how the dominant, conservative wing of the Party used the courts 
to protect against invasive regulatory schemes favored by the progressive, 
minority wing of the Party.  Second, an examination of the New Deal/Great Society 
Democratic political order reveals the role the courts played in enabling the liberal, 
dominant wing of the Party to circumvent conservative, minority wing obstruction of 
civil rights and how the courts helped liberal Democrats woo African American 
voters so as to transform and liberalize the Democratic Party.  Third, the period of 
divided government is detailed to reveal how the dominant, economically 
conservative wing of the Republican Party uses the Supreme Court to manage issues 
highly salient to the socially conservative minority wing.  Judicial administration of 
religion in education, homosexual rights, and abortion resulted in the Republican 
Party eschewing those issues from its legislative agenda and, simultaneously, resulted 
in center-left policy consistent with dominant wing preferences.  By judicializing 
social issues, the Republican Party created greater Party unity than what would 
otherwise be possible, which enabled it to rise to power at the turn of the 21st Century.  
The party-court dynamic has implications for judicial power, party government, and 
constitutional theory and each are explored in the conclusion. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction: The Party-Court Dynamic In American Politics 
 
 
 
  2
The ability to gain and hold power defines the relative success of political parties 
in American politics.  When parties hold power over extended periods of time, they 
effectively reorder institutional commitments and the American political order.1  
However, a paradox marks American political history.  National parties have been highly 
competitive throughout American political history, yet, much of that same history is 
defined by extended periods of one-party control of the national government.  Moreover, 
the American party system begets strange bedfellows, which is to say that national parties 
in the United States frequently contain intra-party coalitions that have little in common 
with one another.  So, how, in a system defined by competitive parity and disjointed 
coalitions, can a political party maintain and extend its hold on power so as to reorder 
American political commitments? 
In order to answer that question, we must turn to an unusual source of partisan 
stability: the national judiciary.  The tale of American party politics cannot be told 
without detailing how parties utilize the national judiciary, particularly the Supreme 
Court, as a force for stabilizing, maintaining, and transforming their national political 
coalitions.  The development of the modern national judiciary, with its extensive 
jurisdiction, uncontested powers of review, and a highly regarded ultimate court of 
appeal, provides political parties the means of diffusing intra-party tension over political 
controversies by shifting such issues to the courts.  The same institutional features that 
                                                
1 I borrow the term political order and political regime form the American political development 
literature.  While scholars of American political development disagree on the exact terms of what 
constitutes a political regime, they largely agree that political orders are marked by the dominance of one 
party in national elections (Plotke 1996; Polsky 1997); the persistence of the partys ideological 
commitments in American political discourse (Polsky 1997); and the creation of political and institutional 
currents that layer on top of old state structures (Orren and Skowronek 1994; Skowronek 1993). 
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provide the courts with a democratic pedigree also provide judges with a sympathetic ear 
to certain intra-party demands, which make the courts particularly suitable institutions to 
rely upon during periods of intra-party crisis.   
This dissertation is dedicated to exploring the ways in which political parties, and 
the coalitions that make up those parties, use the courts and the subsequent impact 
judicial decision-making has on political parties.  Examining how political parties use 
courts to manage their national coalitions and, transversely, the impact court decisions 
have on the composition of power-holding coalitions facilitates a fuller understanding of 
how the national judiciary functions in American politics.  Without the proper analytic 
framework, we fail to understand how political parties use courts as a necessary means of 
diffusing inherent intra-party tension, which, in turn, enables parties to govern over 
extended periods of time.   
There have been numerous efforts to link judicial action with governing 
coalitions.  In 1957, Robert Dahl argued that the Supreme Court will never serve as an 
effective check against existing national majorities due to the fact that Supreme Court 
justices are appointed by party leaders that have an interest in assuring that justices share 
many or most of their ideological preferences.  Through some rudimentary but effective 
empirical testing, Dahl showed that the Supreme Court rarely struck down laws passed by 
the current national governing coalition.  Instead, the Court upheld the acts of current 
legislative majorities and, on the rare occasions it exercised its powers of review, the 
Court struck down legislation that represented the interests of old legislative majorities.  
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Thus, the Court legitimated the current power-holding coalition by upholding its statutes 
while clearing away the commitments of old political regimes.   
 Dahls article created a framework adopted and improved upon by a second 
generation of scholars.  Mark Graber examined Marshall Court decision-making in light 
of the Jeffersonian political regime and found that Marshall Court decisions were not 
simply pro-Federalist rulings that ran counter to the preferences of Jeffersonian 
Republicans, but, rather, the Court tended to craft opinions based on the common 
preferences that the Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans shared (1998).  Scot Powe 
(2000) and Michael Klarman (1996) made similar observations regarding the Warren 
Courts pro-civil liberties rulings, arguing that these decisions fit within New Deal-Great 
Society liberalism and the political climate of the day, rather than as the Court acting 
independently.  Cornell Clayton and J. Mitch Pickerill examined how Rehnquist Court 
federalism decisions map well onto the emerging views of the dominant, Republican 
Party (2004).   
The recent work in regime politics takes seriously Dahls idea that the Supreme 
Court operates as a coordinate partner with the dominant power-holding coalition in 
American politics and that Court decisions map well with the dominant political ideology 
of the day.  However, the regime politics scholarship appreciates the relationship between 
national coalitions and courts without making courts mere agents of political coalitions.  
Courts remain independent and judicial independence manifests in ways unanticipated by 
political actors.  For example, Ken Kersch argued that the march of civil liberties 
throughout the 20th Century was nothing of the kind.  Rather, the Supreme Court 
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frequently expanded and contracted civil rights based on the demands of the regulatory 
state (2004).  Thus, preferences of the dominant national coalition can result in expansion 
and/or contraction, sometimes simultaneously, of civil rights and liberties whenever the 
Court concretizes political settlements on the contours of rights regimes such that 
expansion on dimension of civil rights decreases protection on another dimension.   
While Kersch showed how the preferences of the dominant national coalition can 
manifest on multiple dimensions, Mark A. Graber demonstrated how the courts function 
as a policymaking institution when elected officials are either unable or unwilling to act 
(1993).  According to Graber, the courts rarely act in countermajoritarian ways since 
legislators regularly rely on the courts to make policy areas too controversial to risk 
legislating.  George Lovell expanded on this idea and showed how courts regularly make 
policy when there is no clear legislative intent because legislators are unable to resolve 
conflicts regarding key statutory provisions (2003).  The dominant national coalition 
benefits from deference to the national judiciary in at least two ways.  First, by avoiding 
highly controversial issues that threaten their electoral security, courts essentially take the 
blame for making policy in areas that political actors have an electoral incentive to avoid.  
Second, creating vague statutory language enables the construction of broad legislative 
coalitions necessary to pass Congress.  By avoiding high degrees of specificity, 
legislators with differing aspirations and goals for the legislation can agree on statutory 
language since unclear wording can encompass various interpretations.   
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Kevin McMahons recent work on President Roosevelts role in paving the way to 
Brown v. Board of Education2 developed the idea of the Supreme Court advancing the 
aspirations of certain members of the dominant national coalition (2004).  Specifically, 
McMahon addresses why the Court acted on civil rights when it did and the role the 
president played in facilitating judicial action.  By placing judges sympathetic to liberal 
Democratic civil libertarian preferences and deferential to the exercise of federal power, 
Roosevelt created a Court that would advance [Roosevelts] intraparty and institutional 
interests [and create] a legal order clearly in conflict with his legislative compromises 
on race (2004, 13).  McMahons work touches on the dynamics between political parties 
and the courts but his main focus is on highlighting presidential power through judicial 
decision-making.  The impact of these decisions on the party is largely absent. 
Scholarship that places Supreme Court decision-making in the context of political 
regimes offers better explanations of judicial decision-making than looking at such 
decisions in isolation.  Yet, the design of this scholarship was to cast judicial decision-
making in light of national coalitions and not to examine the ways in which the judiciary 
impacts partisan politics.  So, despite a vibrant literature on courts in regime politics, we 
still know little regarding how the existence of the judiciary impacts both intra- and inter- 
party politics, the impact of judicial decisions on the internal composition of political 
parties, and whether judicial decision-making can aid or harm partisan power-holding in 
American politics.  In this dissertation, I address this gap by arguing that courts play a 
vital role in American intra-party politics by creating a means of stabilizing, maintaining, 
and transforming heterogeneous coalitions.  While courts help extend the life of parties-
                                                
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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in-power, court rulings tend to favor the dominant wing of the party-in-power.  Thus, 
courts play a role in managing power-holding coalitions and create outcomes preferred 
by privileged coalitions within the party-in-power.  It is to this pattern that we now turn. 
 
The American Party System 
 The politics of power-holding in the United States is tricky at best.  The American 
constitutional system was designed specifically to preclude the existence of political 
parties, yet, the party-free constitutional order only lasted until need for an organized 
opposition arose (Hofstadter 1968) and ambitious politicians organized to form a viable 
alternative to the political status quo (Aldrich 1995).  The emergence of coalitions, 
designed to mobilize political opposition and organize for electoral and political victory, 
ended the noble dream of a government managed through republican virtue.  Yet, 
political parties quickly became the central conduit through which political interests held 
power in the United States, which gave rise to an odd phenomena.  Political parties serve 
to mobilize political interests and collectivize political action, however, the American 
two-party system is not well suited to establishing stable, homogeneous political 
coalitions. 
 American political parties can best be described as large coalitions of smaller 
coalitions.  Parties with homogeneous preference structures are rare.  In large part, the 
heterogeneity of interests inherent in American parties stems from the need for large, 
national coalitions in order to secure electoral victories.3  Heterogeneity of interests 
                                                
3 Duverger argued that countries with first-past-the-post voting systems almost always result in two-party 
systems like that in the United States (1963).  These two-party systems are the most susceptible to national 
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always causes disjunction within a political party but the degree of the disjunction varies 
significantly.  Minor disjunction arises from dedicating party energy to certain issues 
while relegating other issues to the partys backburner.  When an issue is not particularly 
salient, ignoring an issue or dedicating limited energy to its resolution does little to 
impact partisan unity.  However, when an issue on which the party is divided becomes 
salient and constituents of party members demand action, parties must find a way to deal 
with this heterogeneity of interests without dividing the party.  This issue is particularly 
problematic for the party-in-power where small defections can result in a loss of power.  
So how does a party-in-power prevent defection while balancing the competing interests 
within its national coalition? 
 To answer this question, we must further dissect the nature of political parties in 
the United States and develop a useful analytical framework through which to understand 
the role of courts in partisan power-holding.  As noted above, political parties contain 
numerous coalitions.  The nebulous nature of political coalitions makes the study of intra-
party coalitions difficult.  Compounding the difficulty, intra-party coalitions can appear 
and disappear as quickly as political expediency warrants.  Moreover, coalitions can form 
on multiple policy dimensions so that stable and cohesive coalitions often elude 
demanding empirical measure.  However, when we look at political parties in a historical 
perspective, we can identify two major coalitions within the party-in-power pertaining to 
the highly divisive issue of the day. These coalitions are relatively stable and constant 
throughout each of the case studies.  For the sake of consistency across case studies, these 
                                                                                                                                            
coalitions with heterogeneous interests due to the need for a coalition approximating 50% plus one of the 
electorate.    
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two coalitions will be referred to as the dominant intra-party coalition and the minority 
intra-party coalition. 
 
The Dominant Intra-party Coalition 
With a few notable exceptions,4 the presidential wing of a party exercises the 
greatest power and influence within the party. The dominance of the presidential wing of 
the party-in-power is easily explained.5  The presidential wing is defined by the drawing 
of the presidential nominee from the ranks of that wing.  Simply put, in order to gain a 
partys nomination for the presidency, it is necessary to gain either the support of 
entrenched party machines and influential party bosses, as was the case prior to 
convention reforms in the mid-20th Century, or secure popular victories in state-by-state 
elections by taking policy positions that have the greatest appeal to the greatest number of 
primary voters.6  Either way, the effect of the party nominating process is to align the 
presidential nominee with the largest and/or most powerful coalitions within the party. 
The control of the presidency gives the dominant wing of the party significant 
influence in several ways.  First, control of the presidency enables the dominant wing of 
the party to exercise both positive and negative policy-making authority.  The president 
has certain coercive powers through which to bargain and cajole interests and institutions 
                                                
4 There have been a few exceptions to this rule.  Andrew Johnson and Theodore Roosevelt both had notable 
differences with the dominant wing of the party.  Of course, both Johnson and Roosevelt assumed the 
presidency due to historical contingency rather than electoral politics.  In both cases, the predecessors 
ideology matched the dominant wing of the party. 
5 Past scholarship use the terms presidential wing, the dominant wing, and the elite wing interchangeably.  
For the sake of consistency, I primarily use the label dominant wing throughout most of this work, although 
a few references to presidential wing occur when necessary.  
6 Such strategy has the effect of aligning the candidate with the largest and most active groups within the 
party, thereby, creating a majoritarian effect within the Party. 
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into law-making action (see Neustadt 1991).  Following the expansion of executive 
power that occurred during the New Deal, the presidency increased both its capacity to 
directly make policy and the dependence of other institutions on presidential leadership 
(see Lowi 1985).  Additionally, the presidents de facto and de jure veto power prevents 
the ideological opposition from realizing (and perhaps even attempting) those policies the 
president adamantly opposes. 
 Second, dominant wing preferences enjoy a unique rhetorical position.  Rather 
than bargain with political and institutional equals, the president can take preferred 
policies directly to constituents by going public (Kernell 1997).  Not only does this 
power have a persuasive force but also presidential rhetoric can fundamentally alter the 
conceptions of the political order (Tulis 1987, 12).  Such a powerful position enables 
the presidential wing, and hence the dominant wing, to exercise greater control over the 
party agenda and the structuring of party energy to realize that agenda. 
 Finally, the presidential wing of the party-in-power enjoys a privileged position 
within the party.  Presidents, particularly during, although not limited to, the 20th 
Century, have been the symbolic and actual head of the party.  As Woodrow Wilson 
observed, the president can dominate his party by being spokesman for the real 
sentiment and purpose of the country by giving the country at once the information and 
the statements of policy which will enable it to form its judgments alike of parties and 
men (as quoted in Milkis 1999, 49).  Through the president, policies preferred by the 
dominant wing have unique voice in the party, which can push and pull the party toward 
certain positions and policies it would otherwise not seek with the same vigor.   
  11
Perhaps most importantly for this study, the dominant wing enjoys significant 
control over the judicial nomination and appointment process.  Supreme Court justices 
appointed by the party-in-power are most apt to reflect the policy preferences of the 
dominant wing of the party (Funston 1975, 807; Segal and Spaeth 2002, 186).7  This is 
far from an exact science, as multiple justices have shown,8 however, there seems little 
doubt that the justices sitting on the Supreme Court overwhelmingly reflect the policy 
preferences of the appointing party (Segal and Spaeth 2002; Moraski and Shipan 1999).  
The significant influence of the dominant wing does not ensure that Supreme Court 
decisions will completely conform to their preferences.  The judiciary is an independent 
institution with its own policy-making rules, forms, and proclivities.  However, there is a 
high probability that the outcome will fall within certain ideological bounds preferable to 
the dominant wing than if some form of deference or delegation of authority did not 
occur.  As such, legislative deference to the judiciary has a high probability of resulting 
in a policy that favors the preferences of the dominant wing. 
 
The Minority Coalition 
  The advantages listed above result in greater control of the party agenda, party 
energy, and the means to achieve policy goals by the dominant wing of the party.  
However, the structural advantages enjoyed by the dominant wing fall well short of total 
                                                
7 During periods of divided control of government, it is less clear that any one political party is truly in 
power and, hence, becomes more difficult to determine the influence of particular coalitions within parties.  
The predominant influence of the president in the process is also less certain (see Moraski and Shipan 
1999).   The modern phenomenon of divided government and how it alters this scheme will be discussed in 
Chapter Four. 
8 Justices Story, McReynolds, Cardozo, and Souter are just three examples of appointees to the Supreme 
Court whose voting records are quite distinct from the preferences of the appointing president and his wing 
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domination of the party.  Since two-party systems require large, national coalitions in 
order to compete for national power, failure to account for the demands of minority 
coalitions can result in defection from the party, which adversely impacts its electoral 
competitiveness.  Historically, national elections in the United States have been 
sufficiently competitive to make group defection from one party enough to assure their 
inability to win or hold power.  In order to maintain party unity, the dominant wing can 
not wholly ignore the demands of minority coalitions within the party.  Thus, the 
minority wing in the party has power in the form of defection.   
 For example, in the late 1840s, the antislavery wings of both parties began to 
agitate for action on the issue of slavery in the territories.  While the northern-dominated 
Whig Party was willing to accommodate certain free-soil demands, the Democratic Party 
in both the North and South was unwilling to make such concessions.  A group of 
predominantly northern, free-soil Democrats defected from their party, formed the Free 
Soil Party in 1848, and enjoyed some initial electoral success.  Free-soilers won thirteen 
congressional seatsmostly in New England and New York.  More significantly, the 
Whigs exploited the split in the Democratic Party and won the presidency (Sundquist 
1983, 63-68). 
 For reasons related to the political and electoral advantage of holding power, 
established party actors have significant interest in preventing defection from the party.  
In other words, to prevent defection, dominant wing party members must account for 
minority wing preferences.  Capitulation to minority wing preferences on non-salient 
issues costs little more than the allocation of political resources or redistribution of 
                                                                                                                                            
of the party. 
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particularized benefits.  For example, while the reclamation of arid lands in the southwest 
had little appeal to northern, economically conservative Republicans during the first part 
of the 20th Century, northern conservatives nonetheless supported public funding of 
irrigation and land cultivation programs, preferences of the minority western-progressive 
wing of the Republican Party.9  However, when minority wing preferences on salient 
issues run counter to the policy preferences and ideological commitments of the dominant 
wing of the party, the costs of capitulation increase significantly. 
 The presence of competing preferences creates tension among the various intra-
party coalitions.  Making matters worse, party members in government face competing 
incentives that amplify the tension within the party.  On the one hand, party members 
seek to realize, maintain, and protect either their policy preferences or those preferences 
that will maximize their chances of re-election.  On the other, party members benefit by 
having a united party that can either place them in highly influential positions and/or 
enable them greater opportunity to send benefits back to their respective districts.  The 
greater the variation of preferences regarding the salient issue, the greater the tension is 
likely to be between the two wings of the party.   The tension is amplified given that 
realization or obstruction of a contested policy will threaten party unity.  Thus, when 
there is significant disagreement within a party-in-power on a salient issue, the 
disjunction between the various intra-party coalitions threatens party solidarity. 
 In these situations, elected officials in the party-in-power face a peculiar problem.   
Ignoring the demands of one wing of the party can lead loss of solidarity within the party 
and declining support for the party in the electorate.  However, yielding to one wing of 
                                                
9 See the Republican Party Platforms of 1900, 1904, and 1908 (Porter and Johnson 1956, 123; 138; 160). 
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the party means the other wing will have to support a policy that runs counter to their 
preferences and may have significant electoral consequences.  Either of these scenarios 
can result in a loss of control over the national government.  This damned-if-you-do, 
damned-if-you-dont scenario requires party elites to find a way to cut the Gordian Knot.  
 
 
Resolving Intra-party Tension 
 In part, the answer to the riddle of salient, divisive issues depends on the nature of 
the issue (see Figure 1).   Given that party membershipboth in government and in the 
electorateis divided on their preferred resolution, setting an appropriate course of 
action is no easy task.  However, the issue itself may limit the options available to party 
elites.  Certain issues, such as tariff revision, tax policy, and foreign affairs, are not easily 
delegated to electorally unaccountable policymaking institutions, like the courts or 
administrative agencies.  Should such a nondelagable issue cleave a party and gain a high 
degree of salience, party members in government will have little choice but to make 
policy through the traditional legislative process.  This represents a real danger for the 
party-in-power since any outcome favorable to one wing of the party will run counter to 
the preference of the other wing of the party and party members in the electorate 
sympathetic to the losing wing will likely respond unfavorably in the next election.  Such 
was the case with the Republican Party when it attempted to revise the national tariff 
during the Taft Administration.  Large numbers of progressive Republicans failed to 
continue supporting the Party following tariff revision that favored business interests in 
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the East over Midwestern agriculture. 
 Salient issues that cannot be delegated must be dealt with by the party-in-power.  
However, most domestic issues contain features that enable elected officials to delegate 
certain policy-making authority to administrative agencies or courts.  Most notably, any 
domestic policy that seeks to regulate private behavior touches upon the proper exercise 
of government power, the natural limitation of those powers, and the rights of individuals 
vis-à-vis governmental power.  When domestic policy contains such an issue, political 
actors can easily draw courts into the policy-making arena.  Given that a party-in-power 
faces the prospect of losing power if party officials fully address the issue through the 
legislative process, the best interests of party elites may be served by delegating the issue.  
Of course, simply because an issue is delegable and certain members of the party-in-
power will benefit from judicial or administrative empowerment does not guarantee that 
the party will exercise this option.  For example, the liberal wing of the Democratic Party 
largely abandoned its court-centered civil rights strategy in 1964 with the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act.  Previous civil rights acts that garnered wide liberal Democratic support 
relied heavily on the courts for civil rights enforcement, which gave some measure of 
relief to southern conservatives in the Party who were content to allow southern judges to 
temper aggressive civil rights claims.  However, by 1964, liberal Democrats felt either 
sufficiently comfortable with their hold on power or sufficiently compelled by the moral 
imperative of the civil rights issue that they willfully acted in a way that led southern 
conservatives in the electorate to abandon their Party in national elections. 
 Despite a few instances to the contrary, the case studies below show a pattern in 
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which the party-in-power repeatedly seeks out judicial intervention on delegable issues 
that cleave the party.  The means through which a party-in-power seeks judicial 
intervention vary significantly based on various political and issue-based conditions.  
Table 1 lays out the various ways a party-in-power can draw courts into the policy-
making arena and the respective benefits for the dominant and minority wings.   
 
FIGURE 1:  Options for Resolving Salient Divisive Issues 
 
Salient Divisive 
Issue
Delegable Issue
Non-delegable
Issue
Political 
Resolution
Judicial 
Intervention
Direct Statutory
Empowerment
Indirect 
Statutory
Empowerment
Executive 
Request
Active Issue
Deference
 
 Direct statutory empowerment of the judiciary occurs when one wing of the party 
pushes for legislative action.  If the minority wing of the party-in-power demands 
legislation and threatens defection, the dominant wing can acquiesce to the legislation but 
secure strong judicial review over the legislative action in question.  This strategy gives 
the minority wing a legislative victory, thereby preventing potential defection, but assures 
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that a sympathetic judiciary will likely protect the core preferences of the dominant wing 
that are jeopardized by the legislation.  Where the dominant wing is demanding 
legislative action that runs counter to minority wing preferences, judicial supervision can 
act as a compromise position.  The dominant wing can secure its legislative victory 
without straining relations with the partys minority wing while the minority wing gains 
some minimal protection of its preferences in the lower courts where local judges are 
likely to be more sympathetic to minority wing concerns.   
TABLE 1: Means of Judicial Intervention, Benefits, and Impact on Party 
 Means of 
Court 
Involvement 
Benefit for a 
Dominant 
Wing that 
Desires 
Progressive 
Change 
Benefit for a 
Dominant 
Wing that 
Desires Status 
Quo 
Benefit for a 
Minority 
Wing that 
Desires 
Change 
Benefit for a 
Minority 
Wing that 
Desires 
Status Quo 
Impact on 
Party 
       
Direct 
Statutory 
Empowerment 
 Statutory 
grant of 
power 
 Creation of 
new court 
Creates 
opportunity for 
limited change 
through courts 
 
Compromise 
position that 
still protects 
jeopardized 
preferences 
Secure 
legislative 
victory  
Chance to 
win at lower 
levels of 
federal 
courts 
 Stabilizes 
party by 
appeasing 
major intra-
party 
coalitions  
       
Indirect 
Statutory 
Empowerment 
 Ambiguous 
language in 
important 
statutory 
provision(s) 
Creates 
opportunity for 
limited change 
through courts 
Compromise 
position that 
still protects 
jeopardized 
preferences 
Secure 
legislative 
victory  
Chance to 
win at lower 
levels of 
federal 
courts 
  Stabilizes 
party by 
appeasing 
major intra-
party 
coalitions 
       
Executive 
Request  
 Solicitor 
General 
involvement 
in Supreme 
Court case.  
Request 
judicial 
action 
Circumvent 
minority wing 
opposition 
while avoiding 
divisive 
legislative 
action 
Symbolic 
appeasement 
of minority 
wing demands 
Party unity Party unity  Stabilizes 
party by 
removing the 
need for 
legislative 
action 
 Can bring 
new 
constituency 
into party 
through 
judicial action 
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Active Issue 
Deference 
 Dominant 
wing actively 
argues that 
an issue 
rightly 
belongs to 
the courts 
Leaves 
divisive issue 
to sympathetic 
courts 
Leaves 
divisive issue 
to sympathetic 
courts  
Party unity Party unity  Stabilizes 
party 
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 The effect of direct statutory empowerment then is similar in nature for both 
wings of the party-in-power but the degree of success for each wing varies significantly.  
Since the dominant wing of the party-in-power has a natural alliance with the national 
judiciaryparticularly the Supreme Courtthe dominant wing will likely gain greater 
protection or secure greater policy gains when the court acts on its behalf than on behalf 
of the minority wing.  Yet, in terms of constituent politics the effect is the same.  Elected 
officials aligned with the minority wing can assure their constituents that the courts will 
protect their interests when they demand judicial oversight the same way the dominant 
wing can when it make similar demands.  The effect on the party is also the same. 
Empowering the judiciary to make policy on a highly divisive issue stabilizes the party in 
a way unlikely to occur without judicial intervention. 
 Indirect statutory empowerment has a similar effect as direct empowerment, 
however, the means are quite different.  Direct statutory empowerment occurs when the 
bargaining power of the wing demanding judicial oversight is quite strong.  However, 
when the bargaining position of the wing hoping to empower the courts is relatively 
weak, it may seek to insert vague statutory language which will likely result in the courts 
determining the statutes meaning.  Again, once judicial policy-making is likely, the 
dominant wing, if it is the wing seeking judicial supervision, increases the chances that 
their core preferences will be protected by the Supreme Court.  If it is the minority wing 
seeking judicial protection, it may gain some measure of protection from the lower levels 
of the federal judiciary.  However, minority wings rarely win on highly divisive issues 
that come before the Supreme Court.  The result for the national coalition, though, is, 
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again, creating greater stability than without the safety of the judiciary.   
 When a salient issue arises on which the party-in-power is divided and the 
dominant wing seeks change but faces minority wing obstruction in Congress, the 
dominant wing may seek to use its hold on the presidency to request judicial policy-
making within this area.  The dominant wing can use the Solicitor Generals Office to 
circumvent minority wing obstruction by asking the courts to render policy from the 
bench.  This avoids a direct legislative clash between the dominant and minority wings of 
the party-in-power, which would otherwise create great internal pressure and, likely, 
fracture the partys national coalition.  Thus, if the executive branch requests judicial 
action, it creates the possibility that the dominant wing will secure a greater number of its 
preferences and continue to hold power.  Direct attempts at overcoming minority wing 
obstruction in the legislature would likely not bear less legislative fruit and harm party 
solidarity. 
 Members of the minority wing are unlikely to gain many direct benefits from the 
executive requesting judicial intervention.  The Supreme Court will likely favor dominant 
wing preferences to the detriment of the minority wing.  Yet, the minority wing certainly 
benefits from avoiding a legislative confrontation with its brethren wing since elected 
officials aligned with the minority wing benefit from power-holding in the distribution of 
goods and securing its preferences on issues that garner greater consensus within the 
party.   
 Finally, there are times when party interests may be best served by deferring 
salient, divisive issues to the courts.  When a partys hold on power is particularly 
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vulnerable or a party is attempting to consolidate power, the party may agree to allow the 
courts to play the primary role in defining policy in this area.  Active issue deference is 
particularly likely when the dominant wing of the party is not looking to significantly 
alter existing policy as the Supreme Court is unlikely to deviate significantly from 
dominant wing preferences.  Thus, the dominant wing benefits from judicial policy-
making by securing its preferences and increasing its partys ability to secure and hold 
national power.   
 The minority wing, again, is unlikely to fair as well.  Unless a sizable portion of 
the party is willing to support the appointment of jurists who favor changing policy on 
the issue(s) currently deferred to the judiciary, policy is unlikely to swing in such a way 
that would be consistent with minority wing preferences.  Much as in the case of 
executive requests for judicial intervention, any benefit for the minority wing flows from 
the fact that elected officials from the minority wing benefit from membership in the 
party-in-power and those officials can easily shift blame for policy outcomes onto the 
courts.  In such cases, issues deferred to the courts become judicialized and debate on 
the issue often center on judges and judicial philosophies.  Minority wing voters tend to 
express high levels of frustration with the national judiciary while loyally supporting the 
party that appointed many of those same judges to the bench. 
 As the various strategies above suggest, the courts play an imperative role in 
partisan compromise.  These compromises usually favor the dominant wing of the party-
in-power but benefits accrue to all members of the party through the partys continued 
hold over national power.  Given that the dominant wing of the party-in-power accrues 
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greater opportunity for policy victories and continued power-holding, the strategy of 
using the courts as a means of stabilizing the party will likely be initiated principally by 
the dominant wing.   
 The focus the judicial strategy of the party-in-power does not deny the existence 
of other judicial strategies.  The party-out-of-power, interest groups, and individuals will 
likely have their own judicial strategies.  These strategies may compliment or conflict 
with the strategy of the party-in-power.  However, due to the likely ideological 
congruence of the court with the party-in-power, should the judicial strategy of other 
groups run counter to the preferences of the party-in-power, the chances of success are 
relatively low.  Efforts by organized labor to secure and protect workers rights during 
the first two decades of the Twentieth Century met with frequent frustration because the 
conservative Republican political order, which dominated American politics, had little 
sympathy for the highly progressive claims of organized labor.  On the flip side, when the 
preferences of other groups overlap with the preferences of the party-in-powers 
dominant wing, these litigation campaigns can be highly successful.  The NAACPs legal 
strategy became highly successful once the liberal wing of the Democratic Party 
ascended to power and African Americans became a vital member of the liberal wing of 
the Party.  Yet, since the focus of this dissertation is the way the party-in-power uses the 
national coalition to manage its national coalition and the impact this strategy has on the 
party following judicial decisions, the existence of other strategies bears little on the 
analysis below. 
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Case Selection 
 The following three chapters provide case studies of parties-in-power using the 
courts to manage their national coalition by empowering courts to resolve highly divisive, 
salient issues and the resulting impact judicial decisions have on the party.  All three 
cases occurred during the 20th Century.  Each study varies in the composition of the 
party-in-power, the issues and amount of authority delegated to the courts, and the degree 
of success achieved through this strategy.  However, the case studies are linked by a 
deliberative effort by members of the party-in-power attempting to maximize their ability 
to secure favorable policy outcomes and manage the national coalition that keeps them in 
power. 
 While the case studies examine a significant portion of the 20th Century, they are 
by no means comprehensive; nor are they meant to be.  Rather, each case examines how 
the party-in-power utilizes the courts to manage salient issues that cut across their 
national coalition.  The cases also demonstrate how the structure of the American party 
system has significant import on judicial policy-making authority and highlights the role 
the national judiciaryparticularly the Supreme Courtplays in regime politics.  These 
illustrations of judicial power in regime politics also underscores how the dynamic 
between parties and courts impacts the development of public policy and American 
institutions. 
 The periods examined are representative of the dynamic that occurs between 
parties and courts throughout American history.  The chapters are presented in 
chronological order, however, one is not dependent on the other.  Rather, each stems 
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from the nature of our political structure and the intercurrence that occurs among the 
institutions in that system.  The existence of an institutional pattern does not preclude 
political actors learning from the triumphs and mistakes of preceding political regimes.  
However, the study is primarily focused on the examination of the party-court dynamic 
through an institutional perspective.  Yet, even through an institutional perspective, the 
cases reveal significant variance within the dynamic.  In each of the studies, different 
actors in different governmental branches play the central role in extending judicial 
authority to avoid intra-party conflict.  In the same vein, the response of the Supreme 
Court varies significantly within and between each period of study.  Judicial actors were 
frequently caught between the demands of political allies and the norms, practices, and 
institutional constraints inherent in legal institutions.  Finally, the inability of the courts to 
successfully resolve the tensions inherent in heterogeneous national parties reveals that 
courts may be able to extend the life of a political order but they can not prevent the 
inevitable decay of all political regimes.  
 The following three chapters offer analysis on three discrete political orders, led 
by distinct political parties.  Each chapter offers a unique insight into party-court relations 
and the complex inter-institutional dynamic that exists under our constitutional system.  
Chapter 2 examines the Republican political order that coalesced during the mid-1890s 
and continued into the early 1930s.  This period reveals a heterogeneous Republican 
Party highly divided over issues of labor, national regulatory authority, and tariff reform.  
This case shows how a privileged coalition in the party-in-power can use the courts to 
protect their core policy commitments while giving the appearance of yielding to the 
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demands of other intra-party coalitions.  The case also shows how a party can use the 
courts to stabilize its coalitions following a rift in the party and a subsequent loss of 
power.  Finally, the Progressive Era was central to the development of the modern 
administrative state and this chapter displays how the relationship between the party-in-
power and the Supreme Court limited the development of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.   
 Chapter 3 explores the New Deal/Great Society Democratic Party from 
approximately 1938-1968.  The Democratic Party was marked by a significant divide 
between northern liberals and southern conservatives.  While this divide occurred on 
several dimensions, the chapter focuses on the effort by the dominant, liberal wing of the 
Party to liberalize racial policy, particularly in the South.  Entrenched southern 
conservatives made significant legislative action virtually impossible, therefore, the 
dominant wing used the courts to pursue a more egalitarian racial policy.  The liberal 
wings appeal to the courts during the mid-20th Century highlights an attempt to use the 
courts as an agent of progressive reform and, at the same time, as a means of liberalizing 
the Party by wooing African American voters who bolstered the liberal wing of the Party.  
Finally, this case also shows how the abandonment of a court-centered policy led to the 
fracture and eventual destruction of the Democratic political order.    
 Chapter 4 explores the contemporary Republican Party from 1980 through the 
present.  Divided government marks most of this period and, thereby, shows how the 
relationship between parties and courts is not wholly dependent on unified government.  
Rather, the Republican Party was able to use a series of presidential victories to place 
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jurists sympathetic to dominant wing preferences on the national judiciary.  The tension 
between the dominant economic conservative wing and the minority wing of social 
conservatives led to the channeling of social issues to the courts.  By removing the 
divisive social issues from the legislative agenda, libertine economic conservatives could 
pursue their economic agenda while acting to realize the social rights agenda.  In such 
areas as religion in school, gay rights, and abortion, the economic conservative 
Republicans have deferred significant policy-making authority to the national judiciary in 
order to appease the socially conservative wing of the Party and maintain party cohesion.  
The party-court dynamic created conditions ripe for the rise of a Republican political 
order. 
 Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by drawing several implications from the 
dynamic between parties and courts.   Specifically, it reconsiders party government in 
light of the courts as a means of stabilizing national coalitions.  Additionally, the role of 
the courts in a democratic political order is analyzed in light of the pattern of party-court 
interaction.  Finally, the relationship between the development of partisan and judicial 
power is explored. 
 These chapters will portray an underappreciated relationship between political 
parties and the judiciary.  The relationship is systemic, dynamic, and crucial to 
understanding both party politics and judicial behavior.  Moreover, the relationship is 
critical to understanding who gets what, when, and how under the American 
constitutional system.   
  27
 Finally, this dissertation reveals a greater need to study the role of courts in 
regime politics.  Frequently, courts and judges are treated as principle players in 
constitutional politics.  However, to truly elucidate a political jurisprudence, we must 
understand the political actors who benefit from judicial decision-making and how this 
can influence political outcomes over time.  While separation of powers is a defining 
feature of the American political system, diffusing power provides well-positioned 
political coalitions multiple means of achieving or stymieing change. 
 Political contests that end in the High Court tend to be matters of great political 
significance.  Winning politically does not guarantee winning legally; nor does winning 
in the courts assure that political victories outside the courts will immediately follow.  
However, the transfer of issues from the political arena to a legal one is significant for 
American politics and not just because of the policy outcomes.  Rather, judicial decisions 
significantly impact the American party system and the coalitions that make up those 
parties.  Those who hoped to tie nationally elected office to a collective political machine 
not only succeeded in linking national politics to local politics and the political branches 
with one another, but they also created a system that would link the vitality of party rule 
to the courts.   
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Chapter 2 
The Republican Party in the Progressive Era: Coalition 
Maintenance and Judicial Retrenchment 
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Formation of the Republican Party Coalition: The Election of 1896 
 American partisan politics experienced a dramatic shift during the 1890s.  
National elections from 1872 through 1896 were highly competitive.  The parties 
swapped control of the House five times, the Senate four times, and the presidency three 
times.  Yet, the national elections of 1894 and 1896 were critical realigning elections 
(Key 1955; Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1983; but see Pomper 1968).  Key coalitions 
within the Democratic Party abandoned their partisan moorings for the Republican Party.  
Moreover, the voters that began voting for the Republican Party in 1894 and 1896 
sustained their pattern of voting for a significant period of time.  The change in voting 
behavior brought a shift in the balance of power between the two major American parties 
and solidified a new Republican political order.   
 The realignment of the party system was not readily foreseen by political 
observers of the day.  The national government had been through a period of divided 
government and national elections had been exceedingly close.  The competitiveness of 
national elections led both parties to devote significant political resources to turning out 
partisan supporters on election day and securing their votes through patronage (Silbey 
1991, 151).  Commensurate with the distribution of patronage was the fight over 
expanding the pool of government benefits to distribute.  Many of the most significant 
fights in Congress in the 1880s and 1890s were over measures designed to broaden 
patronage, including maintaining and expanding tariff protection and the revenue it 
raised.  Such measures overwhelmingly favored the Republican Party as tariff surpluses 
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were largely allocated to Civil War pension programsa key source of Republican 
patronage (see Bensel 1984, 72-73; Skocpol 1992).   
As a counter to the Republican-dominated, pension-driven patronage system, the 
Democratic Party increasingly relied on its urban machines to secure electoral victories.  
The era is famous for boss dominated politics like that of Tammany Hall in New York.  
These urban party machines (usually Democratic) dolled out large amounts of patronage 
in return for electoral support.  The machines were so efficient and the patronage so 
desirable that the era boasted the highest levels of voter turnout in American history 
(Silby 1991, 144-147). 
 The influence of patronage, sectional disparities, and the competing ideological 
visions of the governments role in society elevated the level of party identification 
among voters.  Joel Silbey noted that throughout the mid-1800s, voters rarely abandoned 
their party.  In fact, he goes so far as to assert that [m]ost [voters] would as soon have 
changed their religion as their politics (1991, 171).  Throughout the latter half of the 
1800s, party identification was durable and sustained. 
 However, starting in 1892 and culminating in the election of 1896, Democrats in 
the Atlantic seaboard states began to leave the Democratic Party for the Republican 
Party.  Throughout the 1890s, the rising tide of populism led to a split in the Democratic 
Party in several border states and resulted in Kentucky, Maryland, and West Virginia 
swinging to the Republican Party.  Most importantly, the 2,000,000 individuals who 
voted for the first time in 1896 adopted the Republican Party and, arguably, sustained this 
voting pattern throughout the Progressive Era (Mayer 1967, 257). 
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►◄ 
In 1896, the Democratic Party firmly embraced the populist wing of their party 
and nominated William Jennings Bryan as their presidential candidate.  The national 
convention was an astonishing and complete victory for populist, free-silver Democrats.  
The convention, dominated by western populists, defeated a resolution commending the 
Cleveland administration, which backed the gold standard, (Sundquist 1983, 151) and 
crafted a platform that included demands for free and unlimited coinage of both silver 
and gold at current rates; an attempt to reenact the income tax and/or reconstitute the 
Supreme Court so that the income tax would pass constitutional scrutiny; greater powers 
to the Interstate Commerce Commission and such restriction and guarantees in the 
control of railroads as will protect the people from robbery and oppression (Porter and 
Johnson 1956, 98-99).  The convention was highlighted by Bryans famed Cross of 
Gold speech, which reportedly concretized populist sentiment. 
 In response, the Republican Party committed itself to an economic policy of 
international protectionism and domestic free enterprise.  Along with nominating William 
McKinley, a noted economic conservative with the self-titled McKinley Tariff to his 
credit, the convention adopted a platform with a series of planks dedicated to the Partys 
allegiance to the policy of protection, as the bulwark of American industrial 
independence, and the foundation of American development and prosperity (Porter and 
Johnson 1956, 107).  The platform also included a commitment to the gold standard and 
greater tariff protection for certain agricultural and manufacturing interests.  In fact, 
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protection of American industry and commitment to the gold standard became staples of 
Republican politics throughout the Progressive Era.   
 Yet, the Republicans owed their 1896 victory as much to what the Democrats 
advocated as to any plank in their own platform.  The Democratic Party overestimated 
the size and strength of the Populist movement, which they embraced by making free 
silver coinage the foundation plank of their platform.  A significant portion of the 
American population still lived in the Northeastern and Midwestern portions of the 
country.  The areas actively agitating for silver (and other populist policies) were sparsely 
populated, rural sections of the country that, while politically mobilized, did not have the 
number of voters as the areas back east.   
 Additionally, the Democratic Party misjudged the middle class response to its 
embrace of populist monetary policy.  While it was clear that banks and business opposed 
increasing the monetary supply through silver as raising the monetary supply favored 
debtors over creditors, the middle class did not stand to lose as much as banking and 
other creditor interests.  However, as Richard Hofstadter noted, The middle classes, 
which often took seriously the hysterical literature describing the Populists as anarchists 
or socialists, either ridiculed or feared them (1968, 99).  Such fears were fed by the likes 
of Mark Hanna and the Republican national committee, which spent twice as much 
during the presidential campaign of 1896 than it had in 1892 (Mayer 1967, 252), much of 
it on campaign pamphlets designed to elevate concerns over the monetary issue.  Eastern 
and midwestern middle class voters became increasingly uncomfortable with Bryan at the 
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head of the Democratic Party and his use of  populist rhetoric that placed the free silver 
issue above all others. 
 Further, the Populist-Democrats overestimated class identity as a unifying force 
throughout the country.  Populists did not distinguish between farmers and industrial 
labor as they were both members of the same socio-economic strata.  However, class 
failed to unify voting interests (as it has always failed in the United States) even to the 
point where farmers did not vote as a block.  Eastern farmers who had acute problems 
and discontents of their own, looked upon Western farmers as competitors and enemies 
(Hofstadter 1968, 99). The absence of working class unity and sectional cohesion within 
the agricultural vote ensured a poor showing by the Democratic Party in the national 
elections. 
 The failure of the Democratic Party to unify working class farmers and labor, 
western and eastern agricultural interests, and maintain their dominance of the urban vote 
resulted in a realignment that brought a new Republican regime to power which 
dominated national politics for more than three decades.  The coalition of big business, 
manufacturing interests, labor, eastern agriculture, and the Protestant middle class formed 
the pillars of the Republican Party.  However, as might be deduced from the list, the 
Republican Party was not uniform in their interests.  Western expansionists in the 1870s 
suffered significantly due to over-expansion, land speculation, drought, low agricultural 
prices, and depressed conditions in the silver-mining industry.  These conditions gave rise 
to a politics of progressive reformism among Republican leaders in western states. The 
element of western progressive reform was frequently at odds with the conservative 
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northeastern Republican agenda. With the realignment of 1894-1896 bringing western 
progressives into the Republican Party, Party leaders had to figure out a way of dealing 
with divisive issues while holding a firm grip on power.   
 
The Dividing Lines 
 The division in the Republican Party comes into sharp focus by looking at 
regulation of railroads, trusts, and the tariff.  In each of these issues, the Republican Party 
was internally divided between the conservative hardliners and progressive insurgents.  
Conservatives favored minimal regulation of the railroads except where it favored the 
interests of railroad carriers, regulation of monopolies only where significant harm 
resulted from restraints on trade, and high tariffs to protect American industry and 
support the pension system.  On the flip side, progressives believed all three issues were 
interrelated in that tariffs enabled and protected certain trusts and large railroad 
companies had near monopolistic control over certain areas of the country.  The only 
remedy to these perceived ills was ample regulation of the railroad carrier lines to protect 
Midwestern shipper interests, destruction of trusts wherever they existed, and downward 
reform of the national tariff. 
As the dominant wing of the party, controlling the presidency and wielding 
considerable influence in the House and Senate, conservative Republicans did little to 
address the issue of trusts and even less to enforce the laws on the books.  President 
McKinley was highly complacent toward trusts and benefited greatly from generous 
campaign contributions by big business in both 1896 and 1900.  In McKinleys 1900 
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presidential acceptance letter, he dedicated two paragraphs out of ten pages to the trust 
issue.  In those two paragraphs, he managed to weakly proclaim that the combination of 
capital should be made the subject of prohibitory or penal legislation (as quoted in 
Geering 1998, 67) but he offered no suggestions or recommendations.  McKinleys 
position no doubt pleased both business interests and eastern Republicans who 
consistently aligned with their corporate constituents.  However, western members of the 
Grand Old Party (GOP) did not share in the same benefits and viewed the trust issue quite 
differently. 
 To members of the minority, progressive wing within the Republican Party, trusts 
were responsible for practically every important inequity in contemporary American 
life (Holt 1967, 11).  Perhaps most importantly in the West, the rising cost of living, 
which caused great hardship during the period of declining agricultural prices, was 
attributed to the so-called money interests.  Progressives believed that the solution to 
the rise of private, corporate power was the assertion of public power.  However, beyond 
knowing that government was part of the solution, progressives were much less certain as 
to how to remedy the ills of the trusts.  A few radicals proposed state ownership of certain 
industries, such as coal mining and the railroads, however, progressives were not 
socialists and were sufficiently uncomfortable with state ownership of property to 
virtually eliminate this option.  The most favored and most realized proposals tended to 
be regulatory legislation designed to oversee the monopolistic practice in question. 
 Nowhere is this trend more evident than in the regulation of the railroads.  As 
early as 1884, the New York Times declared railroads were grinding monopolies that 
  36
could be regulated in the minutest particulars by Congress.10  The persistence and 
growth of consolidating railroad lines under the control of a few powerful companies 
heightened concerns of a monopolistic hold over the nations primary source of 
transportation.  Fears were particularly strong in the West, a region that depended on the 
railroads to ship agricultural products to population centers in the East and overseas.  As 
Robert M. LaFollette declared in 1905, The railway business of this country has become 
a monopoly in fact.11  LaFollette later summarized the driving force of western 
progressive fears, Fares made by the railway company are made by a party prejudiced in 
its own interests, and therefore, certain to be unjust to the public.12 
 Progressive interest in curtailing the monopolistic practices of railroad companies 
was both a revolt from status quo corporate practice and an affirmation of American 
commercialism.  Regulatory schemes were revolutionary insofar as they were able to 
change the beliefs of railroad men that national regulation was superior to the cutthroat 
competition of unregulated, free market competition (Kolko 1965, 207).  Yet, the 
revolution of national regulation advocated by progressive Republicans was tempered by 
the fact that most of the initiatives affirmed the American belief in private ownership and 
capitalistic competition.  Even radical legislative proffers tended to propose setting 
definite (not just maximum) shipping rates and fines for every day of noncompliance 
with an Interstate Commerce Commission order.13  These proposals are a far cry from the 
                                                
10 New York Times December 20, 1884, 4. 
11 LaFollette, Robert M. Fair Railroad Regulation. Saturday Evening Post March 4, 1905. 
12 LaFollette, Robert M. Fair Railroad Regulation. Saturday Evening Post April 15, 1905. 
13 Both of these measures were proposed in the Quarles Bill (S. 2439) in 1903.  The measure passed the 
House but failed in the Senate. 
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public ownership of the railroads demanded by certain leftist political groups.14 
 While most elected officials during the early part of the 20th Century agreed that 
monopolies could be regulated, they did not agree on much else including whether they 
always should be regulated.  Whereas progressives were willing to regulate monopolies 
wherever they occurred, the conservative wing of the Republican Party was much more 
tempered.  Naturally occurring monopolies were a product of the market and, therefore, 
acceptable (Broderick 1989, 20).  [T]he Republican Partys general position was that 
firms could grow horizontally or vertically to whatever extent they were capable as long 
as trade was not illegally restrained (Geering 1998, 68).  Moreover, government 
intrusion on natural outcomes of the market was an egregious use of government 
authority over legal activities. 
 In placing the trust issue in the context of the railroads, the issue became even 
more complex due to the ideological, political, and personal ties between the railroads 
and conservative Republicans.  Old Guard Republicans believed the economic health of 
the nation was intrinsically linked to the health of the railroads.  This belief was well 
justified as [r]ailroad capital represented one-seventh of national wealth (Ely 2001, 
225).  The hardliners economic philosophy made for a natural alignment of railroad 
interests with eastern Republicans, which gave the Party an important financial and 
electoral advantage over the Democratic opposition.  Many leading Republican elected 
officials also had strong financial ties to the railroads, although the effect of such ties is 
unclear. 
                                                
14 The Socialist Party called for public ownership of the railroads in all of its party platforms from 1900 
through 1920 (see Porter and Johnson 1956, 128; 142; 165; 189; 211; and 240) 
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 When it came to regulating monopolistic combinations and practices by the 
railroads, the conservative wing of the Republican Party only supported regulatory 
measures when one of three factors was involved.  First, the railroads actively supported 
the proposed governmental regulation and, thereby, secured the support of the 
conservative wing of the Party.  As noted above, during the late 19th Century and early 
20th Century, railroad companies began to see governmental regulation as the cure for 
certain commercial ills and not just as an obstacle to profit maximization. Governmental 
regulation could alleviate some of the burdens of unregulated competition and the 
constant drive toward consolidation (Ely 2001, 225).  Regulation helped protect 
smaller railroad operations from larger corporate predators.  Moreover, larger railroad 
lines could engage in practices others could not.  For example, rebating15 was used most 
effectively by the largest and most wealthy lines.  Small carriers also used rebating but 
these lines were more vulnerable to bankruptcy as they did not have the financial 
resources to survive sustained losses.  Rebating provided incentives for the largest 
shippers to use certain carrier lines.  However, the practice significantly cut into carrier 
profit margins to the ire of railroad executives.  The market alone was unable to arrest 
rebating for as soon as one line provided a rebate, the others had to match their 
competitors prices in order to compete.  The result was an economic race to the bottom 
that saw many lines fold as a result. Prohibitory governmental regulation on rebating was 
the only remedy that offered hope to curtail or eliminate the process. 
                                                
15 Rebates are departures from published rate schedules used as incentives by railroad companies to entice 
large shipping companies to use their lines.  Two rebating practices were common: public and private.  
Public rebates were a common feature of rate wars designed to openly drive competing railroad lines out of 
business.  Private rebates were given as a special, particular, and secret benefit to the same ends of 
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 Second, conservatives supported federal regulation as [s]tate regulation [began] 
to grow more cumbersome, and was less controllable and more unpredictable than federal 
regulation (Kolko 1965, 89).  Not only did the sheer number of states and the diversity 
of regulatory laws make business practices exceedingly complex but, perhaps more 
disconcerting to the railroad industry, progressive politics dominated several middle and 
western states.  These states began to pass increasingly intrusive measures that carriers 
deemed harmful to business practices.  Conservative Republicans hoped that the 
promotion of limited federal regulation would eliminate more intrusive state regulatory 
schemes.  Federal regulation was a way to retrench policies less hostile to the interests of 
the railroads. 
 The final factor in securing the support of the conservative wing of the 
Republican Party was to include strong judicial oversight of the regulatory practice or, in 
some other way, ensure that the courts would be involved in administrative supervision 
and policy formation.  Throughout the first thirty years of the 20th Century, the Supreme 
Court was predominantly a conservative institution.  Economically conservative 
presidents nominated like-minded jurists who were confirmed by a free enterprise-
dominated Senate.  It should come as no surprise that the Republican political order 
resulted in conservative judicial outcomes.  Adding to the conservative tendency was the 
dominant jurisprudential thought that distinguished between valid economic regulation 
and invalid class legislation (Gillman 1993, 10).  The rapid expansion of the state and 
novel employment of state power (both proposed and actuated) often struck the courts as 
paternalistic intrusions on economic freedom designed to favor one group over another.  
                                                                                                                                            
market domination (Ripley 1927, 188). 
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Judicial resistance to rapid regulatory change was not unique to the federal judiciary.  
During this same period, state courts struck down a significant number of state 
regulations and issued thousands of injunctions to protect the interests of corporate 
America (Foner 1998, 123).  In the early 20th Century, the rule of law seemingly 
contradicted progressive preferences and was generally resistance to rapid change.  Given 
the inhospitable nature of American jurisprudence, the courts made an ideal ally for the 
conservative wing of the Republican Party when its economic preferences were 
threatened. 
 To show how the conflict between conservative and progressives played out 
within the Republican Party, we must turn to specific examples of railroad regulation.  
First, the Elkins Act of 1903 provides an illustration of railroad legislation proposed and 
supported by conservatives at the bequest of railroad companies.  Following 1903, 
spurred by Teddy Roosevelts shift toward progressivism, conservatives faced an 
increasing drive by progressives to provide greater regulatory authority to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission.  This increase in progressive agitation led to greater instability 
within the Republican Party and a growing number of threats to defect from the Party if it 
did not act to regulate perceived monopolistic ills.  The Hepburn Act of 1906 and the 
Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 represented regulatory legislation that sat uncomfortably with 
the conservative wing of the Party.  However, faced with the possibility of splintering the 
Party if they ardently resisted the measures, conservatives were willing to capitulate to 
progressive demands once judicial oversight was assured.  Finally, after progressives 
defected from the Republican Party following the battle over tariff reform, conservatives 
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again turned to the courts to protect their economic policy preferences while seemingly 
capitulating to progressive demands in order to minimize the difference between the two 
coalitions and heal the rift in the Republican Party. 
 
Elkins Act of 1903 
 At the turn of the 20th Century, the nations larger railroad companies and banks 
controlled approximately two-thirds of the national railway lines (Kolko 1965, 88).  The 
threat of monopoly caused great concern among shippers and agricultural interests.  
However, despite seemingly oligopolistic operations, the industry remained fiercely 
competitive to the point where businesses were willing to limit profits to drive 
competitors out of business.  The principle means of achieving such ends was the rebate.  
When carrier lines provided rebates, they were able to provide an incentive to large 
shippers to exclusively use their lines and, conversely, not use competitor lines.  Rebates 
were both the principle means of achieving near monopolistic control over a particular 
railway line and a significant contributor to declining profit margins that frequently 
pushed certain, usually smaller, railways to the point of bankruptcy. 
 In 1900, Stephen B. Elkins became the chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Interstate Commerce.  Senator Elkins was the co-owner of the West Virginia Central and 
Pittsburgh Railroad16 and a long time advocate for railroad interests.  Shortly after taking 
the chairmanship, Elkins was met by urgent appeals to curtail the evil use of rebates 
and discriminations (Lambert 1955, 261).  Dealing with the rebate issue was unique as 
                                                
16 Elkins co-owned the West Virginia Central and Pittsburgh Railroad until 1902 when he and his father-in-
law, Henry G. Davis, sold it to B & O Railroad. 
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there was virtually no opposition.  Large railroads supported the abolition of rebating as it 
was the only mechanism smaller lines could use to lure large shippers away from them.  
Small railroads frequently got into bidding wars with on another, which was sufficiently 
harmful to their profitability that it drove many lines out of business.  Shipping and 
agricultural interests were sufficiently agitated about the threat of monopoly that they saw 
any attempt to regulate trusts as a step in the right direction.   
 In 1902, Senator Elkins introduced the Anti-Rebating bill (also known as the 
Elkins bill), which was largely written by the Pennsylvania Railroad (Kolko 1965, 95).  
The measure tightened the prohibition of rebates by making companies and individuals 
liable for rebating activity up to $20,000.  Both railroads and shippers could be 
prosecuted for giving or receiving rebates.  However, the Elkins bill failed to include 
three progressive provisions and these omissions reveal the bills conservative nature.  
First, the bill did not give the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the authority to set 
shipping rates.  The power to set rates was left in the hands of the railroads, which were 
only required to publish their rates in advance of sale.  Second, Elkins had excluded from 
the bill the possibility of imprisonment for violating ICC rebating decisions, which had 
been favored by progressive members of the Party and garnered criticism shortly 
following its passage (Lambert 1955, 261).  Third, the measure did not provide the ICC 
with the power to fine railroads directly.  Instead, upon reasonable grounds the ICC 
could go to a federal circuit court to try the case and enforce the appropriate rates.  
Judicial review had always been a requisite for the support of railroad companies (Kolko 
1965, 89) and the Elkins bill did not fail to include this provision.   
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Despite what amounted to a conservative regulatory bill, progressives eventually 
supported the bill when they recognized that progressive alternatives would not pass the 
Senate.17  With the support of both conservatives and progressives, the Elkins Anti-
Rebating Act passed the House with only six votes in opposition and the Senate entirely 
without dissent.  President Roosevelt quickly signed the bill into law in February of 1903.  
While the Elkins Act enjoyed significant support among railroad men, shippers, 
conservatives, and progressives, there were a few dissenting voices.  The dissent 
stemmed, not from what the Act did, but from the motivations that drove regulatory 
activity.  As the Commercial and Financial Chronicle wrote, The whole movement 
against the railroads is predicated . . . on the idea that they are extremely prosperous and 
that some of their profits might as well be taken from them and appropriated for the 
benefit of shippers and the general public.   
For its part, the Supreme Court quickly rendered a decision in favor of large 
railroad lines.  In a labored opinion, Justice White ordered an action against Missouri 
Pacific Railroad Company back to the circuit court for further proceedings rather than 
uphold the circuit courts injunction against Missouri Pacifics rate charges between St. 
Louis and Wichita, which far exceeded other freight charges for similar distances.18  
Oddly, the Court rendered their decision despite the fact that Missouri Pacific admitted 
unreasonable rate discrimination in its demurrer.  Yet, despite upholding the circuit 
courts dismissal of the demurrer, the Court still ordered a new trial.  As Justice Brewer 
noted in dissent, the Court essentially crafted a ruling that rendered the government 
                                                
17 Friction over Trust Bill. New York Times February 7, 1903, 3. 
18 Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. United States, 189 U.S. 274 (1903). 
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powerless to compel the carriers to discharge their statutory duty[.]19  The New York 
Times unequivocally declared the railroads the victors under the Elkins Act.20   
With the courts actively protecting the interests of carrier lines, the real danger of 
the Elkins Act was not its anti-rebating scheme.  Rather, as conservatives would realize 
later, the revitalization of the ineffective Interstate Commerce Commission led 
progressives to argue that the Elkins Act was precedent for more regulatory legislation.  
Progressive Republicans soon began to agitate for new legislation that would further 
empower the Interstate Commerce Commission.  
 
The Growing Divide 
 In the years following the passage of the Elkins Act, there was wide recognition 
that the Act failed to address fundamental inadequacies of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.  Yet, despite growing agitation among progressives to rein in corporate 
power, they still had to overcome conservative control over the Party and legislative 
agendas in order to secure passage of legislation designed to increase governmental 
oversight.  The frustration felt by insurgent Republicans grew as the Democratic Party 
increasingly claimed the progressive agenda for themselves and produced tangible 
evidence for such claims.  The 1904 platforms of both Parties provide an important 
illustration.  The Democratic platform included a plank calling for an enlargement of the 
powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, to the end that the traveling public and 
shippers of this country may have prompt and adequate relief from the abuses to which 
                                                
19 Ibid. at 291.   
20 Decision Favors Railroad. New York Times March 10, 1903, 5. 
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they are subjected in the matter of transportation (Porter and Johnson 1956, 132).  In 
contrast, despite a progressive push for greater reform and regulation, the Republican 
Partys platform contained only a weak affirmation of the Elkins Act and omitted any 
course for future regulatory activity (Porter and Johnson 1956, 138). 
 The Old Guard was able to thwart progressive efforts to modify the platform, but 
they miscalculated the extent of Roosevelts desire and drive to reel in bad trusts.  In 
the first 3 ½ years of his presidency, Roosevelt proved more progressive on the trust issue 
than his predecessor; a fact that had troubled members of the conservative bloc since 
Roosevelts nomination as vice president.21  In 1902, Roosevelt officially signaled his 
departure from lax governmental oversight of trusts and corporate power, both consistent 
with McKinleys hard-line conservativism, by instructing his Attorney General, Philander 
C. Knox, to launch a suit to dissolve the Northern Securities Company under the long 
neglected Sherman Antitrust Act. 
 While Roosevelt was certainly much more progressive than any of his Republican 
predecessors to hold the White House, he was hardly a radical progressive.  Instead, 
Roosevelt embodied much of the ideological strain within the Party.  On the issue of 
trusts and their regulation, Roosevelt held a position that was quite similar to the one 
espoused by arch-conservative Mark Hanna, which was, in reality, a moderate position in 
that he rejected a monolithic understanding of monopolies.  Government intrusion on 
natural outcomes of the market would be an egregious use of government authority over 
legal activities, even if those natural outcomes produced a monopoly.  However, 
                                                
21 Shortly after McKinleys assassination, Mark Hanna, a hardline conservative, exploded,  I told William 
McKinley it was a mistake to nominate that wild man at Philadelphia . . . Now look, that damned cowboy is 
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consistent with the progressive understanding of monopolies, certain trusts resulted from 
illegitimate interference (including governmental interference) with the market 
equilibrium.  Monopolies achieved through manipulation of the market were ripe for 
busting as the government needed to undo that which it achieved through illegitimate 
means.22  Thus, Roosevelts support for good monopolies and hostility toward bad 
monopolies made him more progressive than conservatives would have liked but more 
conservative than progressives would have liked. 
 Of course, Roosevelts moderation in the executive branch created a difficulty for 
the Republican Party when it came to setting the Party agenda.  Under McKinley, 
progressive reform was highly unlikely as conservatives occupied veto points in the 
White House and in the Senate.  However, under Roosevelt, progressives believed fate 
improved their standing within the Party and Roosevelts bully pulpit leadership style 
could lead to a more progressive agenda despite their minority status within the Party.  
On the flip side, conservatives realized their once unquestioned control over the Party 
                                                                                                                                            
President of the United States (as quoted in Mayer 1967, 272). 
22 Evidence of Roosevelts philosophy on monopolies and government regulation can be seen in his famous Square 
Deal speech: 
 
In his turn, the capitalist who is really a conservative, the man who has forethought as well as patriotism, should 
heartily welcome every effort, legislative or otherwise, which has for its object to secure fair dealing by capital, 
corporate or individual, toward the public and toward the employee . . .  
 
There must be ever present in our minds the fundamental truth that in a republic such as ours the only safety is to stand 
neither for nor against any man because he is rich or because he is poor, because he is engaged in one occupation or 
another, because he works with his brains or because he works with his hands. We must treat each man on his worth 
and merits as a man. We must see that each is given a square deal, because he is entitled to no more and should receive 
no less . . . . 
 
Finally, we must keep ever in mind that a republic such as ours can exist only by virtue of the orderly liberty which 
comes through the equal domination of the law over all men alike, and through its administration in such resolute and 
fearless fashion as shall teach all that no man is above it and no man below it. 
 
"A Square Deal," at the N.Y. State Agriculture Association, Sep. 7, 1903. 
Available at http://www.pbs.org/greatspeeches/timeline/#1900. (Visited on June 3, 2004) 
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slipped with McKinleys assassination but, especially during Roosevelts first few years 
in office, believed that the leadership of the conservative bloc could temper the 
Presidents more progressive impulses.  The reality was that Roosevelt straddled the 
conservative-progressive divide for most of his presidency leaving both wings of the 
Party without presidential control.23   Roosevelts presidency represented one of the few 
enigmatic periods in American political history when the dominant wing of the party-in-
power did not count the president as a definitive member of its ranks.  
Following the 1904 election, Roosevelt became decidedly more concerned with 
growing national discontent over shipping rates on railroad carrier lines.  In his annual 
message to Congress, Roosevelt requested the passage of legislation that vested the 
Interstate Commerce Commission with the power to decide, subject to judicial review, 
what shall be a reasonable rate.24  Progressive Republicans in the House met Roosevelts 
proposals with applause.25  However, the dominant, conservative wing of the Party 
initially proved quite resistant to the idea, as demonstrated by the inability of progressives 
to add a plank to the 1904 Republican platform calling for increased railroad regulation.  
Conservative resistance to extensive railway regulation effectively allied Roosevelt with 
western progressives on the rate regulation issue, for the first time, forcing conservatives 
to resist significant regulatory reform with executive pressure working against their 
interests. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
23 Roosevelt is too often remembered as a highly progressive president, a fact the historical record does not 
support.  While he was the most progressive Republican president to date and oversaw several important 
reform measures, his shift to the left following his departure from the White House has left a progressive 
cast to his legacy that his presidential record does not support. 
24 President Roosevelts Message. Wall Street Journal December 7, 1904, 5. 
25 Read in Both Houses: Reception of the Presidents Message at Capitol. Washington Post December 7, 
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Hepburn Act of 1906 
 The House, where the progressive wing of the Republican Party was strongest, 
was quick to respond to Roosevelts call for regulatory action.  In 1905, the Esch-
Townsend bill passed the House by an overwhelming vote of 326 to 17.  The measure 
had several provisions designed to curtail the power of the railways and limit the extent 
to which large railway lines could expand their control.  Most significantly, the bill gave 
the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to set reasonable railroad rates that 
remained effective until set aside by court review.  The bill also created a transportation 
court to hear all railroad cases on review (Cushman 1941, 69).  One might question 
why the Esch-Townsend bill managed to pass with so few dissenting votes given that 
conservatives were so resistant to empower the ICC to regulate shipping rates.  The 
answer is in strong judicial review.  Throughout the debates over regulatory reform, 
conservatives in the House accepted some measure of administrative regulation so long 
as the legislation contained an explicit provision requiring judicial oversight of regulatory 
action.  The Esch-Townsend bill contained both provisions to empower the ICC, favored 
by progressives, and to have robust judicial review, favored by conservatives.   
 Despite the bills warm reception in the House, the Senate was not so 
accommodating.  As historian George E. Mowry wrote, the Esch-Townsend bill [met] 
with the determined opposition of the conservative phalanx [and] it was smothered in the 
dark recesses of the Committee on Interstate Commerce (1946, 24).  The Committee, 
chaired by the Old Guards own Stephen Elkins, viewed the bill unfavorably and Senator 
                                                                                                                                            
1904. 
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Aldrich, who led the conservative wing in the Senate, managed to bury the bill.  The 
legislative session expired without the bill making it out of Committee.   
Such may have been the fate of all regulatory bills if public pressure had not been 
increasingly stoked by the conjunction of four factors first identified by economist 
William Ripley (1927, 487-492).  First, railroad carrier lines rapidly consolidated.  
Second, coinciding with the growing consolidation, freight rates sharply and rapidly 
increased.  Third, a few men increasingly exercised financial control over the bulk of the 
railroad system.  Fourth, a series of public disclosures revealed the extent to which 
railroad rate discrimination spawned from the rise of industrial monopoly.  Public 
agitation over these issues led to an irresistible outpouring of public opinion (Harbaugh 
1973, 2084), which created conditions wherein the Republican Party had to prevent 
against party members in the electorate either demobilizing or defecting to an 
increasingly progressive Democratic Party. 
In 1906, William Peters Hepburn, chairman of the House Committee on Interstate 
Commerce, introduced a bill, supported by the White House, that empowered the ICC to 
set future maximum carrier rates following a complaint, alleging price rebating or 
gorging, filed with the Commission.   The measure was unanimously voted out of 
committee and passed by a staggering margin of 346 to 7 in the full House.  Even with 
the significant external pressures noted above, the margin of passage is surprising 
because the House was sufficiently malapportioned to perpetuate conservative 
domination of the House (Harbaugh 1973, 2088).  What makes the vote in the House all 
the more curious was the intense battle that occurred in the Senate.  Several scholars have 
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conjectured explanations for this oddity.  First, Kolko argued that House members had to 
concern themselves with the interests of the shippers and the people due to 
constituent politics (1965, 132).  The electoral incentive undoubtedly played a role, 
particularly in the South and West, but it is unclear why eastern congressmen, perennially 
aligned with railroad interests would suddenly benefit more by siding with the interests of 
shippers unless we account for the demands of continued partisan unity.  Second, 
Stephenson noted conservatives in the House looked to the Senate, the bulwark of 
conservativism, to kill the measure  a fate that befell much progressive legislation in the 
past (1971, 286).  While the logic of this explanation is sound, no direct evidence 
supports this hypothesis.  Finally, Speaker Joseph Canon likely secured party unity 
through the Republican machine in the House by including a provision for strong judicial 
review over ICC regulationa measure that took much longer to secure in the Senate.  
Whatever the case, the Hepburn bill met with significant resistance in the Senate.  
Yet, the fight over the bills passage should not be confused with uncertainty of its 
passage.  The confluence of events and pressures noted above formed the impetus for a 
cross-party coalition of progressive Republicans and Democrats that guaranteed 
legislative victory so long as the bill came to a final vote.  The real issue was the form of 
that victory.  In the Senate, this meant that much of the debate centered on conservative 
demands that the bill contain a strong grant of judicial review and enable the courts to 
define the extent of their own powers of review.   
Immediately after the bill was sent to the Senate Committee on Interstate 
Commerce, Senator Dolliver, a progressive from Iowa, offered a resolution that the bill 
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be accepted unmodified as it came from the House.  Several conservative committee 
members objected to this maneuver as they had planned to amend the bill and strengthen 
judicial oversight of regulatory activity.  Two conservative members of the Committee, 
Stephen Elkins and Joseph Foraker, even had bills of their own which they hoped to 
substitute for the Hepburn bill.  However, the Old Guard simply did not have enough 
votes to prevent the bill from leaving the committee unamended.  All five conservatives 
on the Committee voted against reporting the bill to the entire Senate but were squarely 
in the minority.26 
Perhaps more revealing than the conservative votes against reporting the bill was 
their reasoning.  All dissenting members of the Committee signed a statement explaining 
their votes.  In the words of Senator Aldrich, A majority of the Republican members of 
the Committee did not join in the favorable report . . . for the reason . . . that clear and 
adequate provision should have been made for subjecting the orders of the commission 
affecting rates to judicial review.27  But knowing that recalcitrance would only widen a 
growing divide between conservative and progressive Republicans, Aldrich concluded 
that if the bill was properly amended to provide for review, four of the five dissenting 
senators were ready to give their support to the House bill.28 
The majority of the ensuing debate on the Senate floor was over whether the 
Hepburn bill should include broad or narrow judicial review.  However, this debate 
over how extensive judicial oversight does not mask the real divide.  Progressives desired 
extensive administrative management of the railway system.  The Old Guard sought to 
                                                
26 Senators Aldrich, Crane, Elkins, Foraker, and Kean all voted against the measure in Committee.   
27 Congressional Record, vol. 40, 2969. 
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limit such control to those areas that benefited railroad companies or ensured fairness in 
the marketplace. Unable to limit legislation to the latter, the conservative wing of the 
Republican Party was forced to seek an institutional ally that could place restraints on the 
former.  Broad judicial review would likely bring limitations on administrative decisions 
and provide a sympathetic forum outside of the bureaucracy to challenge ICC decisions.  
The fundamental end game facing elected officials was determining the scope of the 
administrative state and the degree to which certain dimensions of the regulatory state 
would be privileged over others (see Skowronek 1982).  Conservatives wanted to ensure 
that strong judicial review would be privileged over bureaucratic regulatory schemes that 
would give reformists the final word. 
Upon reaching the Senate floor, progressive senators attempted to amend the 
Hepburn bill to limit judicial oversight while conservative senators proposed increasing 
judicial supervision and review.  Senator Joseph Bailey (D-TX), a progressive from the 
other side of the aisle, proposed an amendment that limited judicial review to only 
questions of legality and procedure so that substantive issues would be beyond judicial 
inquiry.  He also attempted to secure an amendment that prohibited judicial injunction of 
ICC rates prior to and during the review period.  Both proposals adversely impacted 
railroads, particularly the latter as it let the railroads suffer by having to lose charges 
while a case on appeal was being argued (Stephenson 1971, 297).   
These amendments met with conservative derision.  As Senator Aldrich stated, 
the proposition to make the decision of the commission final, without any possible 
chance to have the rights of the parties litigated or maintained by the courts was an 
                                                                                                                                            
28 Ibid. 
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infamous proposition (as quoted in Stephenson 1971, 299).  Yet, the infamous 
proposition had significant support outside of the Old Guard.  Twenty-six Democratic 
senators supported the Bailey amendment and leading Democrats believed as many as 20 
Republican senators would support the bill.29  However, the Democrats underestimated 
the Partys ability to work out a compromise that protected the interests of both 
conservatives and progressives.30  Ultimately, the lack of conservative support, questions 
about the constitutionality of the amendment, and Roosevelts untimely waffling on the 
amendment undid support for the progressive amendments and the measure failed by a 
vote of 23 to 54.31   
By the time the Bailey amendment was defeated, the Hepburn bill had been under 
consideration for two months with little progress toward passage.  As noted above, the 
Senate successfully killed many regulatory bills by deliberating them to death.  While 
still confident of the bills passage, supporters of the bill were increasingly aware that the 
legislative session ended in two months and they needed to bridge the divide over judicial 
review.  Roosevelt, more concerned with passing some measure of reform than being 
doctrinaire (Mowry 1960, 26), hosted several of the moderate progressives on March 
31.32  By the end of the meeting, Roosevelt had laid the groundwork for a compromise on 
                                                
29 Atlantic Constitution April 17, 1906, 1; April 19, 1906, 1. 
30 Compromise came from both the conservative and progressive wings.  On April 16th, Senator Hayburn 
(R-ID)widely considered a western moderate with progressive tendenciesproposed an amendment 
providing for the broadest review that has yet been proposed. Newspapers marveled at the conservative 
strategy of using western senators to secure Old Guard politics.  See Wants Broad Review. The 
Washington Post April 17, 1906, 4. 
31 Congressional Record, vol. 40, 6672. 
32 Senators in attendance included Dolliver, Allison, Cullom, Clap, and Long.  The inclusion of Senator 
Allison is somewhat surprising given he was a member of the arch-conservative bloc of Aldrich, Platt, 
Spooner, and Allison, sometimes referred to as The Four (see Stephenson 1971, 134).  However, Allisons 
home state of Iowa had great interest in regulatory action and may have been thought to be more willing to 
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judicial review by embracing conservative demands for broad powers of judicial review 
over ICC decisions (Kolko 1965, 139).    
Roosevelts compromise became more important to party unity as, from the 
March meeting until early May, frustrations mounted within the Republican Party.  The 
recalcitrant conservative wing increasingly agitated progressives by refusing to stipulate 
to anything but broad judicial review.  Conservatives were equally unhappy that reform 
was being pushed from within their own ranks.  Noting the games conservatives were 
playing, Senator Dolliver cuttingly remarked: 
Senators have begun speeches by denouncing the measure as 
unconstitutional and ended by declaring their purpose to vote for it, as if 
the proverb read, Be sure you are wrong, and then go ahead.  A Senator 
who is against the bill made a speech for it, while another who is for it 
made a speech against it.  A Senator who has gone over the measure three 
times in elaborate arguments finds no soundness in it, sees in every section 
the mangled remains of the Constitution, seriously proposes to take a little 
bill of his own and tuck it in tenderly by the side of these wicked and 
repugnant offenses against constitutional government as an alternative 
remedy.33 
 
In an attempt to heal the widening breach in the party, Roosevelt withdrew his support 
for anything short of broad judicial review (Mowry 1960, 26).34  With the Presidents 
refusal to support the progressives desire for minimal judicial oversight, conservatives 
moved to secure strong judicial oversight through an amendment proposed by Senator 
Allison.   
The Allison amendment, described as quite verbose and a little confusing 
(Fowler 1961, 347), was essentially the House version of judicial review except that it 
                                                                                                                                            
compromise than many other conservatives. 
33 Congressional Record, vol. 40, 6778. 
34 Roosevelt to Knute Nelson, April 11, 1906, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 209. 
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explicitly enabled the courts to define their own powers of review over ICC regulation.  
As Senator Long noted 
In my opinion, this bill as it came to us from the House without which I 
proposed, or with the amendment proposed by the Senator from Iowa [Mr. 
Allison] does not differ in any particular.  The extent of judicial 
interference with rates made by the Commission under the House bill 
unamended . . . under the amendment of the Senator from Iowa would be 
the same.35   
 
By this point, progressives were happy to get as much as they could and, LaFollette aside, 
were willing to support the Allison amendment.  Once the amendment was formally 
attached to the Hepburn bill, conservative resistance dissipated and the bill passed the 
Senate 71 to 3.  Roosevelt signed the bill into law on June 29, 1906. 
 Without a close examination of the legislative history of the Hepburn Act, it 
appears as if there was wide-sweeping support for such regulatory reform.36  However, as 
noted above, public pressure created conditions wherein some form of regulatory 
legislation needed to be passed in order for the Republicans to maintain their hold on 
power.  Therefore, conservatives who opposed such regulatory action were forced to find 
a way to protect their preferences and mitigate against the growing divide within the 
Party that threatened the very fabric of the Republican political order that had existed for 
nearly a decade.  The Hepburn Act did just this but left much of the ICCs new powers 
                                                
35 Congressional Record, vol. 40, 6687. 
36 Kolko makes this argument, stating, The votes in the Hepburn Bill in both the House and Senate were 
nearly unanimous.  Unless one maintains that the railroads were totally powerless politically, which was 
hardly the case, the votes for the Hepburn Bill can only be understood as an indication that enough 
important railroads essentially backed the measure, or were neutral toward it, to make such an 
overwhelming vote possible (1965, 148).  However, Ely counters citing, Railroad companies, in fact, 
were adamantly opposed to giving the ICC rate-making authority (2001, 226).  Kolko only considered one 
dimension of the political debate: Support or opposition to rate regulation.  As we have seen, there are 
multiple political considerations within the debates over the Hepburn bill including policy and partisan 
cohesion.  Incorporating these multiple considerations helps frame the debate with greater accuracy. 
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subject to judicial oversight through the Acts grant of broad judicial review.  As we will 
now show, the Supreme Court largely endorsed and secured conservative preferences in a 
series of rulings.   
 
The Hepburn Act Before the Court 
 Conservative wing reliance on the judiciary proved a successful venture.  In a 
series of rulings, the Supreme Court held true to conservative policy with only slight 
deviation.  While a few conservatives would have been happier if the Court had struck 
down the Hepburn Act, something the Court never embraced, most believed that 
Congress acted within established constitutional bounds when it delegated regulatory 
authority to the ICC.  With constitutional nullification out of the picture, conservatives 
hoped that the court would carefully monitor ICC rulings and protect free enterprise 
wherever possible.  The Court seemed happy to comply. 
 In 1910, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the ICCs newly established 
powers.  In ICC v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,37 the Court gave a nod to progressive 
reform by upholding the ICCs power to regulate the distribution of freight cars.  The 
Court signaled limited deference to the Commission by declaring that it would not, 
under the guise of exerting judicial power, usurp merely administrative functions by 
setting aside a lawful administrative order upon our conception as to whether the 
administrative power has been wisely exercised.38  However, the Court rejected the 
ICCs assertion that the courts must treat the railroad company as being at fault for the 
                                                
37 215 U.S. 452 (1910). 
38 Ibid. at 470. 
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failure to daily deliver all the cars called for in times of car shortage.39   
On the whole, Illinois Central Railroad was a mixed bag.  The Court announced 
that it would not oversee every last administrative ruling crafted by the ICC, recognizing 
a political and administrative need for the ICC in regulating the flow of commerce.  
However, by rejecting the ICCs rule that privileged shippers over carriers, the Court 
signaled that it would not allow the ICC to use its new powers over rate regulation to 
create new legal presumptions regarding the culpability of railroad companies.  In an 
important test of ICC regulatory authority, the Court affirmed the power of the ICC to 
regulate shipping rates but also signaled its unwillingness to allow the ICC to craft policy 
wholly at odds with conservative economic preferences.  The New York Times reported 
the matter as a victory for the ICC but noted that it was a very limited victory.40 
 In years following, the Supreme Court used the Hepburn Act in ways that more 
obviously favored conservative policy.  Specifically, the Court used the Acts expansion 
of federal power to exclude state regulationthe level at which the most progressive 
regulation occurred.  In Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Harwick 
Farmers Elevator Co,41 the Court stripped the states of regulatory authority.  Chief 
Justice White asserted: 
It must follow in consequence of [the Hepburn Act] that the power of the 
State over the subject-matter ceased to exist from the moment that 
Congress exerted its paramount and all embracing authority over the 
subject. We say this because the elementary and long settled doctrine is 
that there can be no divided authority over interstate commerce and that 
the regulations of Congress on that subject are supreme.42 
                                                
39 Ibid. at 471. 
40 Coal Roads Lose Suit. New York Times January 11, 1910, 2. 
41 226 U.S. 426 (1913). 
42 Ibid. at 435. 
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The Court affirmed the limitations on the state in Charleston & Western Carolina 
Railway Co. v. Varnville,43 holding [t]hat [the absence of conflict] is immaterial. When 
Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand[,] coincidence is as ineffective 
as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther 
than Congress has seen fit to go.44  In both cases, progressive state measures were 
nullified for more business-friendly ICC regulations. 
 As can be seen in the few cases cited above, the Supreme Court effectively 
facilitated the Republican Partys compromise.  By refusing to strike down the Hepburn 
Act on constitutional grounds, the Court upheld the progressive legislative victory.  
However, by limiting the degree of regulatory authority of the ICC and striking down 
progressive regulatory measures at the state level, the Court breathed new life into 
conservative economic and regulatory preferences.  It was not a perfect victory for either 
side but, given the constraints of the governing Republican Party coalition, it was the 
greatest success possible.  
►◄ 
 The Hepburn Act did not quell the progressive impulse for greater regulation of 
the railways.  The success of progressives in the West only heightened the strength of 
progressives in the Republican Party.  Reform governors such as Robert M. LaFollette 
(Wisconsin), Albert Cummins (Iowa), Coe Crawford (South Dakota), and Hiram Johnson 
(California) rose to political power based on vigorous attacks on the railroads.  In his 
gubernatorial inaugural address, Governor Johnson called for greater regulatory control 
                                                
43 237 U.S. 597 (1915). 
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over the railway systems in California by empowering the states Railroad Commission 
and dismissing the bogie man of unconstitutionality that conservative opponents used 
as their primary reason for opposing such measures (Lower 1993, 29).45   
The growing strength, size, and momentum of the Republican Partys progressive 
wing gave them greater influence over intra-party policies.  Recall in 1904 that the 
Partys platform made no mention of support for increased railroad regulation.  In 1908, 
progressives were able to secure a plank endorsing the passage of the Hepburn Act and 
hinting at support for more regulation.  While the three-sentence plank was trivial 
compared to the Democratic plank that was greater in size and substance, the mere 
addition of the plank in the Republican platform revealed the growing strength and 
confidence of the progressive wing of the Party, which led to even greater internal 
tension.  Yet, 1908 hardly brought victory to progressive Republicans.  The presidency 
was once again returned to a conservative-minded easterner in William Howard Taft. 46  
While the Republican platform contained compromise positions, on the whole, it was a 
ringing endorsement of conservativism.  Perhaps most noteworthy was a plank 
upholding . . . the authority and integrity of the courts, State and Federal (Porter and 
Johnson 1956, 160).  During a period when state and federal courts were increasingly 
under attack as a judicial oligarchy that had usurped the powers of Congress and 
thwarted the will of the people by . . . nullifying legislation designed to ameliorate the 
                                                                                                                                            
44 Ibid. at 604.  
45 Governor Johnson successfully passed a reform measure that empowered the state commerce agency to 
regulate rates within state boundaries.  However, as noted above, the Supreme Court in Chicago, Rock 
Island and Charleston & Western Carolina Railway overturned such measures. 
46 Taft was from Ohio, which is arguably in the Midwest.  However, Ohios economy and politics were 
aligned with the east and quite at odds with western progressive states like Iowa, Wisconsin, and, even, 
California. 
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more baneful effects of the Industrial Revolution (Ross 1994, 1), the dominant wing of 
the Party still embraced its role as the protector of judicial power.47  Since progressive 
Republicans were the primary advocates of judicial reforms designed to make the courts 
more accountable, the pro-judiciary plank shows the degree of control conservatives 
retained over the national party system.   
 
The Tariff and the Republican Divide 
 In 1908, one issue loomed larger than all others: tariff reform.  The last time the 
tariff had been revised was in 1897 and was a source of significant sectional agitation.  
The Dingley tariff of 1897 overwhelmingly benefited eastern manufacturers and their 
bankers and, to a lesser extent, to vulnerable wool, fruit, timber, and sugar-beet producers 
in the West (Sanders 1999, 219).  Midwestern farmers received virtually no benefit from 
the tariff while the tariff was downright hostile to southern interests.  As Richard Bensel 
noted, The developmental engine [the tariff] left the southern periphery to shoulder 
almost the entire cost of industrialization . . . The [nonindustrial] periphery was drained 
while the [manufacturing] core prospered (1984, 63).  The resulting sectional alliances 
pitted Midwestern and southern agricultural interests against far western and eastern 
manufacturing; a slight variation from the railroad rate alignment discussed above.   
                                                
47 In his inaugural address, Taft acknowledged the need to protect both judicial power and corporate 
interests when he addressed demands to curtail the power of the courts to issue injunctions.  Another labor 
question has arisen which has awakened the most excited discussion. That is in respect to the power of the 
federal courts to issue injunctions in industrial disputes. As to that, my convictions are fixed. Take away 
from the courts, if it could be taken away, the power to issue injunctions in labor disputes, and it would 
create a privileged class among the laborers and save the lawless among their number from a most needful 
remedy available to all men for the protection of their business against lawless invasion. 
 
Taft, William Howard. Inaugural Address.  Available at http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres43.html. 
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Upon being sworn into office, President Taft promised, above all, to adhere to the Partys 
platform and revise the Dingley tariff despite conservative preferences to leave the tariff 
unrevised (Pringle 1939, 395).  Under a combination of presidential and progressive 
pressure, eastern conservatives agreed to revise the tariff but they did not share the 
assumption of midwestern progressives that revision would be downward.  Unfortunately 
for progressives, President Tafts idea of revision was also different than their own, even 
if he support limited tariff reduction.  Progressives quickly realized that the gains made 
with the help of Roosevelt did not come so readily under a new administration.   
The tariff issue reveals the importance of courts to the maintenance of the 
Republican political order.  As will be discussed below, the Payne-Aldrich tariff divided 
the Party much the way railroad rate regulation did.  However, the tariff has never been 
an issue upon which the courts played a significant role in oversight or policy-making.  In 
other words, the issue could not be delegated to the courts in any substantial way.48 
Without the assistance of the courts, the Republican Party had no way to alleviate the 
internal tensions that threatened to tear it apart.  Either conservatives or progressives 
needed to yield to the demands of the other.  Both proved unwilling to yield and 
unwilling to share power with those they saw as their opposition. 
 A good deal of noise had been made about revising the tariff during Roosevelts 
administration, however, the issue received little attention.  The Washington Post noted 
that Speaker Cannon and Roosevelt struck a deal to keep the tariff off the national agenda 
                                                                                                                                            
(Visited on February 15, 2005) 
48 See Nondelegable Issue on Figure 1.  Page 15, supra. 
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in return for smoothing the way for the passage of the Hepburn Act.49  Others argued 
Roosevelt neglected tariff reform because he believed it unworthy of his attention 
(Pringle 1939, 420).  The lack of attention to tariff revision also may have stemmed from 
a sincere belief in the operational success of the Dingley tariff, since Roosevelt stated as 
much in his personal correspondence.50  Whatever the reason, the protracted neglect of 
tariff revision increased agitation over the high tariff schedule.  Midwestern agricultural 
and production interests complained bitterly over a tariff designed to protect eastern-
based industry, which resulted in higher prices for goods only a downward revision 
would ease.  When Taft took up the tariff issue in the first year of his administration, the 
cleavage between progressive and conservative Republicans began to look like an 
unbridgeable divide. 
 Throughout the debates over the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, Taft attempted to maintain 
party unity.  However, several factors compelled Taft to take action that destroyed any 
hope of maintaining the Republican coalition.  First, a cornerstone of Republican Party 
ideology was economic nationalism and a facilitative, rather than regulatory, role for the 
state in governing domestic competition in the marketplace (Geering 1998, 67-71).  The 
tariff, however, required government privileging certain industries for protection, while 
leaving other industries to the whimsy of the invisible hand.  The Party that argued the 
national government should err on the side of modest regulation of trusts made protection 
its cornerstone.  As one Massachusetts congressmen proclaimed, The policy of 
                                                
49 President Has House: He and Cannon Agree on Railroad-rate Legislation. The Washington Post 
November 29, 1905, 2. 
50 Shortly after his departure from office, Roosevelt wrote,  . . . there is no real ground for dissatisfaction . 
. . with the present tariff; so that what we have to meet is not an actual need, but a mental condition among 
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protection may be wrong but it is the policy of the Republican party and when protection 
ceases to exist the party will cease to exist (as quoted in Harbaugh 1973, 2088). 
 Second, the tariff divided the Republican Party along sectional lines.  Eastern and 
far western industry benefited from the protection provided by the tariff.  Midwestern 
agrarian interests suffered as the tariff resulted in higher prices for goods.  Since 
sectionalism largely determined support for tariff reform, national Party leaders were 
forced to balance competing interests when setting the Party agenda regarding tariffs.  
Compounding the problem, most Republican senators and congressmen did not have to 
concern themselves with these competing interests when satisfying constituency demands 
since ones position on the tariff was largely determined by geography, and local politics 
drove national policy-making.  However, the absence of competing demands at home did 
not determine the policy of the president or the national Party platform, as these were an 
amalgam of constituent and partisan pressures.  As a result, the tariff remained a major 
division throughout Tafts administration. 
 Third, several leading progressive Republicans formed a coalition with the 
Democratic opposition to propose an amendment that would write into the bill an income 
tax.  The measure was designed to overturn the Supreme Courts decision in Pollack v. 
Farmers Loan & Trust, Co.51  While the income tax enjoyed a sizable amount of support 
in both parties, hardline Republican conservatives in the Senate opposed it for two 
reasons.  The primary reason was that an income tax would render the protective tariff 
superfluous from a fiscal point of view (Bickel and Schmidt 1984, 22).  Powerful 
                                                                                                                                            
our people (as quoted in Pringle 1939, 430). 
51 157 U.S. 439 (1895). 
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conservative senators like Aldrich and George Sutherland ardently embraced the wisdom 
of protective policy (Paschal 1951, 58-59).  A secondary reason stemmed from the 
conservative argument that such blatant attacks on Supreme Court rulings undercut the 
independence of the national judiciary.  Given the reliance on the courts by conservative 
Republicans, the latter point was where most of the legislative debate was focused.   
Senator Sutherland set forth the conservative position that any legislative 
endeavor to force the Court to reconsider its decision in Pollack would set public opinion 
against  
 . . . the independence, the dignity, the respect, the sacredness of that great 
tribunal whose function in our system of government has made us unlike 
any republic that ever existed in the world, whose part in our government 
is the greatest contribution that America has made to political science.52 
 
Yet, the opposition to the amendment was outnumbered and seemingly destined to fail if 
not for an innovative legislative strategy crafted by Senator Aldrich.  In order to remove 
the income tax provision from the tariff proposal, Senator Aldrich and President Taft 
brokered a deal to eliminate the income tax provision from the bill and craft a 
constitutional amendment, for which Aldrich agreed to rally conservative support.  The 
goal of the maneuver was clearly to protect the integrity of the Supreme Court since the 
Court would have been forced to either duplicate an unpopular ruling or overturn a 
recently established precedent.  Much as the Supreme Court frequently acted to protect 
conservative preferences, conservatives acted to protect the integrity of the Court.   
 The maneuver did several things damaging to the Republican coalition.  First, it 
eliminated the possibility of the Supreme Court, once again, resolving an issue divisive to 
                                                
52 Congressional Record, vol. 44, 4022. 
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the Republican Party.  Second, it drew to light the difference in which the conservatives 
and progressives valued the courts and their role in American policy-making.  Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, Tafts negotiations with Aldrich gave the appearance that he 
had allied himself with the Old Guard in House and Senate.  This notion was furthered by 
his hardline stands against western insurgent demands to revise the tariff schedules on 
wool, cotton, and industrial products (Gould 1986, 127).  While the Payne-Aldrich Tariff 
was clearly borne of compromise, leading to lower tariff schedules in most major 
categories, the final tariff angered midwestern Republicans who desired greater 
downward revisions.  Taft and his conservative Republican allies bore their ire. 
 The split in the Party was clear following the passage of the tariff.  Taft publicly 
declared in Winona, Minnesota that the revision was the best tariff bill that the 
Republican party ever passed.  Taft may have been trying to put the best face possible 
on the tariff, yet, the statement bolstered western progressives belief that Taft seems to 
have surrendered absolutely to Aldrich (Senator Joseph Bristow as quoted in Gould 
1986, 128).  While insurgent Republicans had been critical of administration priorities, 
prior to Tafts remarks in Winona, they had rarely attacked Taft personally (Holt 1967, 
38).  Following Tafts gaffe, western progressives began criticizing Taft openly and 
vigorously.  Taft attempted to undercut dissent in the Party ranks by cutting off the 
insurgents patronage and throwing the influence of the administration against them in 
the primary election of 1910 (1967, 37-38).  The fight between the conservative wing 
and the progressive wing split the Republican Party and led to Roosevelts re-entry into 
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the ring of national politics, the eventual progressive split in the Republican Party, and 
the formation of the short-lived Progressive Party.   
As briefly noted above, unlike rate regulation, the tariff was not an issue easily 
deferred to the judiciaryand the one policy that could have been left to the judiciary 
was resolved through negotiated compromise, which aggravated progressives.  Only one 
provision of the Payne-Aldrich tariff was tested before the Supreme Court and that was a 
weak constitutional challenge to congressional authority to raise revenue through the 
tariff in which the Court unanimously upheld the Act.53   
The history of the United States tariff is devoid of a judicial ruling with 
significant implications for tariff policy (see generally Taussig 1967).  The inability of 
the courts to oversee tariff policy left the conservative wing of the Republican Party 
without an institution that could stabilize the Republican coalition by enabling the 
passage of progressive reform while safeguarding conservative policies, as the courts did 
with railroad rate regulation.  The result was a conservative-progressive split in the 
Republican Party that eventually led to a sweeping loss of power. 
 
Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 
If the Republican Party was to retain its control over the national government, it 
would need to heal the divide between progressives and conservatives, or, at least, 
prevent the gap from widening further.  In the legislative session following the passage of 
the Payne-Aldrich tariff, conservatives gave in to progressive demands for further 
regulatory legislation by supporting additional revision of the ICCs regulatory powers 
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with, of course, ample judicial oversight.  This no doubt stemmed from mixed 
motivations.  First, throughout his administration, President Taft viewed the Partys 
platform as a mandatory course of action and the 1908 platform supported additional, 
albeit limited, railroad regulation.  Second, the fallout from the Payne-Aldrich tariff 
undoubtedly created the realization that failure to heal the conservative-progressive rift 
within the Party would significantly reduce the Partys ability to hold power in the 1910 
and 1912 elections.  
President Taft and his Attorney General George Wickersham drafted the bill 
Stephen Elkins introduced to the Senate.  Wickersham relied heavily on advice from the 
railroads when he crafted the bill.  Drafts of the bill had been sent out to several railroad 
companies prior to its submission to Congress (Hechler 1940, 165)a fact not lost on the 
progressives the bill was supposed to appease.54  One such progressive, Joseph Bristow, 
wrote about the bill, I will not vote for a bill regulating the railroads which was drawn 
by the railroad attorneys in New York, any more than I voted for a tariff bill that was 
written by the manufacturers of New England (as quoted in Hechler 1940, 174).   
Progressive reservation aside, the bill was not devoid of regulatory substance.  
The central aim of the bill was to fulfill the promises made in the Republican Party 
platform by prohibiting railroads from owning stock in competing lines and to grant the 
ICC the power to regulate the issuance of railroad securities.  Had the bill contained only 
these progressive measures and, perhaps, a few choice additions, progressives would 
surely have embraced the measure from the start.  However, conservatives, backed by the 
                                                                                                                                            
53 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911). 
54 On January 7, 1909, the New York Sun reported that the railroad executives were behind the removal of 
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railroads, insisted on the creation of a Commerce Court, which would oversee all ICC 
regulations and resolve disputes between carriers and the ICC.  The combination of the 
recent tariff fight, the continued ties between the Old Guard and railroad companies, and 
the creation of yet more judicial oversight led to the odd situation of conservatives 
supporting a regulatory bill and progressives opposing it.   
Several provisions evoked the displeasure of progressive Republicans, but none 
more so than the proposed creation of the Commerce Court. The measure was actually 
quite similar to a proposal in the bill Representative Hepburn originally proposed in 1906 
but was eliminated in the House Committee on Interstate Commerce due to concerns that 
such a court would increase the judicial throttling of the [C]ommission (Cushman 
1941, 81).  Senator Cummins, who led the progressives throughout the fight over the 
proposed bill, claimed that placing all authority over ICC regulation in one court would 
subject all subsequent judicial proceedings to immense pressure from a united railway 
industry.  Moreover, the political influence of the railroads would ensure the appointment 
of judges highly sympathetic to carriers, thereby, undercutting ICC authority.55  
Representative Rufus Hardy (D-TX) made a similar argument in the House: 
. . . Environments affect us all.  Our opinions, gradually take a tinge from 
our association.  I do not know that this amounts to very much but when 
you get your court set aside for the trial of one class of cases only, with the 
representatives of the United States, far removed from the people, upon 
one side, and the representatives of the great railroads and other 
corporations immediately and vitally interested on the other, after a while 
your impartial judge begins to see things in a little different light from 
what he did before.56 
 
                                                                                                                                            
several regulatory measures originally proposed in a draft of the bill. 
55 Cummins speech ranged over four days, but see generally Congressional Record, vol. 61, 2, 3341-3385. 
56 Congressional Record, vol. 45, 4939.  
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Finally, in the bill, the Commerce Court was authorized to resolve disputes over fact and 
law, which greatly concerned progressives since this would transfer from the 
Commission to the Court all powers to determine rates and classifications (Mowry 1960, 
95). 
These attacks proved successful on the one hand and a failure on the other.  Taft 
had Attorney General Wickersham meet with the Senate leadership and develop a 
compromise plan on the proposed Commerce Court.  The result was a series of technical 
concessions, which insurgents believed to be important modifications.  However, in 
reality, the compromise position only provided the right of interlocutory appeal to the 
Supreme Court if the Commerce Court ordered an injunction restraining the operation of 
an ICC order.  Clearly, the railroads and conservative Republicans were quite 
comfortable with a compromise position that provided for greater judicial oversight, as 
Wickersham acknowledged in his correspondence to Taft.57  Additionally, progressives 
were later able to amend the bill so that judges to the Commerce Court were to be 
appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and not the president.  Again, 
conservatives had little objection to a measure that placed the power of appointment into 
the hands of Chief Justice Edward White, who had proved himself a solidly conservative 
jurist.58 
Even when progressive Republicans secured legislative victories over 
conservatives objections by piecing together an inter-party coalition with progressive 
                                                
57 George W. Wickersham to William Howard Taft, March 19, 1910. 
58 White had been quite conservative both as a member of the House of Representatives and as a member of 
the Supreme Court.  One of Whites biographers dubbed him the defender of the conservative faith 
(Highsaw 1981).   
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Democrats, the victories were short-lived.  An amendment was introduced and passed 
over conservative dissent that enabled the ICC to suspend new rates for 120 days beyond 
their effective date and up to six months if the Commission hearings on the new rate were 
not finished by the time the 120 days expired.  A similar coalition was able to reword the 
long and short haul provision.  However, conservatives successfully support the addition 
of a subsequent provision, which partially diffused conservative objections by enabling 
railroads to apply to be relieved from the operation of this section.  Gabriel Kolko 
noted that over the next eight months, the ICC received over 5,000 such requests from the 
railroads, all of which were granted until an investigation of each one could take place 
(1965, 193-4).   
Thus, the Mann-Elkins Act, which passed with overwhelming support by 
conservative and progressive Republicans in both the House and Senate, did little to 
advance progressive regulatory action.  The Act provided the ICC with a new power to 
suspend and investigate rate hikes but it created a court designed to oversee the 
Commissions actions.  It further failed to provide a workable standard for just and 
reasonable rates, which, again, empowered the courts to define the extent of ICC 
regulatory action.  Finally, it failed to amend the commodity clause, which the Court had 
subsequently gutted and rendered virtually impotent in United States v. Delaware and 
Hudson Railroad.59  The Act was sufficiently innocuous that the Railway Age Gazette 
claimed, It does not necessarily follow that [the Mann-Elkins Act] will either hurt or 
help anyone.60 
                                                
59 213 U.S. 257 (1909). 
60 Railway Age Gazette, XLIX (July 8, 1910), 63. 
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While Taft and other party elites hoped that enacting some type of regulatory 
measure would help heal the rift in the Republican Party, the Act was insufficient to 
bridge the divide wrought by the tariff.  Moreover, the fight over the creation of the 
Commerce Court helped remind progressives and conservatives of the severity of their 
ideological differences even while they strove toward compromise.  The result was a 
Party divided; the actions of the Commerce Court did little to assuage wary progressives. 
As it turned out, progressives reservations regarding the Commerce Court proved 
accurate.  Within a year of its creation, the court undercut the independence and authority 
of the ICC and overwhelmingly favored the railroads.  In its first year, 57 cases were filed 
with the Commerce Court; although only 38 of these cases involved the court as an 
appellate tribunal standing between the Interstate Commerce Commission and the 
Supreme Court of the United States (Ripley 1927, 581).  The Commerce Court 
successfully disposed thirty of these cases.  In 27 out of 30, it issued restraining orders or 
final rulings in favor of carriers and against shippers (1927, 581).  The Commerce Court 
became so reviled by progressives in both parties that proposals for its abolition were 
introduced as early as 1911.  In 1912, legislation abolishing the Commerce Court passed 
both the House, now controlled by the Democrats, and the Senate on two separate 
occasions.  However, Taft vetoed both measures, which did not play well in his re-
election bid.61  The court was abolished in 1913 following Wilsons ascent to the White 
House and the corresponding Democratic control of the House and capture of the Senate.   
                                                
61 The Progressive Party, which garnished most of its support from progressive Republican defectors, 
included an anti-Commerce Court plank in their platform,  . . . in order that the power of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to protect the people may not be impaired or destroyed, we demand the abolition 
of the Commerce Court (Porter and Johnson 1956, 179). 
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With the Commerce Court proving a particularly bitter pill for progressives and 
the degree of difficulty of securing even minimal regulatory legislation through the Party 
apparatus, progressive Republicans grew increasingly separatist in their political 
strategies.  Making matters worse for Republican solidarity, a popular former president 
firmly embraced the progressive wing of the Party and led them in what would be a failed 
attempt to establish a Progressive Party.   
Progressives in the Republican Party had threatened defection for years and 
conservatives had grown increasingly wary of the possibility.  Once Roosevelt began to 
embrace certain progressive measures, the rift in the Party became increasingly obvious.  
Senator Jacob H. Gallinger (R-NH) noted this problem in a letter to one of his 
congressional colleagues: Unless some restraint can be placed on the White House the 
Republican party will be divided into hostile camps before 1906 (as quoted in Gould 
1986, 78).  Conservatives were able to appease progressives for another five years but the 
divide proved too great to overcome.  The relative ideological closeness of progressive 
Republicans and Democrats on the trust issue made a cross-party coalition inevitable.  
Yet, despite this progressive alliance, conservatives were able to secure outcomes 
suitable to their constituents during the first two decades of the 20th Century.  Perhaps 
more interesting, progressive defection from the Republican Party in 1912 proved to be 
temporary as the Republican political order was able to re-establish its hold on power 
throughout the 1920s.  But given the degree of division between conservatives and 
progressives, how were conservatives able to rehabilitate the Party, particularly when the 
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Democratic Party in the first two years of the Wilson administration engaged in a serious 
effort to recast the American administrative state akin to progressive Republican desires?   
The answer, again, points to a reliance on the national judiciary.  Throughout the 
first few years of the Wilson administration, conservative Republicans attempted to 
minimize their differences with progressives in order to bring them back into the Party 
fold.  This presented some difficulty considering the number of regulatory measures, 
generally favored by progressives and opposed by conservatives, in the first two years of 
the Wilson administration.  Conservative Republicans again turned to the courts to 
protect their preferences in the face of a progressive assault.  However, in contrast to the 
preceding years, conservatives made little opposition to progressive legislation, opting 
instead to only wage significant legislative battles when matters of judicial oversight 
were involved.  By avoiding the political thicket and not objecting to progressive 
reforms, the conservative wing of the Republican Party was able to lure those 
progressives who had defected from the Party back into the Republican fold. 
 
Democratic Control and the Move to Regulate Trusts 
With the progressive impulse at its apex, the regulatory movement expanded from 
the regulation of railroads to the oversight of all industrial practice in interstate 
commerce.  Of course, the railroads played a major role in commerce among the states 
but progressive interests went beyond rate regulation.  The Democratically-led 
progressive drive focused on rehabilitating and strengthening the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
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which the Supreme Court previously gave a conservative construction and rendered it 
impotent to address the ills of corporate power.  
In 1911, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in the Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States62 and United States v. American Tobacco Co. cases.63  The rulings in these cases 
had been highly anticipated by both the left and the right.  E.G. Lowry wrote that no 
cases before the Supreme Court  
caused the markets and the whole industrial and commercial world to 
pause more perceptibly than have the cases of the government against the 
Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco Company. . . For 
months the financial markets have virtually stood still awaiting their 
settlement.64 
 
The day following the Supreme Courts decision, Wall Street broke out of a prolonged 
slump as the market jumped upward.65 
 Wall Street reacted with great joy at the Courts rulings and, no doubt, President 
Taft and many of his conservative colleagues were equally pleased.  In principle, the 
Supreme Court embraced the conservative vision and understanding of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.66  Several years prior to the Courts rulings, Mark Hanna had articulated 
the difference between good and bad trusts.  Subsequent Republicans had adopted 
such an understanding of monopolies, including then-President Taft.  In a letter to 
Congress, Taft explained that mere bigness of corporations and the mere incidental 
                                                
62 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
63 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
64 Lowry, E.G. 1911. The Supreme Court Speaks. Harpers Weekly, 55:8. 
65 New York Tribune May 17, 1911, 1. 
66 In a letter to his wife, Taft wrote that the Courts opinion was a good opinion and, although, the 
Courts reasoning did not take exactly the line of distinction I have drawn,[ ] it certainly approximates it 
(as quoted in Pringle 1939, 665).  Tafts greatest concern regarding Standard Oil was whether the Court 
was well suited to distinguish between good and bad trusts (1939, 666).  The New York Tribune also 
noted the consistency between Tafts articulation and the Courts ruling  (May 16, 1911, 8). 
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restraint of trade and competition were not the problems.  The problem lay in the 
aggregation of capital and plants with the express or implied intent to restrain 
[competition].  Thus, there were good trusts and bad trusts, and only the latter 
should be punished.   
 In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court abandoned its fourteen-year-old precedent set 
in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association67 that held any restraint of trade 
was impermissible under the Sherman Act.  The Court substituted its holding in Trans-
Missouri for a rule of reason, which made illegal those combinations of trade that 
harmed the public good by restraining the free flow of commerce and tend[ing] to bring 
about. . . the enhancement of prices.68  While the Court did not overtly draw the 
distinction between good and bad trusts, the effect of the rule of reason was to 
construct such categories (Hofstadter 1968, 249).  The Court further reserved for the 
judiciary, and not the executive, the authority to determine whether business conduct was 
an unreasonable restraint on trade.   
 Progressives on both sides of the aisle were as unhappy as conservatives and 
businessmen were thrilled.  William Jennings Bryan claimed that Standard Oil left the 
Sherman Act exactly as trusts would have written it.69  Four Democratic Congressmen, 
two Democratic senators, and one Republican senator immediately introduced legislation 
to overturn the rule of reason (Sanders 1999, 278).  On the flip side, Andrew Carnegie 
declared that he was satisfied almost beyond measure and a happy man today (as 
                                                
67 166 U.S. 318 (1897). 
68 221 U.S. 1, 58.  The Court embraced the standard of an undue restraint on trade, which the courts would 
ultimately determine on an ad hoc basis.  
69 Detroit News May 17, 1911, 11. 
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quoted in Bickel and Schmidt 1984, 112).  Even the stock market responded following 
news of the decision; total transactions on the day the Court released its opinion neared 
1,000,000.70 
 Both the Democratic and Progressive Parties used the Courts opinion as an 
impetus for greater regulatory action in their respective platforms.  The Democratic 
Partys antitrust plank included a rebuke of the Supreme Courts rule of reason:  
We regret that the Sherman anti-trust law has received a judicial 
construction depriving it of much of its efficiency and we favor the 
enactment of legislation which will restore to the statute the strength of 
which it has been deprived by such interpretation (Porter and Johnson 
1956, 169).   
 
Similarly, the Progressive Party platform demanded a strong National regulation of 
inter-State corporations and the establishment of a strong Federal administrative 
commission of high standing, which shall maintain permanent active supervision over 
industrial corporations engaged in inter-State commerce (178).   
These two platforms held the key to the creation of a new Democratic political 
order.  Since the Democratic Partys control over Congress and the presidency stemmed 
primarily from the progressive-conservative split in the Republican Party, the Democratic 
leadership knew that they would need to engage in the politics of coalition building 
(James 2000, 136).  Those building such a coalition needed to look no further than to 
progressives who defected from the Republican Party since, as the two platforms suggest, 
they shared the desire to regulate the rapid expansion of corporate power.   
So the Wilson years posed a dilemma for progressives who either chose to stay 
within the Republican Party or left the Party for Roosevelts Progressive Party.  
                                                
70 Business Likes Oil Decision. New York Times May 17, 1911, 1. 
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Woodrow Wilson won the presidency on a platform more progressive than its Republican 
counterpart.  The insurgent Republicans, therefore, faced the prospect of either joining 
the Democratic majority on progressive measures, resulting in de facto abandonment of 
their party, or joining with the Old Guard and attempting to refashion party unity.  
Almost all of the progressives chose the latter, if for reasons other than a sudden change 
of heart regarding Old Guard policies. 
The Democratic governing strategy was not well designed to expand their 
coalition.  Democrats in the House and Senate governed through party-driven caucus.  
The exclusive nature of the caucus system reaffirmed the pre-existing divisions between 
the parties.  Moreover, the centralized nature of Democratic legislative organization was 
anathema to progressive Republican ideology.  The exclusive and secretive caucus 
decision-making process was too similar to Cannonism and the city machines that 
progressives equated with corrupt politics.  Summing up the opinion of many of his 
progressive colleagues, Senator Clapp wrote that the destruction of the caucus would 
bring the dawning of a better day (as quoted in Holt 1967, 85). The Democratic Party 
in Congress attempted to reach across the aisle from time to time, however, the 
exclusivity of the Democratic power structure rankled progressive Republicans. 
Adding to the caucus problem, Wilson viewed himself as the head of the 
Democratic Party, not as independent from the Party or its collective agenda.  Wilsons 
governing style reflected that commitment and he carried out his legislative agenda 
through the caucus system crafted by the Democratic majority in Congress.  Moreover, 
Wilson failed to appoint a Republican to his cabinetthe first Democratic president to 
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fail to appoint an opposition party member since Buchanan.  Historian John Blum argued 
that had Wilson been more active in his pursuit of progressives, he would have lost more 
Democratic votes than he would have gained from progressives (1956, 66).  However, 
certain factors cast doubt on this assertion and lend credence to the fact that Wilson and 
the Democratic Party had both the agenda and the ability to lure progressives into the 
Democratic fold. 
First, as mentioned above, Wilsons agenda was quite progressive and had the 
support of several leading progressives from outside the Democratic Party.  The 
ideological proximity made for a strong lure for those who had begun to doubt 
Republican commitment to progressivism.  Second, in contrast to the exclusive 
Democratic caucus system, Wilson frequently relied on progressive Republican advice 
and input when drafting regulatory measures.  Senator Cummins played a central role in 
Wilsons antitrust legislation, discussed below.  Finally, Wilson used patronage to keep 
Democrats firmly behind his bills.71  Wilsons mastery of the patronage system as a 
means of garnering support provided Wilson greater leeway in building a larger, 
progressive governing coalition.  Thus, Wilson not only had the agenda to attract 
progressive Republicans but also had the means of establishing sufficient discipline 
among Democratic regulars to prevent internal revolt. 
Wilsons commitment to progressivism and his attempt to build a larger 
Democratic coalition came most readily in his attempt to curb the power of trusts through 
administrative regulation.  While most legislative energy was devoted to tariff reform 
                                                
71 Wilson became so proficient at distributing patronage to his Democratic colleagues that Senator Weeks 
(R-CA) declared it a menace to free institutions (as quoted in Holt 1967, 86). 
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during the first year of Democratic control, the second year brought a concentrated effort 
to rehabilitate antitrust law and overturn the Courts newly imposed rule of reason 
standard.  Specifically, Wilson attempted to secure a series of bills similar to the seven 
sisters acts that he successfully enacted toward the end of his tenure as governor of New 
Jersey.  The keystone of the acts was the New Jersey Trust Definitions law that 
prohibited any monopoly from entering into 
any agreement by which they directly or indirectly precluded a free and 
unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or 
consumers, in the sale or transportation of any article or commodity, either 
by pooling, withholding from the market, or selling at a fixed price, or in 
any other manner by which the price might be affected (Updyke 1913, 
650).   
 
Agrarian Democrats, in particular, embraced Wilsons efforts to create free and 
unrestricted competition, which would have reinstated prohibitions against all restriction 
on competition similar to the Courts Trans-Missouri doctrine. 
 What followed in 1913 and 1914 was the legislative effort to pass the so-called 
five brothers, five individual bills crafted as a hybrid version of Wilsons seven 
sisters and a bill introduced by Senator LaFollette (R-WI) and Representative Lenroot 
(R-WI) in 1911 (James 2000, 170).  The five brothers had five central aims.  First, the 
legislation contained clarifying language regarding the Sherman Antitrust Acts 
prohibition on restraint of trade by defining those practices that constituted monopolizing 
behavior.  Second, certain types of price discrimination, exclusive contracts, and the 
ability of mine owners to sell their resources to certain parties would be banned.   Third, 
the brothers would prohibit a director, officer, or employee from holding a post at 
another national financial institution, thereby, eliminating the interlocking directorships.  
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Fourth, it proposed creation of a federal administrative agency with significant powers to 
facilitate the gathering of information, including subpoena power of both documents and 
witnesses and unlimited access to all corporate records and relevant papers.  Finally, it 
permitted the agency to regulate new securities issued by the railroads.72  Together the 
bills were comprehensive, authoritative, and unmistakably aimed at killing the rule of 
reason.  As the New York Times editorialized, the rule of reason would be swept away 
by the bills provisions.73   
 Representative Hepburn and Senator Newland introduced the bills in the House 
and Senate respectively and received words of support from progressives and notable 
silence by conservatives.  Senator Cummins, who played a role in drafting the bill, 
signaled his overwhelming support by declaring the necessity of such a commission: 
The modern methods of carrying on business have been discovered and 
put into operation in the last quarter of a century; and as we have gone on 
under the anti-trust law and under the decisions of the court in their effort 
to enforce that law, we have observed certain forms of industrial activity 
which ought to be prohibited whether in and of themselves they restrain 
trade or commerce or not. We have discovered that their tendency is evil; 
we have discovered that the end which is inevitably reached through these 
methods is an end which is destructive of fair commerce between the 
states. It is these considerations which, in my judgment, have made it 
wise, if not necessary to supplement the anti-trust law by additional 
legislation, not in antagonism to the anti-trust law, but in harmony with the 
anti-trust law, to more effectively put into the industrial life of America 
the principle of the anti-trust law, which is fair, reasonable competition, 
independence to the individual, and disassociation among the 
corporations.74 
 
                                                
72 For greater detail, see Sklars The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism  (1992) and Jamess 
Presidents, Parties, and the State (2000, 170-72).   
73 New York Times January 23, 1914, 3. 
74 Congressional Record, vol. 51, 11455. 
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Most progressives shared Cummins sentiments about the need to control the evils 
associated with trusts and many more initially seemed willing to support Wilsons 
agenda. 
Conservatives, on the other hand, were less agreeable.  But given their remote 
odds of defeating the legislation in Congress and the potential to drive a permanent 
wedge between them and progressive Republicans, conservatives were not in a position 
to successfully oppose such reform.  Instead, the conservative wing of the Party chose to 
engage in a politics of selective opposition.  On many of the proposals, conservatives 
voiced little objection unless progressive Republicans first objected.  Only on the issue of 
whether the commission should have quasi-judicial authority did conservatives mount 
sustained opposition.   
Conservative opposition to an administrative agency with quasi-judicial powers 
centered on two questions.  First, did the courts have the power to review the 
commissions findings of fact or were they bound by the commissions findings?  
Second, who would interpret the phrase unfair methods of competition in commerce, 
which the bill forbade?  Progressives argued that the proposed commission would have 
final determination over factual findings and bear primary responsibility for constructing 
unfair methods of competition through its application to real cases.  Senator Sterlings 
(R-SD) interpretation bore out this belief: 
Under the plain language of this act the court is the auxiliary to the 
commission, and the court has as much judicial power as the sheriff or the 
clerk of a court would have, its business being simply to enforce the order 
of the commission, and that is all.  Its powers here are ministerial, not 
judicial.75 
                                                
75 Ibid. at 12215. 
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Thus, the courts were to serve a ministerial role quite distinct from the oversight role the 
judiciary had carved for itself in other regulatory arenas.   
 However, conservative Republicans, led by Senator George Sutherland, rebutted 
the idea of a ministerial court and argued that the commissions factual findings must be 
subject to judicial review.  Senator Frank Brandegee, a conservative senator from 
Connecticut, argued, It is for Congress to set up [the Commission] and leave the power 
[to determine unfair methods of competition] with the courtsand I do not believe we 
can take it away.76  Brandegee also warned that without due process of law guaranteed 
by judicial review of the commissions factual findings, the commission would issue 
arbitrary orders.77  Senator Sutherland also expressed his belief that the courts retained 
their authority to review the commissions factual findings since such power stemmed 
from the essence of judicial power as the right to determine what the law is.78  As will 
be shown below, the Supreme Court subsequently adopted Sutherlands interpretation 
and convert[ed] practically every question of fact involved in a trade commission 
hearing into a question of law (Cushman 1941, 201).   
 On the second question of whether the courts or the commission should have the 
power to define the phrase unfair methods of competition, proponents of the bill 
wanted to create a standard sufficiently flexible to enable the commission to apply it to 
evolving business practices, various industries, and changing economic conditions. They 
did not believe that using such a phrase would tie the commission to the common law 
                                                
76 Congressional Record, vol. 51, 12216. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. at 12031. 
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definition; the commission would be free to define the phrase as it investigated alleged 
corporate malfeasance. 
 Conservatives were entirely uncomfortable with the prospect of a regulatory body 
free from the moorings of judicial oversight.  Senator Sutherland again took to the floor 
of the Senate and criticized the notion that the commission could depart from the 
common law construction of unfair methods of competition.79  Even Senator Borah, a 
progressive from the Midwest, and a few Democrats suggested that such authority should 
not be placed in the hands of an independent and unresponsive regulatory commission, 
but should instead reside with the courts.80   
 Congress never fully remedied these two discrepancies.  While the Federal Trade 
Commission Act passed by a wide margin, the failure to fully enumerate the power and 
authority of the trade commission gave the courts final policy-making authority over the 
Federal Trade Commission and its investigatory authority.  The most notable trend 
throughout the 63rd session of Congress was that conservatives remained in the 
background and muted their opposition to most of the bills provisions.  Only in a few 
instances did conservatives feel compelled to advocate for greater judicial oversight than 
the bill permitted.  By minimizing the differences in the Party, conservatives attempted to 
heal the calamitous rift that drove them out of power in 1912.  The strategy worked so 
well that Senator Bristow, a progressive Republican, noted that conservative Republicans 
who had fought the progressives for the past 15 years were now rather eager to vote with 
us (as quoted in Holt 1967, 111).  As the rift in the Party closed, issues that did not cut 
                                                
79 Ibid. at 11178. 
80 Ibid. at 11600. 
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across traditional lines of cleavage became salient81 and re-established the pre-1912 
partisan alignment.  With the recurrence of the old alignment, the Republican Party 
reclaimed its dominance of national politics.   
 
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 before the Court 
 Once again conservatives had placed great faith in the courts.  Recognizing their 
weak bargaining position, conservatives relied on intentionally vague statutory language 
with disputed meaning to enable judicial oversight of the newly empowered FTC.  Of 
course, the past two decades showed that the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, were 
more than willing to assert judicial policy-making authority over regulatory legislation.  
The case of the Federal Trade Commission Act proved to be no exception.   
 Much as with the Courts rulings on the ICC, the Supreme Court was willing to 
sustain a significant portion of the legislatures delegation of authority to an 
administrative agency.  However, the Court was unwilling to yield to the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) in several ways that mirror conservative objections regarding the 
Commissions authority to define unfair methods of competition and the finality of the 
Commissions findings of fact.  Recall that conservatives objected to the FTC defining 
unfair methods of competition because they feared that the Commission would deviate 
from the judicially prescribed common law definition and create a much stricter 
                                                
81 The most notable issue was foreign affairs.  Those who left the Republican Party for the Progressive 
Party in 1912 tended to be nationalists who were genuinely committed to the aggressive assertion of 
American rights in the Western Hemisphere and the Far East (Mayer 1967, 338).  Wilson bungled several 
international efforts, including an attempt to oust the president of Mexico and a proposal to award 
Colombia $25,000,000 in damages for the United Statess role in fostering the revolution in Panama during 
Roosevelts administration.  Wilsons international policy so angered progressive Republicans that Senator 
Bristow candidly conceded that his dislike of the Presidents foreign policy blinded him to other virtues of 
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definition that prohibited corporate activity that was then legal.  In Federal Trade 
Commission v. Gratz,82 the Supreme Court expressed similar concerns and foreclosed the 
authority of the FTC to craft such a definition. 
 Gratz was an overwhelming victory for conservative interests.  Not only did the 
Court signal a continued oversight role for the national judiciary but also it did so with a 
sizable majority.  Writing for a seven-member majorityfive of which were Republican 
appointeesJustice McReynolds undercut the policy-making authority of the FTC when 
he declared: 
The words unfair method of competition are not defined by the statute 
and their exact meaning is in dispute.  It is for the courts, not the 
commission, ultimately to determine as matter of law what they include . . 
. The act was certainly not intended to fetter free and fair competition as 
commonly understood and practiced by honorable opponents in trade.83 
  
This would have been sufficient to please conservatives and their constituents but the 
Court moved even further to mark its claim on defining what would constitute American 
anti-trust policy.   
In analyzing the findings of the FTC regarding Gratzs corporate practices, 
McReynolds noted, Nothing is alleged which would justify the conclusion that the 
public suffered injury or that competitors had reasonable ground for complaint.84  By 
inserting a requirement of offending the public welfare, the Court asserts an antitrust 
doctrine strikingly similar to the doctrine of Mark Hanna.  While President Wilson 
identified trusts by their organizational efficiency, conservatives had distinguished 
                                                                                                                                            
the Administration (338). 
82 253 U.S. 421 (1920). 
83 Ibid. at 427-428. 
84 Ibid. at 428. Emphasis added. 
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between good and bad trusts by determining whether the public interest had been 
violated (James 2000, 161).  The Court clearly was more concerned with an injury to the 
public than its organizational size or strength. 
A few years after Gratz, the Supreme Court shifted its attention to the other major 
conservative reservation regarding the Commission: the finality of FTC factual findings.  
In Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co.,85 Justice McReynolds, once 
again writing for seven justices, readily dispatched with the idea that the Commissions 
factual findings bound the courts. In a terse opinion revealing a shade of contempt for the 
FTC, McReynolds wrote: 
Manifestly, the court must inquire whether the Commission's findings of 
fact are supported by evidence. If so supported, they are conclusive. But as 
the statute grants jurisdiction to make and enter, upon the pleadings, 
testimony and proceedings, a decree affirming, modifying or setting aside 
an order, the court must also have power to examine the whole record and 
ascertain for itself the issues presented and whether there are material facts 
not reported by the Commission. If there be substantial evidence relating 
to such facts from which different conclusions reasonably may be drawn, 
the matter may be and ordinarily, we think, should be remanded to the 
Commission -- the primary fact-finding body -- with direction to make 
additional findings, but if from all the circumstances it clearly appears that 
in the interest of justice the controversy should be decided without further 
delay the court has full power under the statute so to do.86 
 
Not only did the Court declare that it had the power to review the FTCs factual 
findings as it reported them, but it also had the authority to review those facts the 
Commission omitted from its reports.   
 In claiming review authority over factual findings, the Court also declared the 
power to define the phrase substantially lessen competition or tend to create a 
                                                
85 260 U.S. 568 (1923). 
86 Ibid. at 580. 
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monopoly.  In the words of the Court, We have heretofore pointed out that the ultimate 
determination of what constitutes unfair competition is for the court, not the Commission; 
and the same rule must apply when the charge is that leases, sales, agreements or 
understandings substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly.87  The 
Courts opinion in Curtis Publishing, radically altered the distribution of power in 
regulating the trusts.  As Gerald Henderson observed shortly after the opinions in Gratz 
and Curtis Publishing: 
The question is of great importance, for if the Commission is, by these 
decisions, shorn of all power to exercise administrative discretion in 
matters of unfair competition or of restraint of trade or monopoly, it has 
become little more than a subordinate adjunct of the judicial system (1924, 
102). 
 
To say that the Court relegated the FTC to no more than an adjunct would 
underestimate the breadth of the FTCs investigatory powers.  However, the Court did 
reduce the influence and authority of the Commission by curtailing its ability to define 
what constituted a monopoly and monopolistic practices.  The Court largely stripped the 
FTC of the powers condemned and resisted by conservative Republicans.  By the time 
the Supreme Court made its rulings in the major FTC cases, the Republican coalition had 
reunited and was a cohesive bloc that shared one central goal: defeating Wilsons foreign 
policy agenda, most notably the League of Nations.   
 In 1918, a reunited Republican Party took back the House and Senate.  Two years 
later, the electorate signaled its collective desire to return to normalcy by placing 
Harding in the White House by an overwhelming margin.  Interestingly, normalcy did not 
include much progressivism.  Harding was the most conservative president since 
                                                
87 Ibid. at 579-80. 
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McKinley and most of his domestic agenda was crafted with the Partys corporate 
constituency in mind.  As John D. Hicks observed,  . . . the policy of the Harding 
administration was to do with alacrity whatever business wanted to have done, which 
included a return to free enterprise (1960, 50). 
 Of course, the Republican political order came to an end in 1932.  The ideological 
commitments of the conservative, dominant wing of the Party precluded a vigorous 
administrative response to the economic crisis of 1930.  Herbert Hoover was either 
unable or unwilling to break with Old Guard conservatives and continued to grasp at the 
ethos of rugged individualism while the country dreamed of a government that would do 
something.  In 1930 and 1932, the Republican regime decayed and a new one rose in its 
stead.  However, the failure to perpetuate the Republican order ad infinitum should not 
obscure the degree to which the Republican Party was able to alleviate internal party 
tension to keep its coalition intact.  Moreover, even when the party disintegrated in 1912, 
they were able to coalesce and reclaim power for over a decade.  The Republican Party 
remained intact due to the dominant, conservative wings reliance on the courts to 
safeguard those policies that the minority, progressive wing agitated against.  Without an 
institutional ally in the courts, it is difficult to see how the Republican Party would have 
maintained control over Congress and the presidency as long as it did.   
 
Conclusion 
 Examining the historical record, the Republican Party clearly relied 
heavily on the courts as a means of facilitating compromise.  Conservative 
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Republicans benefited by the courts consistently protecting policy commitments 
favored by the Old Guard.  Progressive Republicans benefited by securing 
legislative victories that curtailed the power of railroads and trusts.  By relying on 
the courts, Party members in government worked to reduce the ideological tension 
within the Party.  Judicial policy-making regarding regulatory action also shifted 
much of the blame for conservative economic policy onto the courts.  Given the 
conservative wing of the Republican Party relied on the courts to retrench its core 
economic preferences throughout the Progressive Era, it should come as no 
surprise that this period saw an unprecedented number of legislative proposals 
designed to limit the review authority of the courts (see Ross 1994).  As the courts 
protected conservative commitments, conservative lawmakers protected the 
integrity of judicial power and even managed to increase the Supreme Courts 
policy-making authority by providing it with greater discretion over its caseload 
once conservative normalcy had been restored.88   
 In addition to playing an important role in shaping the American political 
landscape, the courts played a significant role in the development of the 
administrative state.  Progressives believed that they had crafted legislation that 
would remedy the ills of railroad shipping practices.  They succeeded when 
conservative interests aligned with their own, as was the case in curtailing 
rebating through the Elkins Act.  Yet, when it came to extending more significant 
administrative authority, both the conservative wing and the Supreme Court 
                                                
88 The so-called Judges Bill of 1925 eliminated direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the circuit courts 
of appeal except in a few notable exceptions, like interstate commerce and antitrust rulings, as well as 
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proved unwilling to wholly embrace the progressive agenda.  The Court used the 
Hepburn Act as a means of eliminating state-based railroad rate regulation.  By 
undermining a dualist regulatory regime, the Supreme Court undercut local 
regulatory schemes, which forestalled stringent rate controls enacted by 
progressive state legislatures.  The Supreme Court also curtailed the powers of the 
Federal Trade Commission and refused to yield areas associated with customarily 
judicial policy-making, such as the power to define monopolistic practices.   
 The result was a bureaucratic system that underwent judicial revision to its 
structure and authority.  The disjunction between the original legislative 
construction and the subsequent judicial modification led to institutional 
confusion as to which institution would ultimately be responsible for curtailing 
corporate power.  Of course, the Old Guard of the Republican Party was 
unconcerned with such problems since their corporate constituency favored 
minimal administrative regulation and robust judicial oversight.  Thus, the 
alliance between conservative Republicans and a conservative national judiciary 
dramatically altered the development of the national administrative state.   
Eventually, the same conservative coalition that relied on the courts to 
protect its core commitments was dethroned by an inability to formulate a 
response to the economic depression that plagued the nation.  Conservative 
support for careful judicial scrutiny of administrative rulings and strong judicial 
oversight of administrative power tied conservatives to private power that was 
seemingly unable to pull itself out of the economic disaster.  Free enterprise had 
                                                                                                                                            
reviews of ICC rulings. 
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been the policy on which conservatives had risen to power and held power but it 
was also that which caused them to fall.   
Stephen Skowronek has argued that [t]he courts were gradually swamped 
by Congresss expansion of bureaucratic authority into economic regulation, and 
ultimately they decided to focus their attention elsewhere (1982, 287).  This is, in 
part, accurate but it misses the importance of the judiciary as part of the political 
order.  The courts, particularly the Supreme Court, fought the expansion of 
bureaucratic authority for years following the fall of the Republican Party as it 
acted to protect the same policy and jurisprudential commitments it protected for 
several decades leading up to the New Deal.  However, changes in Court 
personnel and the slow shift in jurisprudence wrought by these new justices is a 
more accurate explanation of the decline of judicial oversight of administrative 
power (see Cushman 1998).  Once the Republican Party was unable to place 
sympathetic jurists on the bench, the judicial conservativism gave way to a 
deferential national judiciary that endorsed national regulatory authority.  The 
liberalism of the New Deal Court was born and a new regime controlled all three 
branches of the national government. 
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Introduction 
 Throughout the Progressive Era, conservative Republicans used the courts as a 
means of retrenching their policy preferences while stabilizing their national party 
coalition.  To appease their business and corporate constituents, conservative Republicans 
needed to maintain status quo regulatory policy and prevent the build-up of a social 
administrative state.  The dominant wing of the party-in-power sought to have the courts 
abate progressive proclivities toward economic regulation.  In short, during the 
Progressive Era, the Republican Party asked the courts to hamper change.  Yet, the courts 
can do more than simply limit change.  If the dominant wing of the party-in-power 
desires progressive change, then courts may be asked to facilitate change.  In other 
words, what happens when the dominant wing of a party-in-power hopes to enact 
progressive policies but faces resistance from a conservative minority within the party? 
 The answer to these questions lies in an examination of the Democratic political 
order, which occurred during the 1930s through the 1960s.  As the political agenda 
shifted away from economic recovery and winning World War II, the liberal wing of the 
Democratic Party increasingly shifted their progressive focus away from economic 
regulation to social egalitarianism.  In realizing their egalitarian vision, the liberal wing 
of the Democratic Party also sought to draw African Americans into the Party by 
attacking the institution of segregation in the South.  Of course, the southern, 
conservative wing of the Democratic Party viewed such action as a monumental insult 
to the Democratic South and the southern way of life. . .89 and used every means 
                                                
89 Congressan L. Mendel Rivers (D-SC) as quoted in Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt & the End of the 
Solid South: 1932-1968. 
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possible to oppose changing economic and social conditions for African Americans in the 
South.   
 During the period of 1938-1968, the Democratic Party faced the prospect of 
governing through a highly divided partisan system.  As with the Republican Party in the 
Progressive Era, the Democratic Party was sectionally and ideologically divided.  
Throughout the Solid South, the Democratic Party was the only viable political 
organization (Key 1984).  Southern Democrats were politically and socially conservative, 
especially when government regulation of the economy shifted to what the white 
southern establishment considered social issues.  In 1938, President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt attempted to purge southern conservatives from the Democratic Party but 
failed utterly.  Following the failed purge, it was clear that Democrats either had to work 
with the conservative wing or find a way around them.  When it came to egalitarian racial 
policy, southern conservatives would not abide by social initiatives so the liberal wing 
need to look for alternatives.  In this chapter, I argue that the dominant, liberal wing of 
the Democratic Party found such an alternative by using the federal judiciary as one of its 
principle means of eliminating racial segregation in the South and wooing African 
American voters into the Democratic Party.   
 Scholars have focused a significant amount of attention on both the legal and 
political effort to eliminate segregation in the South (see Tushnet 1987; Branch 1999; 
1989; Williams 1988; Dudziak 2002).  Historians, legal academics, and political 
scientists alike have been fascinated by the period that saw the end of Jim Crow and the 
dawning of a new period of racial equality in the country.  Yet, much of this literature 
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examines the civil rights movement in terms of social movements, pioneering civil rights 
cases, or international pressures rather than in a manner that highlights how minority 
gains during this period can be explained through the interaction of institutions in the 
American political system.  This analysis will reexamine the sincerity of Democratic 
efforts to work toward dismantling the segregated South as both civil rights leaders and 
scholars articulated their skepticism regarding Democratic earnestness (Hastie and 
Marshall 1942; Brinkley 1995; Irons 1984).  This chapter is not the first work to 
reevaluate the contributions and commitment of the New Deal regime to equalizing 
conditions among the races.  Kevin J. McMahon recently argued that Roosevelt 
appointed reform-minded jurists to the High Bench and actively promoted activism on 
racial issues (2004).  By examining Brown through the lens of presidential leadership, 
McMahon is able to link political constraints on the New Deal coalition, legal reform 
movements, and Supreme Court decision-making.  Moreover, McMahon identifies the 
institutional constraints on the presidency, giving Brown greater conceptual clarity than 
merely attributing it to the preferences of the dominant national coalition.  This is 
especially true since southern conservatives, a vital part of the Democratic coalition, 
adamantly opposed desegregation. 
 Yet, these studies do not examine the Democratic Partys efforts to both realize 
liberal social policy and manage the Partys national coalition to continue holding power.  
Examining judicial strategies and outcomes in light of the New Deal/Great Society 
coalition reveal several important insights.  First, throughout the Democratic political 
order, the courts facilitated the maintenance of the regime by providing an indirect means 
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of attacking segregation and, thereby, diffusing blame and enabling the coalition to 
survive increasingly divisive issues.  Second, the Democratic political order changed 
significantly during its hold on power.  During the Truman administration, the Supreme 
Court played a central role in liberal Democratic efforts to woo African American voters, 
particularly in northern states, into the Party.  The addition of a sizable African American 
voting bloc enabled the Party to continue to hold power and bolstered liberal wing 
strength within the Party enabling it to maintain its dominance of the national Party.  
Third, examining judicial decisions in light of the intra-party conflict sets the Supreme 
Courts revolutionary civil rights decisions within their political context and reveals how 
the Court served the interests of the dominant wing of the party-in-power much the way 
the Court did during the Progressive Era.  Fourth, the concluding section reveals the 
degree to which the Democratic political order relied on the national judiciary in order to 
strike balance and compromise on disputed policy objectives.  Once the Democratic Party 
firmly embraced and acted upon its desire for racial egalitarianism, the Democratic 
political coalition disintegrated and lost its unified control of the federal government. 
 In order to reveal these insights, this chapter will first examine the formation of 
the Democratic Party during the realigning period of 1928-1936.  Attention then shifts to 
President Roosevelts failed attempt to purge southern conservatives from the Party in 
1938 and its implication for the pursuit of progressive racial policy.  Next, I examine the 
inability of the liberal, majority wing of the Democratic Party realize progressive racial 
policy through the traditional political process because of conservative, minority wing 
obstruction.  As a result, Truman used the courts as a way of securing its racial agenda 
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and a means of wooing African American voters, which effectively liberalized the 
Democratic Party.  The examination then shifts to the Eisenhower Administration, its 
inheritance of Trumans court-centered strategy and the Civil Rights acts that use the 
courts as a means of creating legislative compromise.  Finally, the last eight years of the 
Democratic political order are examined in order to reveal how the shift away from a 
court-centered strategy to desegregate the South sped the decay and eventual demise of 
the national Democratic coalition. 
 
The Democratic Political Order Forms  
 As one political order ended, another was born out of its destruction.  In the 
autumn of 1929, the United States stock market began a sharp descent that marked the 
onset of economic depression.  On October 28, 1929, known as Black Monday, the 
frenzied sale of more than 9,250,000 shares drove stock prices down to unprecedented 
lows.  Worse, unlike past crashes on Wall Street, the stocks did not recover.  Most stocks 
continued to decline for months thereafter and the market did not fully recover until 
1954.  While the price of stock fell, unemployment rates took a sharp upward turn.  
Economic chaos beset America and neither political party was well-positioned to fashion 
a remedy.   
 The Republican Party that dominated national politics for the previous decade had 
once again become solidly conservative.  Progressive Republicans still acted as the 
gadfly within the Party but their numbers and influence waned significantly in the 1920s.  
Moreover, Republican policy and ideology strongly reflected a pro-business and non-
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interventionist approach.  President Hoovers strategy for combating the economic 
malady that plagued the country was to regulate small discrete areas of the economy, 
such as agricultural regulation through the Federal Farm Board, or to provide loans to 
corporations and banks through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (see Nash 1959).  
The Republican Party held to their belief that the majority of relief should come either 
from the states, something Hoovers Organization of Unemployment Relief was designed 
to promote, or from charitable organizations.  Despite the scale of national need, the 
Republican Party was unable to abandon its ideological commitments to free enterprise, 
non-intervention, and rugged individualism.  This failure gave the Democrats an 
opportunity to reclaim unified control over the federal government for the first time since 
1916. 
 Despite the opportunity, the Democratic Party did not respond to the economic 
crisis with decisive action.  During the Wilson administration, the Democratic Party had 
proved itself to be more willing and able to enact progressive regulatory measures than 
the Republican opposition.  But, Democrats also had strong ties to business and were 
moored to conservative economic policy by their southern wing.  For example, the 
Democratic Leader in the Senate, Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, opposed a bill that 
provided $375 million in federal grants to states for relief of the unemployed, arguing 
that if all emergency relief were conceptualized as national then the draft on the Federal 
Treasury will threaten to become immeasurable and unlimited (Sundquist 1983, 206).  
However, the floundering of the Republican leadership to respond decisively to the 
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economic crisis led the Democratic Party to seek out an agenda that provided the greatest 
appeal to the forgotten man. 
 No one seemed to appeal to the forgotten man like the man who named them.90  
Franklin Delano Roosevelt quickly emerged as the Democratic Partys best chance to 
recapture the White House.  Roosevelt won the governorship of New York in 1928 and 
secured re-election in 1930 by a staggering 725,000 votes.  During his tenure as the chief 
executive of New York, Roosevelt pushed a progressive agenda through the state 
legislature, which included direct relief aid, pro-labor policy, and a series of public works 
projects (Black 2003, 216-217, 191).  The degree to which the Democratic Party 
embraced the progressive agenda can be seen in both the adoption of the Partys 1932 
platform and the relative ease with which Roosevelt secured the Partys nomination.   
 The Democratic Partys 1932 platform mixed progressivism with some fiscally 
conservative proposals.  The most notable conservative plank proposed an immediate 
and drastic reduction of governmental expenditures by abolishing useless commissions 
and offices, consolidating departments and bureaus, and eliminating extravagance to 
accomplish a saving[s] of not less than twenty-five per cent in the cost of the Federal 
Government.91  The plank clearly runs counter to the Keynesian economic practice of 
governmental regulatory control and deficit spending, which marked much of the New 
Deal.  Moreover, the proposal to reduce governmental expenditures was the first in the 
platform, signaling its rhetorical importance to the Party.  
                                                
90  Roosevelt, Franklin D. The Forgotten Man Speech, April 7, 1932.  Available at 
http://newdeal.feri.org/speeches/1932c.htm.  (Visited on October 22, 2004) 
91 Democratic Party Platform of 1932. Available at 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=D1932. (Visited on October 19, 2004) 
  100
 However, much of the rest of the domestic economic agenda consisted of 
progressive policies designed to alleviate the suffering of the most afflicted.  The 
platform advocated the extension of federal credit to the states to provide unemployment 
relief wherever the diminishing resources of the states makes it impossible for them to 
provide for the needy.92  It also recommended the expansion of public works projects 
that would benefit the public interest, including adequate flood control and 
waterways.93  In perhaps the most progressive, if vaguely phrased, measure, the 
Democrats proposed a substantial reduction in the hours of labor.  Unlike many of the 
other progressive planks, the Democratic Party platform from the previous election in 
1928 contained no such proposal.   
 Adding to the progressive slant of the Partys platform, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt was selected to be the Democratic nominee on just four ballots.  During his 
acceptance speech, the first of its kind, Roosevelt articulated his plan to lead the 
Democratic Party on an activist campaign to remedy social and economic depression.   
Ours must be a party of liberal thought, of planned action, of enlightened 
international outlook, and of the greatest good to the greatest number of 
our citizens. . . [W]hen--not if--when we get the chance, the Federal 
Government will assume bold leadership in distress relief. For years 
Washington has alternated between putting its head in the sand and saying 
there is no large number of destitute people in our midst who need food 
and clothing, and then saying the States should take care of them, if there 
are. Instead of planning two and a half years ago to do what [the 
Republican leadership] are now trying to do, they kept putting it off from 
day to day, week to week, and month to month, until the conscience of 
America demanded action.   
I say that while primary responsibility for relief rests with localities now, 
as ever, yet the Federal Government has always had and still has a 
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continuing responsibility for the broader public welfare. It will soon fulfill 
that responsibility.94 
Roosevelts words and call to arms resounded among millions of voters who either joined 
the electorate for the first time or permanently left the Republican Party. 
 The realignment that occurred between 1928 and 193695 stemmed largely from 
changed voting patterns in the North.  The South had been solidly Democratic for nearly 
a century and would remain so for another decade and a half.  However, the Republican 
Party dominated northern elections since 1896, losing their monopoly in presidential 
elections only during the conservative-progressive split in the Republican Party in 1912.  
Yet, starting in 1928 with Al Smiths advocacy for the repeal of Prohibition, northern 
ethnic and religious minorities began to swing to the Democratic Party (Allswang 1971, 
42-6). 
 During this same period, racial minorities, particularly African Americans, began 
to dealign from their traditional Republican allegiance.  Republican apathy to the plight 
of African Americans following the abandonment of Reconstruction continued 
throughout the Progressive Era.  Southern dominance of the Democratic Party left 
African Americans with little hope of change emanating from the one-party that 
dominated the South (Myrdal 1962, 452-455; Key 1984).  The only political party to take 
seriously the plight of repressed blacks during this period was the Communist Party 
(Kirby 1982, 10).  However, New Deal economic reform proposals were sufficiently 
                                                
94 Roosevelt, Franklin D.  Acceptance Speech as the Democratic Presidential Nominee, July 2, 1937.  
Available at  http://www.cfinst.org/eguide/PartyConventions/speeches/1932d.html.  (Visited on Oct. 22, 
2004) 
95 Realignment scholars have long disputed when the realignment formally occurred.  In part, the dispute 
stems from different definitions of realignment (see Key 1955; Burnham 1970; Clubb Flanigan, and 
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radical that African Americans began to seriously consider the Democratic Party as a 
potential vehicle for significant social reform. 
In the cases of ethnic, religious, and racial minorities, each group contributed 
significantly to the working class.  As such, these groups were hit particularly hard by the 
Depression and desperately needed assistance.  By embracing progressive reform 
measures designed to provide assistance to the lower and working classes, the 
Democratic Party concretized its support among ethnic and religious minorities in the 
North and began to see a rise in northern African American support.  Nowhere was this 
clearer than with the support of labor unions.   
 Throughout the Progressive era, union support was not wedded to one party.  
Rather, organized labor attempted to forge alliances with progressives on both sides of 
the legislative aisle.  In fact, much of New Deal labor policy that favored protecting 
workers, not unions, resulted from the Republican generated union policy (OBrien 
1998).  Throughout the 1920s, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and other union 
organizations worked with progressive Republicans over Democrats to secure protection 
for workers rights (1998, 150).  However, following the economic collapse in 1929, the 
formation of tight bonds [] formed between organized labor and the Democratic Party 
(Sunquist 1983, 217).   
 If the merging of northern minorities, organized labor, and agriculture with the 
Solid South did not formally concretize in 1932, the ratification of the New Deal in the 
1936 national elections certainly did (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980, 257).  
However, the new alignment of a large, progressive wing, largely based in the North and 
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Midwest, and a smaller, conservative wing based in the South created intra-party tension, 
particularly when the progressive agenda shifted from the immediate concern of 
economic regulation toward social issues.  The intra-party tension over the scope and 
degree of government activism needed to be either overcome or minimized if the 
Democratic Party was to maintain its hold on power.  Roosevelt attempted to overcome 
the conservative bloc by purging them from the Party but failed.  Following Roosevelts 
failure, succeeding presidents and other members of the liberal wing of the Party used the 
courts to carry out their progressive agenda, maintain their hold on power, and transform 
the nature of the Democratic coalition by luring large numbers of northern African 
American voters into the Democratic Party. 
 In order to understand the role the courts played in maintaining the Democratic 
political order, we must first focus on southern conservative recalcitrance to the 
increasingly progressive Democratic agenda and Franklin Delano Roosevelts attempt to 
purge conservatives from the Party.   
 
Judicial Reorganization and the Failed Purge of 1938 
 Southern conservatives were willing to pursue a moderately progressive path that 
would stimulate the national economy through public works projects and give the 
national executive a much greater role in regulating the marketplace.  The Seventy-third 
Congress passed legislation at an astonishing rate with little to no significant opposition.  
However, beneath the surface of congressional cooperation with New Deal programs lay 
a resistance born out of the Jeffersonian Democratic tradition that abhorred large national 
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government and encroachment on states rights.  While southern lawmakers were willing 
to cooperate with efforts to address the approximately 14 million unemployed Americans 
in 1932, as New Deal programs continued to slide toward progressive activism, southern 
resistance began to mount. 
 Conservative resistance to activist legislation grew sizably during the shift from 
the first to the second New Deal.  In 1935, legislative skirmishes occurred in both the 
House and Senate over a public utility holding company bill that would have enabled the 
Security and Exchange Commission to dissolve holding companies that could not 
financially justify their existence.  Liberal Democrats, with the active backing of 
Roosevelt, were eventually able to secure passage of a watered down bill but the fight 
sparked the first sustained effort to resist progressive reform and helped lay the 
foundation for future conservative resistance (Patterson 1967, 38-58) 
 Concurrent with the fight over the utility bill, Roosevelt proposed a tax plan that 
would produce ample revenues without discouraging enterprise; and . . . distribute the 
burden of taxes equitably.96  Roosevelt first proposed to tax inheritances and gifts as 
[t]he transmission from generation to generation of vast fortunes by will, inheritance, or 
gift is not consistent with the ideals and sentiments of the American people.97  Roosevelt 
then proposed two progressive tax revisions that would create a surtax on great 
individual net incomes; and a corporation income tax graduated according to the size of 
corporation income in place of the present uniform corporation income tax.98   
                                                
96 Franklin D. Roosevelt. Message to Congress on Tax Revision. June 19, 1935.  Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15088&st=&st1=. (Visited on October 25, 2004) 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
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The redistributive program met with a chorus of conservative dissent in the House 
and Senate.  Two central substantial concerns drove the dissent.  First, conservatives in 
both parties favored lower taxes over a tax hike.  According to conservative economic 
thought, creating larger revenue streams to both consumers and producers would lead to 
greater spending and investment that would spur economic recovery.  A tax hike ran 
counter to this formula and could hamper economic recovery.  Second, Roosevelts tax 
proposal did not seem to create additional revenue with which to balance the budget 
(Patterson, 1967, 60).  Both liberals and conservatives in the Democratic Party pledged to 
balance the budget in 1932 but liberals, led by Roosevelt, had seemingly abandoned this 
commitment, to the annoyance of conservatives.   
With significant assistance from liberal leaders in the House and, particularly, the 
Senate, a slightly weakened tax proposal passed both chambers.  On the strength of 
partisan loyalty and deference to a highly popular president, the measure overcame 
conservative dissent.  Despite the victory for liberal Democrats, the two episodes fanned 
the flames that forged a conservative bloc within the Party.  Nowhere was this intra-party 
opposition more stark and vociferous than in Roosevelts court packing proposal 
introduced less than two years later. 
Still riding the overwhelming electoral victory in November of 1936, wherein the 
Democrats picked up seven Senate seats and 22 House seats, Roosevelt announced on 
February 5, 1937 his desire . . . to strengthen the administration of justice and to make it 
a more effective servant of public need.99  Roosevelt articulated a plan to improve 
                                                
99 Roosevelt, Franklin D. Message to Congress on the Reorganization of the Judicial Branch of the 
Government, February 5, 1937.  Available at 
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efficiency and justice in the courts by adding additional judges to the bench to 
compensate for aged or infirm judges who can attend to the modern tasks of judg[ing 
that] call[s] for the use of full energies.100  While the stated intent of the reorganization 
plan was to improve the judicial system, Roosevelt clearly intended to pack the courts
particularly the Supreme Courtwith jurists sympathetic to New Deal policies and an 
accommodating jurisprudence.101  For the past five years, the Supreme Court handed the 
New Deal a series of defeats by striking down cornerstone legislation such as the 
National Recovery Act,102 the Agricultural Adjustment Act,103 and the Guffey Coal 
Act,104 among others.  Infusing the courts with younger judges more deferential to the 
political branches and more sympathetic to having current economic and sociological 
factors inform their statutory and constitutional interpretation would create a new and 
distinctly liberal jurisprudence. 
A chorus of protest met Roosevelts proposal.  Interestingly, the most ardent 
resistance came from the conservative membership within the Democratic Party.  One 
general complaint accompanied a more substantial concern.  First, conservatives and 
liberals alike, condemned the plan as dishonest.  Conservatives saw the reorganization 
bill for the packing scheme for what it was and publicly called Roosevelts spade a spade.  
Second, Democratic conservatives objected to the danger of corrupting the structural 
autonomy of the Supreme Court and its implications for certain areas of constitutional 
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thought.  Ironically, southern conservatives couched a good degree of their criticism in 
the language of civil libertarianism.  Yet, it was clear that the extension of civil liberties 
to African American was their primary concern, not the protection of existing liberties to 
white Americans. 
When Roosevelt won the Democratic nomination in 1932, few considered him to 
be a racial egalitarian; certainly African Americans did not.  In the 1932 general election, 
even in Democratic strongholds, Roosevelt did not fair well among African American 
voters.  Nationwide, fewer than 25 percent of African American voters cast their ballot in 
favor of Roosevelt.  However, Roosevelt and other liberal Democrats refused to exclude 
African Americans in New Deal programs bringing some much needed relief to a 
community hardest hit by the Depression.  Gunnar Myrdal noted that inclusion in federal 
programs helped African Americans reorganize themselves and break with their 
longstanding tradition of voting Republican (Mydral 1962, 754-5).  The liberal wings 
growing sympathy toward African Americans led to increased concern among southern 
conservatives that liberals, particularly Roosevelt, would attempt to cement this growing 
Negro allegiance by appointing judges who would upset southern racial patterns 
(Patterson 1967, 98).  After all, southern politicians knew that social reform measures 
would have to include [African Americans] due to the Constitution and resented [it] 
(Myrdal 1962, 456).  If southern conservatives gave Roosevelt six appointments to the 
Supreme Court, liberal jurists could undercut white supremacy from the High Bench and, 
thereby, give African Americans a more prominent place within the Democratic Party. 
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While conservative fears sounded a bit conspiratorial, the evidence supports the 
idea that Roosevelt intended to use the courts as a means of reconstituting the Democratic 
Party as southern conservatives believed.  Yet, as is often the case with American parties, 
the Democratic Party could not continue to hold power without its minority wing.  This 
left Roosevelt and the liberal wing with two options.  First, Roosevelt could use his 
political power and resources to run New Dealers in the mold of Hugo Black (D-AL) in 
the South and, hopefully, defeat conservatives in Democratic primary elections.  If 
Roosevelt could succeed along these lines, the South would not be abandoned, rather, it 
would be transformed much as Roosevelt reconstructed the Party in the first several years 
of the New Deal (Skowronek 1997, 288-305).  Second, if the Democratic Party could 
appeal to a large pool of voters who sympathized with the liberal agenda but that did not 
yet vote Democratic, the southern, conservative wing of the Democratic Party could be 
overcome by shear numbers or cast out of the Party altogether. 
Southern conservatives realized that liberals, led by Roosevelt, intended to use the 
courts as a means of wooing African Americans and forwarding the progressive agenda 
and made the issue the proverbial line in the sand.  In response to Roosevelts court 
packing plan, Senator Josiah W. Bailey of North Carolina privately wrote, [Roosevelt] is 
determined to get the Negro vote and I do not have to tell you what this means (as 
quoted in Patterson 1969, 98-9).  One of Senator Baileys colleagues, Carter Glass (D-
VA), declared 
Should men of [Roosevelts] mind have part in picking the six proposed 
judicial sycophants, very likely they would be glad to see reversed those 
decisions of the Court that saved the civilization of the South . . . It was 
the Supreme Court of the United States that validated the suffrage laws of 
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the South which saved the section from anarchy and ruin in a period the 
unspeakable outrages of which nearly all the Nation recalls with shame (as 
quoted in McMahon 2004, 81).  
  
Representative Hatton Sumners (D-TX) declared, Boys, heres where I cash in my 
chips when he heard Roosevelts plans.  He later declared that he would use his position 
as the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee to prevent the bill from reaching a vote in 
committee (Black 2003, 408).  Vice President Garner discussed his displeasure with 
Roosevelts proposal with southern colleagues and tacitly worked against the passage of 
the bill by rallying opposition (Alsop and Catledge 1938, 69).  In fact, the Roosevelt 
Administration knew well that Garner was off the reservation on the court packing plan 
and attempted to bore from the inside (Ickes 1954, 140).  Yet, liberals could do little to 
stop Garner from playing one of the leading rolls in defeating the measure.105 
 While Roosevelt and his liberal allies protested against southern claims that the 
judicial reorganization plan would woo African American voters, these objections had 
little effect.  As Harold Ickes recounted, The other night . . . Senator Bailey, who is 
against the Court plan, made a speech in which he said that I was trying to break down 
the segregation laws of the South . . . I wrote to Bailey today telling him that that had 
never been my position.  Ickes continued, [W]hile I have always been interested in 
seeing that the Negro has a square deal, I have never dissipated my strength against the 
particular stone wall of segregation (1954, 115).  Such efforts to placate southern 
conservatives made little headway.   
                                                
105 Harold Ickes recalls a conversation he had with Senator Tom Corcoran in which Corcoran confirmed . . 
. that it was the Vice President who had betrayed the President  (1954, 171). 
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 The Senate Judiciary Committee sat on the bill for several months before 
adversely reporting the bill out of committee.  Seven Democrats and three Republicans 
signed a report roundly criticizing the bill.  The Committees adverse report was 
multifaceted but perhaps the most telling criticism was the Committees dissatisfaction 
with the portion of Roosevelts plan that would have centralized the federal district and 
circuit court systems and enabled judges to be assigned to districts outside of the district 
in which they live.  The bill thus creates a flying squadron of itinerant judges appointed 
for districts and circuits where they are not needed to be transferred to other parts of the 
country for judicial service.106  The report concluded that Roosevelts proposal was a 
violation of the salutary American custom that all public officials should be citizens of 
the jurisdiction in which they serve or which they represent. 
Southern conservatives realized that they needed local control over the federal 
judiciary in order to continue protecting segregation and conservative political 
philosophy in the South.  Senator Tom Connally (D-TX), one of the signatories to the 
Judiciary Committees adverse report, claimed that he opposed the reorganization plan as 
it was an opening gambit in an effort to transform Democratic philosophy (as quoted in 
Patterson 1969, 112).  Local control of district and circuit courts kept the political and 
legal façade of segregation intact.  Placing southern social conditions in the hands of 
jurists not from the South was anathema to maintaining strong control over segregationist 
policy.  Maintaining sectionalism on the courts also kept the potential to use the courts as 
a means of striking compromise. 
                                                
106 Abstract of Senate Committees Adverse Report on Roosevelts Bill to Revamp Federal Courts, New 
York Herald Tribune June 15, 1937, 10. 
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By the time the court-packing bill came up for a vote, Justice Van Devanter 
announced his retirement, the Supreme Court announced its famous switch-in-time 
decisions in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish107 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel,108 and 
the driving force behind the bill in the SenateMajority Leader Robinsondied.  The 
motion to recommit Roosevelts bill, which effectively sounded its death knell, passed 
70-20.  With New Deal programs no longer in jeopardy, liberal and conservative 
Democrats in the Senate compromised and refused to move aggressively against the 
courts.   
Liberals and conservatives continued their compromise by severely amending and 
paring down a new judicial reform bill.  By removing the provisions for adding additional 
justices to the Supreme Court and allowing judges to sit in districts in which they did not 
reside, the bill passed and became the Judicial Procedure Reform Act of 1937.  However, 
as part of the compromise, liberals secure a crucial provision for future civil rights cases 
that empowered the federal government to appear in cases with constitutional 
implications.  The importance of the federal governments ability to appear before the 
Court on issues in which the government was not a party became vital to Democratic 
political and electoral strategy a decade later.  
Following the failure of Roosevelts court packing plan, the split in the 
Democratic Party became increasingly obvious.  A string of Administration defeats in 
Congress over labor, economic relief, and anti-lynching only added to the liberal-
conservative rift.  Both liberals and conservatives in the Democratic Party began 
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consideration of forming new political coalitions.  Senators Glass, Byrd, Gore, Bailey, 
and Clark all considered creating a conservative party as early as 1934 (Patterson 1967, 
252).  Leading conservative newspapers and magazines increased their calls for a new 
political order.  Roger W. Babson of the Review of Reviews proposed that Carter Glass 
and Lewis Douglas (D-AZ) run for president and vice-president under the label of the 
Jeffersonian Democratic Party.109  Mark Sullivan, a columnist with the New York Herald 
Tribune, proposed Republicans nominate a conservative Democrat as either their 
presidential or vice presidential nominee.  Senators Byrd and Glass featured prominently 
in the names suggested.110   
When not considering new political coalitions, southern conservatives voiced 
suspicion of their current political allegiance, warning against liberal attempts to woo 
African American voters and, thereby, transform the Party into a vehicle for the liberal-
activist state.  Senator Glass wrote, The South would better begin thinking whether it 
will continue to cast its 152 electoral votes according to the memories of the 
Reconstruction era of 1865 and thereafter, or will have spirit and courage enough to face 
the new Reconstruction era that northern so-called Democrats are menacing us with (as 
quoted in Patterson 1967, 257).  Of course, the root of southern discontent sprouted from 
race.  Senator Glass demonstrated this point: 
The catering by our National Party to the Negro vote . . . is not only 
extremely distasteful to me, but very alarming to me.  Southern people 
know what this means and you would have to be in Washington only 
about three weeks to realize what it is meaning to our Party in the 
Northern states.  It is bringing it down to the lowest depths of degradation 
(as quoted in Patterson 1967, 257). 
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The question remained how could southern conservative Democrats change the course of 
their Party. 
 Southern conservatives longed for a return to the pre-Roosevelt Democratic Party 
when the South dominated the Party, but they proved unwilling to break with the Party 
altogether.  Two factors helped keep southern Democrats within the Party.  First, the one-
party dominated South had no viable second party from which to run a successful 
campaign (Key 1984).  Moreover, southern segregationists continued to associate the 
Republican Party with Reconstruction and federal power devoted to the protection of 
African Americans.  Leaving the Democratic Party was distasteful but joining the 
Republican Party was anathema to southern segregationists.   
 Second, many conservative Democratsparticularly in the Senateenjoyed the 
fruits of power-holding.  This was particularly true since many southern conservatives 
had longer tenures than many of their Democratic colleagues.  Since committee 
assignments were decided largely by seniority, the conservatives within the Democratic 
Party would have given up significant power and prestige if they left the Party.  Not only 
were southern Democrats in good position to send benefits back to their home districts, 
but they also occupied key veto points in the legislative system, which enabled them to 
protect their preferences.  Leaving the Democratic Party would have required them to 
yield their privileged positions.  In the 1930s, the cost of leaving the Democratic Party 
outweighed the benefit of ideological congruity. 
 While southern conservatives had numerous incentives to stay in the Democratic 
Party, some liberal Democrats proved quite willing to show them the door.  Roosevelt, in 
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particular, held a burning grudge against those southern conservatives who defected on 
the judicial reorganization bill.  In consultation with several key advisors and Democratic 
leaders, Roosevelt planned to purge conservatives from the Democratic ranks in an effort 
to realign the party system (Burns 1956, 376-80).  Initially, Roosevelt considered 
focusing on the ten Democratic committee members who had signed the adverse 
committee report on his judicial reorganization bill but he eventually targeted a more 
strategic group, which centered on opposing southern conservatives in the 1938 
Democratic primary. 
 Roosevelt moved openly against five conservative Democratic senators and 
several Representatives.111  Roosevelt desired unseating five additional conservative 
Democrats but the chances of securing their defeat was sufficiently low so as to warrant 
dedicating resources elsewhere.112  Roosevelt campaigned particularly hard against 
Senators Walter George of Georgia, Cotton Ed Smith of South Carolina, and Millard 
Tydings of Maryland.  Roosevelts initial success in Florida113 helped encourage the 
Administration that similar New Deal loyalists could also win in the South.  However, 
Roosevelts opposition campaigns in Georgia, Maryland, and South Carolina were 
unsuccessful.  Lawrence Camp, Roosevelts candidate in Georgia, came in a distant third 
in the Democratic primary, received only 23.9 percent of the vote.  In Maryland, 
Roosevelt requested Harold Ickes interview potential candidates to oppose Senator 
Millard Tydings (Ickes 1954, 279).  But their choice, Representative John Lewis, finished 
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some 6,000 votes behind Tydings despite the Administration funneling money and 
Administration spokesmen actively stumping for Lewis.  South Carolinas Governor Olin 
Johnston made some headway but Senator Smiths appeals to states rights and white 
supremacy solidify his political support and carried him to a comfortable victory 
(Patterson 1967, 282 and 284). 
 Roosevelts efforts were not a total loss.  Six senators Roosevelt endorsed and 
actively supported won reelection.114  However, it was clear from the outcome that 
Roosevelt and the New Dealers did not have sufficient political strength or popular 
support to turn the South into a bastion of progressive values.  Senator Glass had warned 
that the Southern people may wake up too late to find that the negrophiles who are 
running the Democratic Party now will soon precipitate another Reconstruction period 
for us (as quoted in Patterson 1967, 285).  The liberal wing of the Party may truly have 
held such a desire but it was not to be.  Yet, New Dealers walked away from the 
campaign unbowed.  Harold Ickes noted that the fight the President has been making 
was necessary and proper.  After all, we do not want to go into 1940 without the issue 
having been drawn between the New Deal and the Old Deal in the Democratic [P]arty 
(1954, 466).  The election of 1938 showed that Roosevelt and the New Dealers would not 
back away from their progressive agenda.  It also showed that the South would not be 
pushed out of the Democratic Party and that the Party needed to contend with both its 
liberal and conservative wings and find a way to mitigate the growing intra-party tension.  
►◄ 
                                                                                                                                            
prior. 
114 Those senators were Peppers, Hill, Barkley, Caraway, Bulkley, and Thomas. 
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From 1939 through 1946, race faded into the background of American politics as the 
nation turned its attention to the increasing instability in Europe and Asia and eventually 
to winning the Second World War.  As Klinkner and Smith noted, 
[T]he Roosevelt administration was at a loss as to how to handle racial 
issues.  Jonathan Daniels, one of the presidents closest advisors on race 
matters, typified this quandary.  In August 1942, he mused that he was 
extremely disturbed about the state of Negro-white relationships 
because he saw the rising instance of Negroes on their rights now 
conflicting with the rising tide of white feeling against Negroes.  
Although black demands were logically strong, meeting them would 
leave the country so divided in home angers that we would lack the 
strength for victory over our Fascist enemies (1999, 176). 
 
So, although race remained an important issue in American politics, during the war, the 
Democratic Party turned its attention away from race in a way that it did not do either 
before or after the war.  African Americans secured a few gains during this period, 
including Roosevelts creation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee in 1941
the signing of which Mary McCleod Bethune declared the most memorable day since 
Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation (Kirby 1980, 119).  Yet, African 
American gains in employment protection were offset by delays in political and social 
advancement.  As Klinkner and Smith stated, the Roosevelt administrations efforts to 
maintain racial peace during the war cut both ways.  Just as it was willing to make 
concessions to blacks to advance its political agenda and help the war effort, it was also 
willing to make concessions to whites for the same reasons (1999, 178).  Following the 
cessation of hostilities and the return of thousands of African American veterans from the 
European and the Pacific theaters, race once again came to the fore of American politics.  
Yet, during the transitions from peace to war to peace again, the United States Supreme 
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Court transformed from a bastion of conservative jurisprudence to a co-equal partner in 
the pursuit for a new progressive deal.   
  
The Roosevelt Court 
 At the start of 1937, the Supreme Court was composed of four conservative (Van 
Devanter, Sutherland, Butler, and McReynolds), three liberals (Brandeis, Cardozo, and 
Stone), and two moderates who tended to lean conservative on economic regulation prior 
to 1937 (Hughes and Roberts).  With four appointments between 1937-1939, Roosevelt 
altered the ideological disposition of the Court and created a new progressive 
constitutionalism that more easily fit the politics of the New Deal.  As Kevin McMahon 
asserted, the Roosevelt administrations judicial policy was primarily formulated as part 
of a larger institutional program  one that sought to supplant the existing institutional 
arrangement with one better suited to advance the values he endorsed (2004, 99).  By 
the time Truman assumed the presidency in 1945, nine proven New Dealers sat on the 
Court and its jurisprudence was distinctly progressive. 
The Roosevelt Court gave early indication that it would defer to congressional 
judgment on matters of national economic regulation.115  However, in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.,116 the Court declared that no such deference would be given to 
legislation that attempted to curtail the rights of minorities.117  The Courts follow ups on 
                                                
115 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 
(1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
116 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
117 In paragraphs two and three of the famed footnote four, Justice Stone wrote: It is unnecessary to 
consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected 
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under 
the general prohibitions of the 14th Amendment than are most other types of legislationNor need we 
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Carolene Products and the protection of racial minorities was ambiguous at best.  In 
Hirabayshi v. United States118 and Korematsu v. United States119 the Court ruled that 
distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature 
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality120 
and that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect . . . [and] courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.121  
However, in both cases, the government restrictions on persons of Japanese ancestry 
withstood the applied scrutiny.  The Courts application of the new test on racally 
restrictive laws may have netted few positive results but it showed that the Roosevelt 
Court would set a higher bar in the interest of protecting racial minorities than its 
predecessors. 
The Court soon moved in much more aggressively against racially discriminatory 
legislation .  Once the liberal wing of the Party created conditions ripe for judicial action, 
the Court no longer had to operate atomistically and could function as part of a larger 
political order.  In other words, in order for the Court to begin dismantling racially 
restrictive institutions in the South, the Court needed both sympathetic jurists on the 
bench and the political support necessary to act in accord with their preferences.  Political 
support came from the Truman Administration and the liberal wing of the Democratic 
Party when the liberal wing of the Party sought to maintain power and reconstituting the 
                                                                                                                                            
enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religiousor 
racial minorities; whether prejudice against discrete and insult minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 
118 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
119 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
120 320 U.S. 81, at 100. 
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Party during a period of acute intra-party tension between liberals and southern 
conservatives.  This balancing act could only occur with the help of the Supreme Court.  
Truman used the Court as a means of reaching out to African American voters and, in so 
doing, used the Court as a transformative vehicle for the national Democratic coalition.  
 
Truman and the Reconstruction of the Democratic Party 
 Initially, the liberal wing of the Party was concerned that Truman would not 
follow Roosevelts liberal, activist agenda.  In 1945, Truman replaced several liberal 
members of Roosevelts cabinet with moderates.  Tom Clark replaced Frances Biddle in 
the Attorney Generals office and Lewis Schwellenbach replaced Frances Perkins as head 
of the Department of Labor.  One critical columnist claimed that Trumans cabinet was 
composed of Wimpys who could be had for a hamburger (Stone 1972, xxi).  The 
criticism was overstated but Truman clearly operated under different political conditions 
than had Roosevelt.  For the first time since 1932, conservatives, both inside and outside 
the Democratic Party, prophesized a shift to the right in American politics.  Truman, a 
New Dealer from a border state with centrist preferences, seemed likely to help move the 
Party in a conservative direction.  However, Truman soon proved his liberal stripes.  The 
subsequent disintegration of the national Democratic coalition forced liberal Democrats 
into a much more aggressive posture regarding national racial policy than might have 
otherwise occurred. 
 With a strong national economy and victory over the Axis powers, the 
Democratic Party suddenly faced normal politics without a unifying theme.  Throughout 
                                                                                                                                            
121 323 U.S. 214, at 216. 
  120
the 1930s and early 1940s, the Democratic Party united behind the need for federal 
regulation, domestic aid, and meeting whatever demands the war wrought.  As of 1946, 
the nationand the Democratic Partyfaced a new set of objectives.  For southern 
conservative Democrats, the goal was to ensure economic stability by extending New 
Deal economic regulation but preventing African Americans from gaining social and 
political rights (Frederickson 2001, 47).  For liberal Democrats, the aims were quite 
different.  Throughout the Roosevelt Administration, many New Deal race liberals 
desired to change social and political conditions in the South but Roosevelt had refused to 
divide the party over race (Berman 1970, 7).  However, now that the United States had 
defeated the illiberal Axis powers and African American soldiers had played an important 
role in the Allied victory, liberals increasingly argued that it was time to bring federal 
power to bear on the segregated South (Klinkner and Smith 1999, 200-1).  Moreover, 
African Americans, especially African American veterans, increasingly demanded both 
attention from political institutions and substantial action on their behalf.  By including 
African Americans in many New Deal economic programs, black voters increasingly cast 
their ballot on behalf of Democratic candidates, particularly in the North.  
Unsurprisingly, African Americans looked first to the Democratic Party to act upon their 
demands.  For these reasons, the intra-party tension within the Democratic Party grew 
from considerable to profound in a relatively short period of time.  Such was the state of 
the Democratic Party Harry Truman inherited.  But the question remained, how would 
the Party manage the growing intra-party tension that threatened to divide the Party? 
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 Southern conservatives believed that Truman was sure to side with them.  Truman 
came from Missouri and may have briefly affiliated himself with the Ku Klux Klan 
(Berman 1970, 9).  Privately, Truman used racial slurs when referring to African 
Americans (Klinkner and Smith 1999, 206).  However, his tenure in the Senate told a 
more sympathetic story.  Truman consistently voted in a pro-civil rights fashion and 
supported greater federal protection of African Americans.  In fact, only once did 
Truman stray from the pro-civil rights side of the issue (Fink and Hilty 1973, 220).  
Historians have suggested that Trumans pro-civil liberties came from a variety of 
sources including political demands wrought by the constituency of the Pendergast 
political machine in Missouri (Berman 1970, 10; Fink and Hilty 1973, 229), his 
friendship with Justice Louis Brandeis (Savage 1997, 10), and personal sympathies 
(Sitkoff 1971, 599).  Whatever the motivation, Truman was among the most liberal 
members of the Senate on the issue of civil liberties and minority protection.   
 Of course, if Truman followed this course of action due to constituency demands, 
it was plausible that Truman would alter his priorities upon reaching the White House.  
Afterall, the country and the Democratic Party had moved away from the extreme liberal 
activist agenda following 1938.  Truman, a moderate within the Party, could easily have 
abandoned his commitment to civil rights and gained greater support in the conservative 
South.  However, Truman did not follow the path that would have led him to greatest 
support in the South.  Instead, he slowly sided with the liberal wing of the Party and 
developed a pro-civil rights agenda that secured greater political, social, and economic 
protection for African Americans.     
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The Move Toward Racial Egalitarianism 
 In the 1946 congressional elections, the Republican  Party won a lopsided victory 
and the African American vote played a major role in aiding the Republican cause.  As 
Frederickson explains, 
Between 1941 and 1944 more than 1 million southern blacks had migrated 
to northern cities where there was no systematic denial of the franchise.  
African Americans had turned from the party of Lincoln and had voted 
overwhelmingly for Franklin Roosevelt in 1936, but they had slowly 
begun to return to the Republican Party, which seemed to be more 
amendable and sensitive to their demands (2001, 52). 
 
The liberal wing of the Democratic Party had grown dependent upon African Americans 
as party of their voting constituency.  Their possible defection to the Republican Party 
threatened both the liberal wings dominant position in the Party and the Democrats 
ability to hold national power.  As a result, liberal Democrats recognized the need to act 
to shore up their coalition despite the threat of southern conservative flight from the 
Party. 
 The demands of securing the African American vote also played into the hands of 
the far left of the liberal wing, which was growing increasingly discontented with the 
Partys moderation.  In 1946, Truman forced Henry Wallace to resign as Secretary of 
Agriculture.  Wallace, the former Vice President whom Truman replaced, was a well-
known radical on civil rights issues and revered among African American voters.  The 
loss of Wallace on the ticket and his departure from the cabinet caused African 
Americans to view the post-Roosevelt Democratic Party with growing skepticism.  To 
make matters worse, Wallace threatened to start a far-left campaign, which would siphon 
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voters from the Partys liberal wing.122  Thus, Truman and his liberal allies embarked on 
a course that attempted to maintain Party unity while bolstering the strength of the liberal 
wing of the Party.   
 On June 26, 1946, Truman sent a message to the annual convention of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).  In the letter, 
Truman roundly endorsed African American efforts to secure their voting rights.  The 
ballot is both a right and a privilege.  The right to use it must be protected and its use by 
everyone must be encouraged.  Lastly, every veteran and every citizen . . . must be 
protected from all forms of organized terrorism.123  Truman left out the details on how 
those rights ought to be secured but the letter was an initial step to woo African American 
voters but it soon became apparent that he would rely on the Justice Department and the 
courts as the vehicles to deliver the African American vote. 
 Just four days later, Truman ordered the Justice Department to investigate 
incidents of racial violence in the South.  In large part, Trumans action came in response 
to the growing violence.  The national news covered a series of violent incidents, which 
led to a rise in national concern over racially motivated violence.124  In September, 
Truman took another step against racially motivated violence when he met with the 
National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence.  Walter White, the chief 
spokesman for the committee and executive secretary of the NAACP, presented Truman 
                                                
122 Wallace eventually did join the Progressive Party to much fanfare.  However, the Party did not make a 
significant impact as Truman moved to the left and undercut many of the Progressive criticisms regarding 
racial policy.  In addition, the Democratic Party engaged in a whisper campaign that linked the Progressive 
Party with communism, which undermined any chance at widespread appeal.  
123 Streator, George.  Negro Groups Aim at Wider Privilege.  New York Times June 27, 1946, 19. 
124 For example, one gruesome event involved the Ku Klux Klan murdering four African American couples 
on their way to work.  Several individuals were arrested and tried but all were acquitted.  The matter was 
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with a petition calling for a special session of Congress to pass legislation that would 
address the escalating violence in the South.  White recalled that after informing the 
President of the magnitude of the violence, Truman exclaimed My God!  I had no idea it 
was as terrible as that!  Weve got to do something! (as quoted in White 1948, 330-1).  
Following the meeting, Truman promised to appoint a commission on civil rights.   
Three months later, merely a month after the Democratic defeat in the 1946 
congressional elections, Truman made good on his promise and issued Executive Order 
9008, which created the Presidents Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR).  The order 
authorized the Committee to inquire into and to determine whether and in what respect 
current law enforcement measures and the authority and means possessed by federal, 
state, and local governments may be strengthened and improved to safeguard the civil 
rights of the people.  The Committee was further empowered to make 
recommendations with respect to the adoption or establishment, by legislation or 
otherwise, of more adequate and effective means and procedures for the protection of 
civil rights . . . .125 
If the South was alarmed by Trumans behavior, it didnt waste much energy in 
publicly opposing his rhetoric or the creation of the PCCR.  In fact, relative silence from 
the southern press followed Trumans announcement.126  Based on the non-reaction from 
southern political leaders and the press, southern Democrats had little motivation for 
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125 Executive Order 9008, 11 Federal Record 14153. 
126 In fact, neither the northern press nor the southern press made much ado of Trumans creation of PCCR.  
The New York Times made no mention of the Committee in the week immediately following its creation.  
The PCCRs publicity came after it rendered its famous report.   
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partisan revolt based on indirect or symbolic civil libertarian action.  However, direct 
action by the Administration to end segregation drew a different response.   
On January 8, 1947, Truman sent his annual economic report to Congress. One of 
his legislative proposals was the familiar request to create a permanent fair employment 
practices commission.  According to Truman: 
We must end discrimination in employment or wages against certain 
classes of workers regardless of their individual abilities. Discrimination 
against certain racial and religious groups, against workers in late middle 
age, and against women, not only is repugnant to the principles of our 
democracy, but often creates artificial "labor shortages" in the midst of 
labor surplus. Employers and unions both need to reexamine and revise 
practices resulting in discrimination. I recommend that, at this session, the 
Congress provide permanent Federal legislation dealing with this 
problem.127 
 
Southern Democrats did not receive this proposal with the same ambivalence as they did 
Trumans creation of the PCCR.  Rather, the response was quite hostile. 
 The New York Times reported that Trumans report split Congress, particularly 
within his own Party.  As C. P. Trussell reported, The Presidents recommendation for 
laws prohibiting racial and religious discrimination seemed to dispel the relief among 
Southern Democrats that was manifest after delivery of the State of the Union 
message.128  Proposals for legislative action evoked a response among southern 
conservatives that using the Justice Department and the courts did not.  Truman and other 
liberal Democrats quickly recognized the strategic advantage of using a court-centered 
strategy for realizing egalitarian racial policy. 
                                                
127 Harry S. Truman, Special Message to Congress: The Presidents First Economic Report, January 8, 
1947.  Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12828&st=&st1=.  (Visited on 
December 30, 2004) 
128 Trussell, C.P. Congress is Split on Truman Report. New York Times, January 9, 1947, 15. 
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 Liberal Democrats knew well the animosity their southern brethren held for a 
permanent FEPC.  Given their ardent opposition, one wonders why Truman would peruse 
a proposal that would exacerbate intra-party tension.  Trumans proposal was designed as 
a response to Republican efforts to secure African American voters in the North.  In 
1944, the Republican Party platform included a plank to make the FEPC permanent.129  
The Republican Party created a strategy to steal African American voters away from the 
New Deal coalition.  While the effort failed in 1944,  African Americans voted 
Republican in large numbers in 1946.  According to one analysis of the 1946 
congressional elections, the shift from the Democrats [among African American voters] 
was evident in virtually every area (Miller 1948, 328).  With the 1948 presidential 
election looming, Truman needed to protect against losing African American voters even 
if that meant risking southern aggravation.   
 The liberal wing of the Democratic Party eagerly supported the creation of a 
permanent FEPC but failed to secure the bills passage.  Southern Democrats, with the 
aid of unenthusiastic conservative Republicans, obstructed the passage of the measure by 
filibustering it to its legislative grave; a tactic that worked in 1946 as well.130  The lack of 
Republican support on the bill was enough to cast doubt on the sincerity of the Partys 
racial egalitarianism.  Moreover, the complete inability of the liberal wing of the 
Democratic Party to make the FEPC permanent reveals its inability to enact progressive 
economic and social reform.   
                                                
129 Republican Party Platform of 1944.  Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1944.  (Visited on December 30, 2004) 
130 Foes Admit Success of FEPC filibuster. Christian Science Monitor February 8, 1946, 16. 
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 Since African Americans demanded tangible policy changes in exchange for their 
vote, liberal elected officials needed to secure substantial victories in order to continue 
holding office.  Of course, if the Party was also to continue holding power, party elites in 
government needed to find a way to balance the pursuit of the African American vote and 
the interests of southern conservatives.  As the liberal wing soon realized direct executive 
action divded the Party but court action did not have the same effect.  When the liberal 
wing moved toward direct action, the Party experience a serious rift between the 
conservative and liberal wings that would not heal until the Party compromised by using 
the courts as the primary vehicle for addressing national race policy. 
Sent to President Truman on October 29, 1947, the PCCRs report, entitled To 
Secure These Rights, was a bold and forthright critique of the failings of modern 
American democracy when it came to racial equality.  Sections three and four of To 
Secure These Rights were perhaps the most importantand most damagingto the 
Democratic Party.  Section three declared that the federal government must strengthen 
the right to citizenship and its privileges.131  Yet, the PCCR suggested a strategy that 
became central to the Democratic strategy on civil rights.  The PCCR singled out the 
importance of the federal government becoming involved in civil rights litigation before 
the Supreme Court through amicus curiae briefs.  The Truman Administration used this 
strategy to great effect and, in so doing, made the Supreme Court vital to transforming 
the Democratic Partys national coalition.   
 Section four detailed a program for action that sought to improve federal 
administrative capacity so to make it possible for the federal government to address 
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violations of civil rights.  Specifically, the PCCR proposed to make the Civil Rights 
Section of the Justice Department a full division and create a permanent Commission on 
Civil Rights.  The PCCR also urged congressional approval of these measures rather than 
rely only on direct executive action, thus, giving civil rights policy greater democratic 
legitimacy.  Despite the unlikelihood of passing pro-civil rights legislation, the PCCR 
outlined a slate of legislative programs it desired Congress to enact.  Such measures 
included greater protection of citizenship rights through the abolition of the poll tax and 
guaranteeing the right to participate in federal primary and general elections, and 
immediate integration of the armed forces.    
 Truman received the report with great warmth and optimism.  In his official 
statement, Truman hoped the PCCRs report would compare favorably to the Declaration 
of Independence and hoped it would become an American charter of freedom in our 
time.132  The response should not have been a surprise to conservative southern 
Democrats who had grown fearful of Trumans direction following his speech to the 
NAACP four months prior.  In that speech, the President boldly declared,  
We must make the federal government a friendly, vigilant defender of the 
rights and equalities of all Americans. And again I mean all Americans . . . 
[W]e can no longer afford the luxury of a leisurely attack upon prejudice 
and discrimination. There is much that State and local governments can do 
in providing positive safeguards for civil rights. But we cannot, any 
longer, await the growth of a will to action in the slowest State or the most 
backward community.  Our National Government must show the way.133 
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Truman was singling out southern states that lagged behind the rest of the country in 
accommodating even the loosest conception of equality among its citizens.  Bringing 
federal power to bear against backward regions of the country was entirely in line with 
the proposals of the PCCR and Truman largely endorsed the need for effective Federal 
Action.134 
 Other members of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party endorsed the PCCRs 
conclusions.  Representative Chet Holifield (D-CA) professed, Everything I saw in it 
was all right . . . It is the most valuable and complete report that has been published in the 
field (as quoted in Berman 1970, 71).  Senator Lucas (D-IL) commended the Committee 
and stated that it has dealt courageously with some fundamentals that the people of this 
country have got to recognize sooner or later and [the] sooner the better (1970, 71).  
As was expected, southern reaction was not nearly so congenial.  Representative 
L. Mendel Rivers (D-SC) criticized the report as a brazen and monumental insult to the 
Democratic South and the southern way of life for both white and colored (as quoted in 
Frederickson 2001, 65).  While the reaction of southern lawmakers tended to focus on the 
states rights issue, the white southern public made more direct and more racist 
criticisms.  One southerner wrote, Mr. President, if the dogooders and Damyankees 
would keep their noses out of our Business as regarding the Negroes of the South we will 
get along fine as we have been getting along for years . . . Your civil rights body is fixing 
to stir up more Hell and Damnation than Carter has oats (as quoted in Billington 1973, 
131).  A southern minister provided a more political critique when he argued, If that 
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report is carried out you wont be elected dog catcher in 1948 (1973, 132).  Even 
southern newspapers decried the PCCRs report as an attempt to extinguish a 
smouldering and slowly dying fire by drenching it with gasoline (1973, 131).  Southern 
members of the Democratic Party in the electorate were beginning to waiver in their 
support for Truman and the Democratic Party outside of the South due to their stance on 
civil rights; these sentiments only degraded after liberals publicly endorsed most of the 
PCCRs recommendations.   
On February 2, 1948, Truman sent a special message to Congress regarding civil 
rights that endorsed ten of the PCCRs recommendations.135  Four of those ten directly 
targeted southern segregation: an anti-lynching bill, protecting the right to vote, the 
creation of a permanent FEPC, and prohibiting discrimination in interstate transportation 
facilities.  Along with these provisions, Truman pleaded with Congress to pass all of his 
legislative proposals: 
The Federal Government has a clear duty to see that Constitutional 
guarantees of individual liberties and of equal protection under the laws 
are not denied or abridged anywhere in our Union. That duty is shared by 
all three branches of the Government, but it can be fulfilled only if the 
                                                
135 The ten recommendations were as follows:  
1. Establishing a permanent Commission on Civil Rights, a Joint Congressional Committee on Civil Rights, 
and a Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice. 
2. Strengthening existing civil rights statutes. 
3. Providing Federal protection against lynching. 
4. Protecting more adequately the right to vote, 
5. Establishing a Fair Employment Practice Commission to prevent unfair discrimination in employment. 
6. Prohibiting discrimination in interstate transportation facilities. 
7. Providing home-rule and suffrage in Presidential elections for the residents of the District of Columbia. 
8. Providing Statehood for Hawaii and Alaska and a greater measure of self-government for our island 
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9. Equalizing the opportunities for residents of the United States to become naturalized citizens. 
10. Settling the evacuation claims of Japanese-Americans. 
 
Harry S. Truman, Special Message to Congress on Civil Rights, February 2, 1948.  Available at 
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Congress enacts modern, comprehensive civil rights laws, adequate to the 
needs of the day, and demonstrating our continuing faith in the free way of 
life.136 
 
The need for a unified front was clear.  It was equally elusive and the liberals in the 
Democratic Party were well aware that these proposals did not have a chance of making 
it past a conservative filibuster in the Senate.   
Yet, the liberal bid to win African American voters by pushing the civil rights 
agenda ostracized white southern voters.  The more it became clear that southern 
Democrats would not support Truman the more imperative it became for Truman and 
liberal Democrats to win the vote of northern African Americans.  In other words, to 
maintain its control over the government and the Party, the liberal wing would have to 
liberalize its domestic policies.  Clark Clifford, Trumans special counsel, devised a 
strategy that would prevent the siphoning of liberal voters by Republicans and a third 
party movement on the left that eventually became the Progressive Party.  Clifford argued 
that since African American voters made up nearly four percent of all potential voters in 
important northern states such as California, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Michigan, and Illinois, the African American vote needed to be secured in order to win 
the general election (Phillips 1966, 197-8).  Most notably, Clifford argued Unless there 
are new and real efforts (as distinguished from mere political gestures which are today 
thoroughly understood and strongly resented by sophisticated Negro leaders), the Negro 
bloc . . . will go Republican (as quoted in Sitkoff 1971, 597).  In other words, any action 
undertaken by Truman would have to be tangible rather than symbolic.  This caused real 
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concern for the Democratic coalition given the conservative wings ability to obstruct 
direct legislative action. 
Based, in part, on the faulty belief by several liberal strategists that the South 
would not defect regardless of how far the Democratic Party moved to the left on 
domestic issues, Truman and the liberal wing increasingly pushed governmental 
action.137  However, these strategists could not have been more wrong.   Senator James 
Eastland (D-MS) declared that the South would fight the liberals attempt to sacrifice 
[the South] on the cross of political expediency (Frederickson 2001, 70).  In relatively 
short order, a sizable number of southern conservatives argued that fighting the 
liberalization of the Democratic Party could include defecting from the Party itself if 
liberals kept pushing the civil rights agenda.  Governor Fielding Wright (D-MS) warned 
that vital principles and eternal truths transcend party lines, and the day is now at hand 
when determined action must be taken (2001, 70).  Similarly, Governor Strom 
Thurmond hinted at defection when he warned that if the Truman Administration did not 
back down from its pro-civil rights stance, the South would flex its collective political 
muscle in the electoral college (2001, 79).  He later warned that the Democratic Party 
could no longer consider the South in the bag (2001, 81).  Mississippi, Alabama, and 
South Carolina state Democratic committees all severed formal relations with the 
Democratic National Committee.   
Not only did the center-left coalition face the threat of southern defection but 
Henry Wallace also threatened to take voters from the leftparticularly labor and 
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Democratic Party went with its domestic agenda (see Sitkoff 1971, 597; Savage 1997, 114). 
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African Americans.  On December 29, 1947, Wallace formally announced his candidacy 
for president under the recently formed Progressive Party.  Wallace and the Progressive 
Party quickly ran into trouble when it appeared as though communists dominated the 
Party.  While members of the Party refuted such claims, the similarities between the 
Progressive platform and the American Communist Party platform were striking (Savage 
1997, 117).  Yet, the potential siphoning of votes was sufficiently real to cause concern 
within the liberal wing of the Democratic Party.138 
 The liberal wing faced a threat of defection from both wings of the Party.  
Liberals needed to either uphold the status quo within the Party and hope that southern 
conservatives would rally or push the liberalization of the Party and hope that the African 
American defection to the Republican Party in 1946 was an aberration.  Truman guided 
the liberal wing to choose the latter and embarked on a strategy designed to capture 
African American votes.  In so doing, Truman began the process of weaning the national 
Democratic coalition off its dependence on the conservative South while bolstering the 
strength of the liberal coalition. 
Trumans special message to Congress on civil rights inaugurated the new 
strategy.  However, since the conservative bloc could obstruct legislative action in 
Congress, Truman adopted the PCCRs recommendation to attack segregation through 
the courts.  Using a court-centered strategy for attacking the segregated South had two 
advantages.  First, unlike working through the Congress, the strategy had a decent chance 
of being successful as the Supreme Court was now populated by liberal-minded jurists 
                                                
138 Democratic strategists Clifford and Rowe advocated for greater movement to the left than to the right as 
they feared defection to Wallace more than they the defection of southern conservatives (see Frederickson 
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appointed by Roosevelt, which had recently awarded African Americans several 
important legal victories.139   
 The second advantage to a court-centered strategy was that it proved less 
damaging to the national coalition than direct executive or legislative action.  
Administration involvement in civil rights pending before the Court did not elicit 
condemnation by southern Democrats.   In fact, they rarely protested against the federal 
governments involvement in civil rights litigation.  Trumans decision to file an amicus 
curiae brief in Shelley v. Kraemer140the first time the federal government had filed a 
brief in such a casedid not cause an uproar among southern lawmakers, the southern 
                                                                                                                                            
2001, 68-9; Savage 1997, 113-120). 
139 During the mid-1940s, the Court ruled in Smith v. Allwright that the white primary was 
unconstitutional.  In their holding, the eight member majority ruled that since the white primary was 
established by state convention, the action was not merely that of a private group but a state agency.  
Justice Reed wrote: 
 
We think that this statutory system for the selection of party nominees for inclusion on 
the general election ballot makes the party which is required to follow these legislative 
directions an agency of the state in so far as it determines the participants in a primary 
election. The party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it 
by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are 
performed by a political party. (321 U.S. 649 at 663) 
 
The Courts action in Allwright led to the abandonment of numerous efforts to save the white primary 
system (Sullivan and Gunther 2001, 876).  Allwright is particularly notable as Attorney General Francis 
Biddle rejected [the Civil Rights Sections] argument that the Solicitor Generals Office should file an 
amicus curiae brief in support of the challenge (McMahon 2004, 153).  The willingness of the Roosevelt 
Court to attack such vestiges of white political supremacy in the absence of direct political support 
indicated that the Court would be willing to do so again, especially at the direct request of the executive. 
 Two years later, the Supreme Court issued a ruling that invalidated a Virginia state law that 
required all passenger motor vehicle carriers, both interstate and intrastate, to separate without 
discrimination the white and colored passengers in their motor buses so that contiguous seats will not be 
occupied by persons of different races at the same time. (Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 374)   Justice 
Reed, writing for an eight member majority, argued that the Virginia statute created a burden on interstate 
commerce and declared that the need for a single, uniform rule to promote and protect national travel 
required the Court to nullify the statute.  Interestingly, Reed also speculated, in dicta, that the increasing 
mobility of Americans may require greater federal co-optation of state regulation of racial association in 
interstate commerce.  When the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court leaned on its line of 
precedent dating back to Morgan to support congressional authority (see Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241). 
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press, or white southern voters.  When comparing the reaction to Trumans court-
centered action to the reaction to his civil rights legislative program, the contrast is 
striking for the lack of tumult in the former.   
 The low-profile, court-centered attack on segregation benefited the Democratic 
Party because it decreased intra-party tension by avoiding direct legislative action.  While 
southern conservatives desired the maintenance of the status quo and were willing to 
obstruct proposed legislation that would alter it, southern Democrats never threatened 
defection due to Justice Department involvement in civil litigation against segregationist 
practices.  The same cannot be said of Trumans attempts to press a civil rights agenda 
through Congress.  Moreover, the NAACPone of the most active, visible, and 
successful organizations attempting to realize equal citizenship rights for African 
Americansused a legal, rights-based strategy to attack Jim Crow laws so elite African 
American leaders were attuned to Justice Department activity (Meier and Bracey 1999, 
8).  So, by attacking Jim Crow through the courts, Truman enabled himself and other 
liberal Democrats to claim credit with the African American community while limiting 
the damage among southern conservatives.   
 On October 30, 1947, the Justice Department announced its intention to file an 
amicus curiae brief in support of the NAACP-backed request that the Supreme Court rule 
racially restrictive covenants on real property violated the Fourteenth Amendments 
requirement of equal protection.  Shelley was quite monumental, even before the 
decision, in that it was the first time the government joined a civil rights case in which 
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private litigants were the only parties (Kluger 2004, 250).  The chief author of the 
governments brief, Philip Elman, was well aware of what was driving the governments 
sudden interest in civil rights cases.  Elman recounted: 
Trumans Gallup poll ratings at that time were very low; it looked as 
though whoever was going to run against him in 1948, probably Dewey, 
would beat him badly.  Tom Clark was Attorney General, and both he and 
[Solicitor General Philip] Perlman were political animals, very much 
aware of the Negro vote . . . Well, I dont know exactly what happened.  
Probably Tom Clark mad the decision after checking with Truman (1987, 
817). 
 
The Justice Department was being called upon to provide the new and real action141 
Clifford had suggested in his electoral strategy.   
 In the governments brief, Elman played to the central principles of American 
citizenship and wrote that the covenants cannot be reconciled with the spirit of mutual 
tolerance and respect for the dignity and rights of the individual which give vitality to our 
democratic way of life (as quoted in Kluger 2004, 252).  Elman claimed that the brief 
was a statement of national policy (1987, 819).  Whether the governments brief truly 
articulated national policy had yet to be determined but the brief certainly made clear the 
executive strongly desired the Supreme Court to make racially restrictive covenants 
impermissible. 
 As noted above, the Justice Department reasonably believed that the Court would 
respond positively to its brief based on its decisions in Smith and Morgan.  However, a 
successful outcome was far form preordained.  In fact, three of the nine sitting justices 
recused themselves and there was speculation that these justices had likely signed 
restrictive covenants in their real property holdings (Kluger 2004, 253).  More 
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problematic, Chief Justice Vinson voted to uphold housing covenants when he sat on the 
DC Circuit Court of Appeals.142   
 Yet, the six members of the Court143 who sat for the case unanimously agreed that 
restrictive covenants were judicially unenforceable and, thus, rendered impotent.  Writing 
for the majority, Chief Justice Vinson abandoned his reasoning in Hundley v. Gorewitz144 
and adopted the governments position on state action within the sphere of judicial 
enforcement.  While Vinson did not adopt Elmans flowery language of the principles of 
citizenship and the aspirations of democracy, he did adopt similar legal reasoning 
regarding state action in restrictive covenants.  The governments brief stated: 
It cannot successfully be argued that the decrees involved in these cases do 
not constitute governmental action because the courts have acted solely to 
enforce private contractual or property rights . . . A court which enforces a 
contract is not merely a mechanical instrumentality for effectuating the 
will of the contracting parties. The law enforces contracts because there is 
a public interest in placing the force of the state behind the effectuation of 
private agreements not contrary to any recognized social policy.145 
 
Chief Justice Vinson echoed this sentiment by declaring: 
It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported 
by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to 
occupy the properties in question without restraint . . . [T]hese are cases in 
which the States have made available to such individuals the full coercive 
power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or 
color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are 
willing and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing 
to sell. The difference between judicial enforcement and nonenforcement 
of the restrictive covenants is the difference to petitioners between being 
                                                                                                                                            
141 See supra note 151. 
142 Hundley v. Gorewitz, 132 F.2d 23 (1942). Wiley Rutledge, who sat for Shelley v. Kraemer, dissented in 
this case. 
143 Of the six member majority, four of the justices were Roosevelt appointees (Black, Douglas, 
Frankfurter, and Murphy) and two were Truman appointees (Vinson and Burton). 
144 See supra note 160. 
145 1947 WL 30432, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae. 
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denied rights of property available to other members of the community 
and being accorded full enjoyment of those rights on an equal footing.146 
 
The Court effectively ended restrictive covenants and handed opponents of segregation 
their first major victory.  Several years after the Courts ruling in Shelley, a leading 
scholar concluded that the governments brief most likely was decisive in the case 
(Abrams 1955, 220). Yet, southern lawmakers directed zero criticism toward the 
Administration for joining the suit and, instead, directed their frustration and anger at the 
Supreme Court.147 
  The need for a court-centered strategy was made all the more apparent by the 
utter failure of liberal lawmakers to gain passage of any of Trumans ten civil rights 
proposals.  All ten proposals sent to Congress were either killed off in committee, 
filibustered, or never came to a vote.  The liberal wing of the Party was neither large 
enough nor sufficiently well-placed to overcome southern obstruction.  Moveover, 
tension between the two wings of the Party was sufficiently high to make a direct 
legislative assault a recipe for electoral defeat.  The possibility of achieving new and 
real action through legislative activity looked virtually impossible in 1948.   
 To make matters worse for Democratic hopes of regaining control of Congress 
and holding the presidency, leading southern Democrats formed several committees and 
conferences that sought to devise a response to the liberalization of the Democratic Party.  
These committees reached a consensus to keep Truman from winning the Democratic 
nomination for a second term.  If that failed, many southern Democrats threatened to 
leave the Party and form a third states rights party.  Moreover, southern lawmakers 
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rallied in both the House and Senate against Truman.  Fifty-two southern Democrats in 
the House formally condemned Trumans civil rights proposal.148  Twenty-one southern 
Democratic brethren in the Senate vowed to stand guard to protect against any civil 
rights measure becoming law.149 
 As southern lawmakers voiced their displeasure with the liberal wings desire to 
legislate new civil rights protections for African Americans, the southern voting public 
abandoned Truman.  As historian Harvard Sitkoff recounts: 
George Gallup reported the Presidents support in the South dropped form 
59 percent in October 1947 to 35 percent in late March 1948.  In that same 
period the number of southerners disapproving Trumans policies leaped 
from 18 to 57 percent.  Another Gallup poll indicated southern voters to be 
nine-to-one against the civil rights program (1971, 602). 
 
The possibility of losing the entire South led Truman to back off his civil rights 
legislative agenda until after the national Democratic convention.  But for Truman and 
other liberal Democrats, the trick was to minimize defection in the South while securing 
policy victories to secure the vote of northern African Americans. 
 To minimize southern defection and maximize civil rights claims, Truman and 
liberal Democrats relied on a court-centered strategy.  In the words of Philip Elman, the 
Solicitor Generals Office was now in business looking for Supreme Court civil rights 
cases in which to intervene as amicus curiae (1987, 820).  With this in mind, the 
Solicitor General submitted another amicus brief in the only other civil rights case before 
the CourtTakahashi v. Fish and Game Commission.150  As with Shelley, the 
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governments involvement resulted in another success and the Supreme Court struck 
down a California state law that effectively denied commercial fishing licenses to 
Japanese residents not eligible for citizenship.  Justice Black rebuked the California law 
declaring, The Fourteenth Amendment and the laws adopted under its authority . . . 
embody a general policy that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide 'in any state' 
on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws.151  The 
Courts ruling in Takahashi did not garner the same excitement as did Shelley, however, 
the Justice Departments involvement still signaled that Truman had committed his 
Administration to fighting racially restrictive legislation; a fact that the mainstream media 
observed.152   
 The victories provided by the Court in May and June of 1948 enabled Truman to 
back off his civil rights agenda until after the Democratic national convention.  In early 
July, the Democrats convened to draft a national platform and select a nominee for the 
1948 general election.  The major point of contention centered on drafting a civil rights 
plank consistent with liberal hopes for action yet also reserved enough for southern 
conservatives.  Despite Trumans declaration that there [would] be no compromise on 
any point of his civil rights program,153 his actionsor inactionsent a different 
message and gave southern Democrats hope that northern liberals would not push the 
civil rights issue.  Specifically, southern Democrats hoped to secure a replica of the 1944 
civil rights plank, which contained only vaguely stated aspirations for equality.154  Of 
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course, a plank so benign would certainly provide sufficient incentive for African 
Americans to continue the Republican voting pattern started in 1946 and put Dewey in 
the White House. 
 Leading up to the Democratic national convention, Truman had grave concerns 
over securing the Party nomination, especially in light of southern opposition.  Yet, 
Trumans concern dissipated five days before the convention when Dwight Eisenhower 
sent a letter to Senator Pepper (D-FL) that unambiguously confirmed that he would not 
accept the Democratic presidential nomination.  This put an end to the draft 
Eisenhower movement that was, oddly, popular among both the left and the right wings 
of the Democratic Party.155  Trumans only other competition was Senator Richard 
Russell of Georgia who pushed a strong states rights agenda that played well in the 
South.  However, Russells platform faltered everywhere else and Truman secured the 
nomination on the second ballot. 
 As with many national party conventions, the real tumult came when the typical 
legislative coalitions began to splinter over the fight for Party control.  In the case of the 
Democratic Party in 1948, the civil rights plank pulled at the standard liberal-
conservative coalitions and led to some unexpected results.  As noted above, Truman and 
many members of the center-left coalition believed that the general election mandated a 
unified Party and that a strong civil rights plank would push the South to the breaking (or 
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rights.  (Porter and Johnson 1956, 404). 
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bolting) point.  Truman proposed a plank that ambiguously affirmed the belief that racial 
and religious minorities must have the right to live, the right to work, the right to vote, 
but avoid any specific recommendations as to how to realize such aspirations.  The plank 
was particularly vague when contrasted with Trumans ten point program proposed to 
Congress just five months prior and the recent aggressiveness of the Justice Department.  
Based on the initial support for Trumans proposal, centrist party elites evidently desired 
to build a Democratic platform based on compromise and unity.  However, the best laid 
schemes of mice and men oft go astray156 and so to did the plans for a compromise on a 
vague civil rights plank.   
 The Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), formed by members of the far-left 
wing of the Party, emerged as a potent force in the push for a more progressive civil 
rights plank.  Led by Hubert Humphrey, a member of the platform drafting committee, 
the ADA forced a potent and specific civil rights proposal to the convention floor for 
debate and a vote.  Given that a sizable portion of the ADA came from northern states 
where the disputed African American vote would matter most, they likely pushed strong 
a strong civil rights plank because of Republican efforts to win northern African 
American voters by adopting the following civil rights plank into their platform: 
Lynching or any other form of mob violence anywhere is a disgrace to any 
civilized state, and we favor the prompt enactment of legislation end this 
infamy. 
 
One of the basic principles of this Republic is the equality of all 
individuals in their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  This 
principles is enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and embodied 
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in the Constitution of the United States; it was vindicated on the field of 
battle and became the cornerstone of this Republic.  This right of equal 
opportunity to work and to advance in life should never be limited in any 
individual because of race, religion, color, or country of origin.  We favor 
the enactment and just enforcement of such Federal legislation as may be 
necessary to maintain this right at all times in every part of this Republic. 
 
We favor the abolition of the poll tax as a requisite to voting. 
 
We are opposed to the idea of racial segregation in the armed services of 
the United States (Porter and Johnson 1956, 452-3). 
 
If northern African American voters dumped the jackass for the elephant, the balance of 
power within the Democratic Party would swing to the conservative bloc.  Humphrey and 
the ADA countered Republican efforts by proposing an even stronger civil rights plank:   
We highly commend President Harry Truman for his courageous stand on 
the issue of civil rights.  We call upon the Congress to support our 
President in guaranteeing these basic and fundamental principles: The 
right of full and equal political participation, the right to equal opportunity 
of employment, the right of security of persons, and the right of equal 
treatment in the service and defense of our Nation (Brown 1948, 181). 
 
In short, the plank would essentially marry the Democratic Party to Trumans ten point 
civil rights program, which only recently caused such turmoil within the Party.   
 To counter the ADAs proposed plank, several southern delegates introduced 
states rights planks.157  These measures garnered great support among southern delegates 
but failed wildly outside of the South and never came close to passing.158  The divide 
between southern conservatives and the rest of the Democratic Party was evident in the 
lack of support for these measures.  On the flip side, the ADA and Humphrey gained 
significant backing for their proposed plank from a coalition of northern African 
Americans and big city bosses.  Both groups needed to protect against potential 
Republican gains that would occur if a weak civil rights plank passed.  The progressive 
plank passed by a vote of 651½ to 582½ and was added to the Democratic platform.   
Truman believed that its inclusion hurt the Democratic Party but he, by no means, 
found it objectionable in principle.  In fact, Trumans acceptance speech did two things.  
                                                
157 Dan Moody (TX), Cecil Sims (TN), and Walter Sillers (MS) each presented states rights planks that 
articulated the principle of state sovereignty and limited federal powers (see Brown 1946, 178; Berman 
1970, 110). 
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First, Truman acknowledged the divide within the Democratic Party over civil rights and 
reaffirmed with which wing of the Party he stood.  Second, Truman attempted to shift the 
blame for the failure to enact his ten point proposal onto the Republican Party despite the 
clear obstruction by southern Democrats.  Truman declared: 
Everybody knows that I recommended to the Congress the civil rights 
program.  I did so because I believe it to be my duty under the 
Constitution.  Some members of my own party disagreed with me 
violently on this matter, but they stand up and do it openly.  People can 
tell where they stand.  But the Republicans all professed to be for those 
measures, but the Eightieth Congress did not act.  They had enough men 
to do it and they could have had cloture.  They didnt have to have a 
filibuster.  There are enough people in that Congress that would vote for 
cloture.159   
 
Faced with a general election, Truman wanted to shift the blame for the failed civil rights 
program onto the Republican Party despite his own Partys recalcitrance on the issue.  
This would be a difficult sell and Truman would soon shift his focus away from casting 
dispersions upon the intentions of Republicans to greater action designed to capture the 
African American vote. 
 
Southern Defection and the Rise of the African American Vote 
 The white southern establishment immediately responded to the inclusion of the 
strong civil rights plank.  Following the conclusion of the Democratic national 
convention, the call went out among disgruntled southern conservative Democrats that 
they needed to discuss their future in the Democratic Party and plan a course of action.  
On July 17, some 5,000-6,000 southerners, predominantly Democrats, responded by 
meeting in Birmingham to discuss the possibility of formally defecting from the 
Democratic Party and forming a third states rights party.  While the purpose of the 
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convention was to push states rights, the issue of race played the most prominent role.160  
Frank Dixon, the former governor of Alabama, gave the keynote address on the first day 
of the states rights convention and articulated the oft-repeated theme of white 
supremacy.  Dixon vehemently argued that Trumans civil rights proposal would reduce 
us to the status of a mongrel, inferior race, mixed in blood, our Anglo-Saxon heritage a 
mockery (as quoted in Frederickson 2001, 137).   
As speaker after speaker took to the floor sounding the familiar themes of race, 
frequently shrouded in the cloak of states rights, consensus built that forming a third 
party was the only viable option.  Once the convention achieved this consensus, the 
delegates diligently set to work selecting a presidential and vice-presidential nominee.  
Eventually, the convention selected Strom Thurmond as the presidential candidate and 
Fielding Wright as the vice-presidential candidate.  The convention also ratified a 
Statement of Principles that outlined eight points centered primarily on state sovereignty 
and their opposition to the elimination of segregation.   
The final strategy to emerge from the convention was, unsurprisingly, 
obstructionist.  The goal of the newly named States Rights Democratic Party161 was to 
capture the 127 Electoral College votes from the South, which would prevent either 
Truman or Republican nominee Thomas Dewey from reaching the 266 electoral votes 
necessary to win the presidency.  In the House, a unified South would control 11 of the 
48 votes, which meant that the South had a strong bargaining position it could use to 
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force the Democratic Party to drop its civil rights plank in return for southern 
reconciliation.   
 With southern defection now tangible, Truman needed to gain the African 
American vote to secure re-election.  Given the stakes, liberal Democrats counseled 
Truman to engage both the courts and direct executive action to secure African American 
voters.  Truman moved on demands made in March 1948 by Grant Reynolds of the 
Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training and A. Philip Randolph of 
the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.  Reynolds and Randolph demanded 
unequivocal anti-segregation and civil rights safeguards for perspective draftees162 or 
threatened that their organizations would organize a campaign of civil disobedience.  As 
Randolph told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 31st, 
This time Negroes will not take a jim crow draft lying down.  The 
conscience of the world will be shaken as by nothing else when thousands 
and thousands of us second-class Americans choose imprisonment in 
preference to permanent military slavery . . . I personally will advise 
Negroes to refuse to fight as slaves for a democracy they cannot possess 
and cannot enjoy (as quoted in Klinkner and Smith 1999, 219).   
 
Realizing that he had the perfect opportunity to win favor with African American voters 
while averting the potentially embarrassing and problematic situation of civil unrest, 
Truman issued Executive Order 9981, which declared that 
the policy of the President . . . shall be equality of treatment and 
opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, 
color, religion, or national origin.  This policy shall be put into effect as 
rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate 
any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale . . . 163  
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The military was to be desegregated and direct action by Truman provided one of the 
most significant civil rights victories to date. 
 On the same day, Truman also issued Executive Order 9980, which required [a]ll 
personnel actions taken by Federal appointing officers [to] be based solely on merit and 
fitness and empowered governmental officers to take appropriate steps to insure that in 
all such actions there shall be no discrimination because of race, color, religion, or 
national origin.164  The order created a review board in each federal agency, so 
governmental employees could appeal if they believed they were subject to 
discrimination.   
African American leaders praised the orders as quickly as southern lawmakers 
condemned them.  Senator Richard Russell (D-GA) roundly declared that the executive 
orders were an  . . . unconditional surrender to . . . the treasonable civil disobedience 
campaign organized by the Negroes . . . 165  Southern and border state newspapers were 
more measured in noting that Trumans orders grew out of the need to win the African 
American vote.  The Shreveport Times labeled the orders as Truman grandstanding to 
try to get back some of the Roosevelt Negro vote which seems to be swinging to the 
Wallace-Communist Progressive banner in some areas (as quoted in Berman 1970, 119).  
The Baltimore Sun wrote, the timing of President Trumans executive orders against 
racial discrimination in civilian government employment and in the armed forces strongly 
suggests that they were politically inspired.166   
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With the Democratic Party now pushing a liberal social agenda and southern 
segregationists defecting in healthy numbers to the Democratic States Rights Party, the 
Party was now dependant on the center-left to win in the fall election.  With the 
Progressive Party floundering under charges of communist capitulation, the far-left of the 
Party stabilized.  However, Truman stilled faced his most significant obstacle to 
reelection, the Republican Partys effort to win northern African American voters. 
Following Trumans efforts through the Justice Department and the two executive 
orders, the Republican controlled Congress attempted to reinvigorate several of the civil 
rights bills pending before it so to woo the national African American vote.  On July 21, 
1947, a cross-party coalition of liberal House Democrats and Republicans passed an anti-
poll tax bill by a vote of 290 to 112.167  However, the measure failed to get past the 
southern filibuster in the Senate.  The same fate met all other civil rights bills.  As 
historian William C. Berman observed, The fact that Congress produced next to nothing 
in the way of significant legislation gave President Truman a ready-made issue: the 
domestic record of the Eightieth Congress (1970, 122).  Truman and liberal Democrats 
consistently used the failure of the Republican controlled Eightieth Congress to pass 
substantial civil rights legislation as a means of luring African American voters.  Of 
course, the fact that southern Democrats were responsible seems like it would render this 
strategy ineffectual.  However, the Dixiecrat secession helped accentuate the differences 
between liberal Democrats and southern conservatives.  By early autumn of 1948, polls 
showed Truman gaining strong support among African Americans in the north and south.  
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In fact, Democratic Party identification among African Americans jumped from 40% in 
1944 to 56% in 1948 (Ladd and Hadley 1975, 60, 112). 
On his final campaign tour, Truman made a speech in Harlemthe first president 
to do so.  According to the New York Times, the audience of approximately 65,000 
received Truman warmly.  Truman concentrated his speech on civil rights and the steps 
he had taken to secure those rights.  In summarizing his accomplishments, he emphasized 
both his executive orders and his court-centered strategy. 
So I went ahead and did what the President can do, unaided by Congress.  
I issued two executive orders.  One of them established the Presidents 
Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed 
Services.  The other covered regulations governing fair employment 
practices within the federal government.  In addition to that, the 
Department of Justice went to the Supreme Court and aided in getting a 
decision outlawing restrictive covenants.168 
 
African American groups did not overlook Trumans strategy.  The National Council of 
Negro Women praised Trumans pro-civil rights agenda and his judicial victory in 
Shelley.169   
Of course, when Truman campaigned in the South, he made no mention of his 
civil rights agenda nor his judicial victories.  In fact, he never mentioned civil rights at 
all.  Instead, Truman played to familiar New Deal themes of economic regulation, wage 
controls, and farm subsidies.  Trumans civil rights policy must have been the proverbial 
pink elephant in the room but the strategy seemed to work as southerners who prospered 
under the New Deal grew increasingly suspicious that the Dixiecrat movement was as 
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much about economic conservatism as it was about protecting segregation (Ader 1953, 
365-6).  In the end, the Democratic States Rights Party only thrived in four states: 
Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.170  The rest of the South continued 
to vote for the Democratic candidate despite significant reservations about the Partys 
new domestic agenda.   
 In what seems counterintuitive, the Dixiecrat movement may have helped Truman 
defeat Thomas Dewey in two ways.  First, southern defection illustrated the ideological 
dissimilarity between southern conservatives and northern and western liberals.  African 
American voters could continue to vote Democratic with confidence that the Party was 
not under the control of southern segregationists.  Second, the failure of the Democratic 
States Rights Party to translate southern solidarity into Dixiecrat voting resulted in 
enough support for Truman that he won the majority of southern states.  
Yet, The failure of the southern segregationists to create a sustainable third party 
movement should not cloud the true key to victory.  The most important votes for both 
Truman and the liberal wing of the Party arguably came from African Americans in 
highly contested northern and western states.  The New York Times credited the 
Democratic landslide, in part, to a heavy Negro vote.171  Trumans civil rights activities 
helped bolster Democratic voting among African Americans from 68 percent for 
Roosevelt in 1944 to 77 percent in 1948.  Moreover, African American voting in close 
                                                                                                                                            
B8. 
170 In each of these states, the Democratic States Rights Party had been listed on the ballot as the official 
Democratic Party.  Therefore, Democratic voters could vote for the Dixiecrats without abandoning the 
Democratic Party. 
171 White, William S.  Democratic House Appears Assured. New York Times November 3, 1948, 9. 
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races helped give Truman a healthy Electoral College victory.172  Berman, in his study of 
African American voting impact, explains: 
Truman carried California by 17,865 votes; in one black district of Los 
Angeles he received 30,742 votes as compared with Deweys 7,146 and 
Wallaces 4,092.  Truman won Illinois by only 33,612; yet Chicagos 
Negroes provided him with a plurality almost four times the margin by 
which he carried the state.  The election in Ohio was particularly close: 
Truman squeezed out a 7,107-vote victory.  Again, as in California and 
Illinois, his winning margin was provided by blacks, this time from 
Cleveland and Akron, who gave him a 65,000-vote plurality over Dewey 
(1970, 129-30). 
 
Trumans strategy to capture African American voters and, thereby, secure electoral 
victory was a monumental success.   
In addition to helping send Truman back to Washington, African American voters 
helped the Democrats retake the House and Senate by a wide margin.173  In urban 
districts where the African American vote was particularly large, the Democrats 
increased their number of Representatives from 41 in 1946 to 74 in 1948 (Savage 1997, 
138-9).  The gamble to liberalize the Democratic Partys domestic agenda turned into a 
sweeping success for the liberal wing.  However, the ability of the Democratic Party to 
hold power would be contingent on maintaining the Souths Democratic loyalty, which 
posed a peculiar problem given the way the liberal wing won so handily in 1948.  
 
Whither the LiberalsCongress or the Court? 
 The political commentators and the press, especially the northern press, 
proclaimed Trumans surprise victory and the overwhelming success of liberal 
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Democrats an endorsement of the Partys liberal civil rights agenda.174  According to 
political commentator Irwin Ross, as Liberal strength increases within and without the 
Democratic party, the weight of dependence can eventually shiftand the liberals can 
end as masters in the house in which they were originally uneasy guests (Ross 1949, 
139).  The New York Times noted that President Truman and the rest of the Democratic 
Party . . . won despite [southern defection].175 
 At first blush, it appeared as if Truman would indeed make civil rights his 
Administrations highest priority during the next four years.  In his state of the union 
address shortly after the election, Truman declared: 
The fulfillment of this promise is among the highest purposes of 
government. The civil rights proposals I made to the 80th Congress, I now 
repeat to the 81st Congress. They should be enacted in order that the 
Federal Government may assume the leadership and discharge the 
obligations dearly placed upon it by the Constitution.  I stand squarely 
behind those proposals.176 
 
Truman proved true to his word insofar as he immediately sent his ten point civil rights 
program back to Congress for consideration.   
 Liberal Democrats in Congress also sought to push ahead with its civil rights 
agenda.  The House of Representatives, as their first matter of business in the new 
session, sought to change an old rule that enabled southern conservative and Republican 
Rules Committee members to kill bills through their committee by refusing to bring them 
up for a vote.  The new rule required the House Rules Committee to call up any bill that 
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174 White, William S. Sweep in Congress. New York Times November 4, 1948, 1. 
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his committee has approved after it has been before the House Rules Committee for at 
least twenty-one days (Savage 1997, 148).  However, the liberal members of the Senate 
failed in their efforts to change the rules governing cloture, which enabled southern 
Senators to filibuster any bill that would provide greater protection to African Americans.  
Thus, Trumans proposals met with the same downfall as the year.177   
Ardent supporters of civil rights legislation hoped that Truman would make his 
civil rights agenda the litmus test for party patronage.  However, he did no such thing.   
In fact, Truman refused to press the issue and seemed resigned to losing in the Senate.  In 
a March press conference, when asked about the on-going Senate filibuster, Truman 
weakly responded, Well, I can tell you more about that at a later date.  I can't comment 
on it now, because the matter hasn't reached the conclusion.178  Truman followed this 
quip with a more anemic response commenting on his role in securing the civil rights 
agenda vis-à-vis Congress stating, 
I only advise the Congress on what I think is good for the country. Then 
they agree as they see fit. We have three independent prongs to the 
Government of the United States--executive, legislative, and judicial. And 
neither of the others ought to interfere with the duties of the other two.179 
    
Once it became clear that the South still held a veto in the Senate, liberal Democrats 
refused to push the civil rights agenda in Congress and offered no future plan of attack.   
The apathy towards civil rights is particularly noticeable when compared to other 
issues that liberal Democrats deemed either more winnable or more worthy of a fight.  
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177 The House passed two bill to make the FEPC permanent and an anti-poll tax measure but neither made 
it through the Senate. 
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Repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act180 quickly became the most pressing issue for Truman and 
other liberals within the Democratic Party.  On April 28, 1949, Truman declared that the 
vote on repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act would be a test of party loyalty and party loyalty 
would be considered when he distributed patronage.181  Truman made no equivalent 
statement on civil rights and, with limited intervention from the Truman Administration, 
civil rights legislation languished in the Senate for the next two years.  So why did 
Truman push civil rights so hard and then back down when he was closest to victory? 
It appears from Trumans (in)action that he did not want to permanently split the 
Democratic Party so he was unwilling to press the issues that most divided it.182  
Moreover, southern Democrats maintained veto power through the filibuster.  So, despite 
the overwhelming success of the 1948 electoral strategy and coinciding political agenda, 
Truman backed off from pushing legislative action to secure civil rights and, instead, 
focused on the courtsan institution that responded positively to liberal policy-making 
in the recent past.  Once again, the Supreme Court was asked to realize liberal policy 
within the Democratic political order that the majority wing could not achieve through 
direct legislative action because of minority wing obstruction and the potential to destroy 
the coalition that kept them in power.   
►◄ 
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With a failed civil rights legislative agenda in both 1948 and 1949, Truman 
combated southern segregation through the courts.  By the fall of 1949, Truman had 
appointed four new justices to the Supreme Court; adding to the Courts five Roosevelt 
appointees.  Trumans appointees have been much maligned by scholars of the Court 
because Truman seemingly chose pragmatism over profundity.  Scholars declared most 
of Trumans appointees mediocre at best and, less kindly, failures (Abraham 1999, 
181).  Moreover, Trumans selection criteria, which appears based more on personal 
loyalty than judicial capacity, has been labeled cronyism.  Richard Kluger wrote that 
Trumans appointees, with the possible exception of Chief Justice Vinson, were neither 
brainy or reflective and all devoid of leadership qualities (2004, 269).  They look 
particularly bereft of intellectual heft because they replaced some of the great minds of 
the Roosevelt Court and were later replaced by some of the eminent members of the 
Warren Court.183  However, in the end, the four Truman justices served the Democratic 
political order quite well as they greatly aided in securing African American voters and 
maintained a devotion to the power and policies of the federal government (Kluger 
2004, 269; see also Abraham 1999, 182). 
Chief Justice Fred Vinson was an ardent New Dealer in the House of 
Representatives prior to his appointment to the US Circuit Court of Appeals.  Justices 
Harold Burton and Sherman Minton both served in the United States Senate.  Justice 
Minton was a particularly strong supporter of Roosevelts court packing plan and highly 
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critical of the Supreme Courts anti-New Deal stance prior to 1937.  Justice Tom Clark, 
as noted above, served as Trumans Attorney General and helped craft Trumans court-
centered attack on segregation to win African American voters.  While these justices 
often have been labeled conservative in civil rights issues, their rulings on segregation 
cases from 1950-1954 consistently sided with racial minorities and helped lay the 
foundation for the rights revolution that occurred in the 1950s through the 1970s.184 
The Truman appointees jumped on their first opportunity to address racial 
segregation since Shelley and Takahashi to hold southern states to a more substantive 
form of equality than was previously practiced under the Plessy v. Ferguson ruling.  In 
Henderson v. United States,185 the Solicitor Generals office submitted a brief in support 
of Hendersons position that the Interstate Commerce Act prohibited segregated dining 
cars, a practice employed by the Southern Railway Company and approved by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission.  Most notably, the Solicitor General took a position 
contrary to the ICC, which urged the Court to uphold the practice of segregating African 
American passengers in dining cars as consistent with Plessy.186  In a revolutionary 
move, the government argued, for the first time, that the doctrine of separate but equal 
was unconstitutional and should be overturned.  The government also supported 
Hendersons contention that segregated dining cars violated the ICA, which provided the 
                                                
184 There is one important exception.  In Morgan v. Virginia, Justice Burton was the lone dissenter in a 
decision that struck down a Virginia statute that required segregated seating arrangements on motor buses 
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Court a means of ruling for Henderson without overturning an established line of 
precedent. 
The Court unanimously187 sided with Henderson and ruled that segregated dining 
cars violated the Interstate Commerce Act.  Writing for the majority, Justice Burton 
wrote, 
The right to be free from unreasonable discriminations belongs, under 
[section] 3(1), to each particular person.  Where a dining car is available to 
passengers holding tickets entitling them to use it, each such passenger is 
equally entitled to its facilities in accordance with reasonable regulations.  
The denial of dining service to any such passenger by the rules before us 
subjects him to a prohibited disadvantage.188  
 
The Court may have been ready to strike down the policy but it clearly was not ready to 
strike down Plessy v. Ferguson.  Justice Burton declined to reach the constitutional or 
other issues suggested.189  However, the victory was still a considerable one for the 
opponents of Jim Crow. 
 On the same day the Court decided Henderson, it handed down two momentous 
decisions in the campaign against segregated education.  Both Sweatt v. Painter190 and 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education191 involved challenges to 
segregated higher education systems.  Herman Sweatt filed an application with the 
University of Texas law school but was denied admission because he was African 
American.  Sweatt first filed suit in a Texas state court.  Although the state court ruled 
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that Sweatt had been denied equal opportunity afforded under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it refused to grant a remedy.  Rather, the Texas court provided the state 
enough time to create a separate facility to educate African American law students.  Such 
a facility was created but Sweatt refused to enroll and he pressed on with the suit.  The 
court eventually found that the school did not violate Sweatts rights as the "privileges, 
advantages, and opportunities for the study of law [were] substantially equivalent to those 
offered by the State to white students at the University of Texas."192  
 Upon Sweatts appeal to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, the U.S. 
government once again advocated for an end to the separate but equal doctrine.  Arguing 
along similar lines as it had in Henderson, the US Governments brief stated,  
the separate but equal theory of Plessy v. Ferguson is wrong as a matter of 
law, history, and policy.  The United States in these cases again urges the 
Court to repudiate the separate but equal doctrine as an unwarranted 
deviation from the principle of equality under law which the Fourteenth 
Amendment explicitly incorporated in the fundamental charter of this 
country.193 
 
Both the NAACP and the Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal 
Education made similar qualitative arguments regarding the nature of education and the 
role segregation played in creating barriers to a quality legal education.194   
 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Vinson adopted the position of the 
petitioner and the US government by noting that segregated legal education could not 
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achieve substantial equality required by the Fourteenth Amendment.  According to 
Vinson,  
Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the 
original or the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial 
equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law 
students by the State. In terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses 
and opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the 
library, availability of law review and similar activities, the University of 
Texas Law School is superior. What is more important, the University of 
Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which 
are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a 
law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the 
faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the 
alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It is difficult to 
believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would 
consider the question close.195 
 
The decision was certainly a victory even if it did not give the Administration everything 
it requested.  The Court, again, acted prudentially and refused to reexamine Plessy v. 
Ferguson despite the mounting evidence of the effects of racial segregation.196 
In the companion case of McLaurin, the Court issued a similar ruling.  As in 
Sweatt, a combination of the NAACP and the US government argued that a graduate 
institution can not treat students differently based solely on race.  George McLaurin, who 
gained admission to the Graduate School at the University of Oklahoma, was required to 
sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom adjoining the classroom; to sit at a 
designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the library, but not to use the desks in the 
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regular reading room; and to sit at a designated table and to eat at a different time from 
the other students in the school cafeteria.197   
Chief Justice Vinson, once again writing the opinion for a unanimous Court, 
declared that the mandatory segregation of McLaurin from white students denied him 
equal protection of the laws.  Specifically, the segregated conditions resulted in a 
situation in which appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate 
instruction.  Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in 
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his 
profession.198  In a single day, the Court boldly announced its suspicion of the legal 
bases for separate but equal and its application.   The combination of Henderson, 
Sweatt, and McLaurin gave southern segregationists their most significant defeat since 
the advent of separate but equal.   
The Courts rulings proved important for Trumans court-centered strategy in 
several different ways.  First, while Trumans appointees caused civil libertarians a good 
deal of initial concern, these rulings made clear that the Truman justices would not 
impede the Administrations judicial attack on segregation.  In the three cases discussed 
above, the Truman justices voted to monitor southern segregationist activity and to hold 
segregationists to a standard never before required under the separate but equal 
doctrine.  The Court did not go so far as to embrace the governments position that 
separate but equal ought to be discarded but they did not reject the contention either. 
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Second, the standard of equality set in Sweatt and McLaurin took the idea of 
equality seriously and, as such, made the possibility of achieving true equality highly 
unlikely.  In evaluating the nature of equality, the Court considered both tangible and 
intangible measures.  This played into the hands of both the government and the NAACP.  
For quite some time, the NAACPs legal strategy attempted to force southern states into 
equalizing conditions, knowing full-well that such equalization could not be achieved.199  
Once the South realized that equalizing conditions was either fiscally impractical or, most 
likely, impossible, these states would either desegregate on their own or the NAACP 
would ask the courts to overturn separate but equal since practice proved its 
impossibility.  The Court took a step closer to the latter by acknowledging that token 
forms of equality were unacceptable under the requirements of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  With these two cases, the Supreme Court, at the 
behest of the Truman Administration, started unsettling its equal protection 
jurisprudence, which would result in the end of Plessy.    
The press did not miss the consequences of these cases, particularly their 
implications for the end of segregation.  Arthur Krock of the New York Times wrote that 
Sweatt and McLaurin made separate but equal a mass of tatters . . . [T]he net of the 
decisions was that equal must be as definitely proved as separate, by tests which 
obviously will be difficult if not impossible for the states to meet, as Texas and 
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Oklahoma failed to do today.200  Both Commonweal and the New Republic sounded 
similar themes that these cases marked the beginning of the end of Plessy insofar as the 
cost of creating truly equal facilities would outweigh any possibility of maintaining 
separate educational systems (Tushnet 1987, 133).  Interestingly, the press also gave 
greater credit to the Truman Administration for the Courts decisions than the NAACP.  
As Krock wrote in the New York Times,  . . . while [Solicitor General] Perlman did not 
get the Plessy doctrine specifically overruled, he got the Supreme Court to put a price-tag 
on it which may have the same effect in numerous localities . . . 201  The NAACP pushed 
this legal strategy for nearly 17 years but the Administrations decision to put the US 
government squarely behind overruling separate but equal and appointing justices 
sympathetic to Administration policies resulted in the most substantial gains for African 
Americans since the Civil War Amendments. 
Finally, Henderson, Sweatt, and McLaurin arguably helped minimize liberal 
Democratic loses in the 1950 congressional election.  Although the Democratic Pary 
maintained control of both the House and Senate, their margin of control slipped 
considerably.  The majority in the House fell from 263 to 234 and the Senate fell from 54 
to 49.  The Republican Party successfully thwarted Democratic efforts to make Trumans 
domestic agendathe Fair Dealthe focus of the campaign and made domestic 
communism and the languishing effort in Korea the central themes of the election.  The 
rise of Joseph McCarthy and his grand suppositions of a vast communist infiltration of 
the American government and military enabled Republicans to secure significant gains in 
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northern and western states.  Yet, these issues resonated with white, moderate voters 
more than African Americans and African American voters still predominantly supported 
northern Democrats.  So, despite Republican gains in the North, Democrats outside of the 
South were able to win or hold 126 congressional and 9 senatorial seats due to the 
growing strength of the northern African American vote (Lemann 1991, 6).  Without the 
growing support of African Americans, based on the tangible civil rights victories 
spurred by executive action through the courts, Democrats would not have maintained 
their hold on power. 
With congressional gains the liberal wing secured in 1948 now erased by 
Republican victories and the 1952 presidential election looming, the Democratic Party 
largely abandoned legislative attempts to secure civil rights legislation.  Yet, the Solicitor 
Generals Office continued to pursue the Administrations civil rights agenda through the 
courts.  As the 1952 election neared, the Solicitor Generals Office and the Court seemed 
to be the last institutions actively pursuing the Fair Deals civil rights program.  In an 
effort to appease the South, which had proved willing to defect, the Democratic Party 
abandoned its progressive civil rights agenda.  The 1952 Democratic Party platform 
included a civil rights plank more similar to its 1944 conservative plank than its most 
recent 1948 progressive plank.  The watered down plank contained no specific proposals 
and read: 
 . . . we favor Federal legislation effectively to secure these rights to 
everyone: (1) the right to equal opportunity for employment; (2) the right 
to security of persons; (3) the right to full and equal participation in the 
Nation's political life, free from arbitrary restraints. We also favor 
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legislation to perfect existing Federal civil rights statutes and to strengthen 
the administrative machinery for the protection of civil rights.202 
 
The Party also publicized the success of its court-centered strategy by commending the 
Justice Departments role in curtailing the reach of Jim Crow and promised to maintain 
this policy.  The plank stated: 
The Department of Justice has taken an important part in successfully 
arguing in the courts for the elimination of many illegal discriminations, 
including those involving rights to own and use real property, to engage in 
gainful occupations and to enroll in publicly supported higher educational 
institutions. We are determined that the Federal Government shall 
continue such policies.203 
 
The liberal wing of the Party fully relied upon the courts to do that which they otherwise 
could not do; namely, realize their civil rights agenda and, in so doing, secure the 
northern African American vote critical to the viability of the liberal wing. 
 In the last two years of his Administration, Truman continued to authorize the 
push against southern segregation.  In 1952, the Solicitor Generals Office filed a brief in 
yet another NAACP-backed case before the Supreme Court.  The dispute in  Brown v. 
Board of Education involved the segregated elementary school system in Topeka, 
Kansas.  However, under its name, the Court consolidated three other cases challenging 
three other segregated state school systems.204  The Solicitor Generals Office once again 
filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs challenge.  The brief was filed at the 
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permission of Trumans latest Attorney General, James P. McGranery, and was signed 
both by McGranery and Philip Elman.   
 The governments brief took a similar, if more aggressive, approach as it did in 
Sweatt and McLaurin.  The argument went as follows: First, the government offered the 
Court several ways to remedy the four cases before it without directly confronting the 
doctrine of separate but equal.  In each case, the states could simply equalize conditions, 
while providing an intermediate remedy such as temporary integration of the school 
systems until sufficient resources could be dedicated to African American schools to 
render them equal to white schools.  In an argument made by both the NAACP and the 
government, if certain intangibles, such as those recognized in Sweatt, made separate but 
equal impossible, then Plessy required desegregation since it was the only way to achieve 
equality.  This line of argument would allow the Court to avoid overturning Plessy but 
abandon separate but equal as currently practiced.   
Second, the brief again urged the Court to overturn Plessy and be done with 
separate but equal once and for all.  Using unequivocal language, the government 
declared its favored position:  
The Government submits that compulsory racial segregation is itself . . . 
unconstitutional discrimination.  Separate but equal is a contradiction in 
terms.  Schools or other public facilities where persons are segregated by 
law, solely on the basis of race or color, cannot in any circumstances be 
regarded as equal . . . 205  
  
Adding precedential force to their words, the government argued that the Courts 
decisions from 1944 through 1950 support the notion that Plessy was unworkable and, 
thus, bad judicial doctrine.  In citing cases like Smith, Takahashi, Shelley, Sweatt, and 
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McLaurin, the government pointed out that if the Court ruled to uphold segregated 
elementary education, its decision would run counter to the direction of its own 
precedent. 
 The governments brief included a final argument that Philip Elman called the 
one thing Im proudest of in my whole career (Silber 1987, 827).  Essentially, Elman 
laid a legal foundation for an orderly and progressive transition206 from the old 
segregated educational system to an integrated model.  In other words, the United States 
government suggested what would become the remedy in Brown II: with all deliberate 
speed.207  The legal maneuver was not popular with the NAACP but it did provide a 
means of assuaging those justices who appeared most reticent of the practical 
implications if they struck down Plessy.   
 Based on the conference notes of Justices Burton and Jackson it looked as though 
four justices (Black, Douglas, Burton, and Minton) would vote to overturn Plessy, two 
justices (Reed and Vinson) would vote to uphold separate but equal, thereby, providing 
the South an opportunity to achieve real equality, and three justices (Clark, Frankfurter, 
and Jackson) withheld announcing their intentions, although it appears as if each of them 
leaned toward overturning Plessy.  However, the justices did not take a final vote on the 
merits as Justice Frankfurter successfully persuaded his brethren to delay decision and 
restore the case to the Courts docket after instructing the parties on a series of questions 
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that were relevant to the respective cases.208  Re-argument was set for October 12, 
1953. 
While the Court decided what to do with the segregation cases, the Republicans 
finally won a presidential election.  Dwight Eisenhower swept into the White House with 
an overwhelming electoral victory and brought Republicans to power in the House and 
Senate on his coattails.209  Truman had been able to retain a sufficient number of southern 
                                                
208 345 U.S. 972 (1953).  The questions were as follows: 
 
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the State legislatures and conventions 
which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not 
understand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools? 
 
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment understood 
that compliance with it would require the immediate abolition of segregation in public schools, was it 
nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the Amendment 
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power under section 5 of the Amendment, abolish 
such segregation, or 
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future conditions, to construe the Amendment as 
abolishing such segregation of its own force? 
 
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2 (a) and (b) do not dispose of the issue, is it within the 
judicial power, in construing the Amendment, to abolish segregation in public schools? 
 
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment 
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal geographic school 
districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or 
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be 
brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions? 
 
5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based, and assuming further that this Court will 
exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4 (b), 
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases; 
(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach; 
(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms 
for such decrees; 
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame decrees in these cases, 
and if so what general directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the 
courts of first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees? 
 
The Attorney General of the United States is invited to take part in the oral argument and to file an 
additional brief if he so desires. 
209 Eisenhower won 55.1% of the popular vote (33,936,137 votes) and 83.2% (442 votes) of the electoral 
college.  In the 83rd Congress, the Republican Party held a 221 to 213 advantage in the House and a one 
member majority in the Senate. 
  168
voters that he garnered sizable southern support.  However, southern Democrats in the 
electorate increasingly drifted from their moorings in the Democratic Party and cast their 
votes in favor of an alternative to the Democratic nominee for the presidency. 210  
Southern voters continued their allegiance to conservative lawmakers in Congress but the 
Party needed to find a way to reclaim their hold on power without the guarantee of a 
Solid South. 
Given the southern Democrats still voted for their conservative representatives in 
Congress, Republican success was short-lived.  The Republican majorities in the House 
and Senate evaporated just two years after their victory in 1952 when the Democrats 
regained control of both houses of Congress.  The Democrats did not lose the Senate 
again until 1981 and the House until 1995.  Even the gains Republicans made in the 
South proved fleeting as white southerners continued to vote Democratic in congressional 
elections.  One consistent trend that emerged in post-Fair Deal national politics was that 
the South increasingly cast their vote for an alternative to the Democratic presidential 
nominee.  The Solid South was no more.  As will be discussed below, the continuance of 
a court-centered civil rights agenda helped slow the decline of the Democratic South but 
once the liberal wing embarked on a direct civil rights campaign, the South abandoned its 
historic partisan roots. 
Eisenhower also never challenged the fundamental tenants of the Democratic 
political order.  As Stephen Skowronek observed, 
His was an opposition carefully tuned to its own limits.  He successfully 
cultivated his own personal independence in politics by severely curtailing 
the disruptive uses of his powers.  Eisnehower was content to prune the 
                                                
210 Eisenhower won Florida, Texas, Tennessee, and Virginia, along with several border states. 
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radical edge off New Deal liberalism.  The keynotes of his New 
Republicanismmoderation, sensibility, and accommodationgave the 
GOP a new political respectability, breaking its identification with Hoover 
and the Depression and extending its appeal into the urban South (1997, 
46). 
 
Divided government undoubtedly constrained Eisenhower but, even during the brief 
period when the Republicans enjoyed unified control, neither Eisenhower nor the 
Republican Congress attempted to bring about a wholesale change to national political, 
economic, and social commitments.  Instead, Eisenhower acted as a good Burkean 
conservative in that he largely maintained the institutional status quo and, when he 
institute change, he did so incrementally. 
Nowhere can Eisenhowers moderation be seen as clearly as in civil rights (Mayer 
1986).  Eisenhower was reluctant to involve his administration in the re-argument of 
Brown but Trumans initial involvement in the case and the Supreme Courts request for 
governmental participation left Eisenhower little choice.  Whether through strategy or by 
chance, Eisenhowers Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, was the most liberal member 
of the cabinet on civil rights so he encouraged the Administration to continue the 
governments involvement.  In large part, Truman bestowed on Eisenhower the court-
centered attack on southern segregation and, in so doing, bound a Republican president to 
the racial policy of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. 
After the death of Chief Justice Vinson and the appointment of Earl Warren211 to 
succeed him, the Court heard re-argument and rendered its famed decision in Brown.212  
The Brown decision was made more controversial for its reliance on sociological data, a 
                                                
211 Klinkner and Smith described the appointment of Earl Warren as Eisenhowers unintentional most 
important contribution to the struggle for civil rights . . .  (1999, 238). 
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supposition supported by the government in its amicus brief.  In fact, the government 
paved the way for such reliance by consistently arguing that separate conditions, by their 
social and psychological nature cannot in any circumstances be regarded as equal. 
Warren echoed such sentiments, leading up to one of the Courts more memorable lines:  
To separate [students] from others of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in 
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone . . . Separate education facilities are inherently 
unequal.213     
 
Brown effectively ended the reign of separate but equal.  However, it would take much 
longer to actually equalize conditions for African American school children (see 
Rosenberg 1991) and it was direct legislative action that eventually helped destroy the 
Democratic political order. 
 
The Push for Direct Legislative Action and the Fall of the Democratic Political Order 
 During the first several years following the Democrats loss of power, the liberal 
wing of the Democratic Party regressed from its once aggressive stance on civil rights 
and deferred to judicial action to realize Brown in the South.  Even after the Democratic 
Party reclaimed control of Congress in 1955, southern lawmakers held important veto 
points in both the House and the Senate that enabled them to thwart any endeavor to pass 
civil rights legislation.  Making the task more difficult, conservative Republicans 
consistently opposed efforts to increase the powers and obligations of the federal 
government.  The coalition of southern Democrats and conservative Republicans made 
                                                                                                                                            
212 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
213 Ibid. at 495. 
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comprehensive civil rights legislation virtually impossible to pass during the first half of 
the decade.   
The strength of the opposition and concern over losing the already decaying 
support in the South led liberal Democrats to voice their support for the Courts efforts to 
desegregate the South but go no further.  The Democratic Party platform of 1956 
demonstrates this balancing act perfectly.  The civil rights plank articulated general 
support for voting rights, security, economic and educational freedom.  The plank also 
contained language supporting the Supreme Courts ruling in Brown and opposing the 
use of force to resist desegregation.  However, the Party offered no legislative plan of 
action to realize the tenants of Brown.  Specifically, the plank read: 
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relating to 
segregation in publicly supported schools and elsewhere have brought 
consequences of vast importance to our Nation as a whole and especially 
to communities directly affected. We reject all proposals for the use of 
force to interfere with the orderly determination of these matters by the 
courts. 
 
The plank was obviously an attempt to appease both liberals and conservatives within the Party.  Yet, this disjunction signaled that 
substantial civil rights legislation would not be forthcoming from the Democratic Party unless the liberal wing achieved a series of 
electoral victories. 
 Within the platform, liberal Democrats also made sure that they rebuffed Republican efforts to claim Brown as their own.  
The statement was purely defensive in nature, designed to protect against sudden African American defection.  
The Democratic Party emphatically reaffirms its support of the historic 
principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men; it recognizes 
the Supreme Court of the United States as one of the three Constitutional 
and coordinate branches of the Federal Government, superior to and 
separate from any political party, the decisions of which are part of the law 
of the land. We condemn the efforts of the Republican Party to make it 
appear that this tribunal is a part of the Republican Party. 
 
The Democratic platform was clearly an attempt to cull the New Deal coalition and 
reclaim the White House.  But the liberal wing would begin to realize that the massive 
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resistance forming in the South was not marshaled exclusively against desegregation; it 
ran counter to the liberal domestic agenda as well.   
That said, as the 1950s progressed, the liberal wing of the Democratic Party 
incrementally increased its strength as northeastern, midwestern, and western states sent 
liberal Democrats to Congress and reduced the relative power of the conservative South 
within the Party.  By 1956, liberal Democrats believed their coalition was sufficiently 
strong in Congress to push for passage of civil rights legislation. Their opportunity 
arrived in 1956, 1957, and 1960 when the Eisenhower Administration backed two civil 
rights bills. 
 The liberal push for civil rights legislation in 1957 and 1960 threatened to destroy 
the Democratic national coalition.  However, the Democrats used the courts to enable 
intra-party compromise.  In both the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and 1960, southern 
conservatives proved more willing to empower the federal judiciary than to create a 
federal bureaucracy tasked with monitoring and enforcing civil rights in the South.  The 
liberal wing compromised by privileging judicial intervention over bolstering the strength 
of African American voting rights.  Both of these civil rights actspassed during the 
Eisenhower Administrationshowed that southern Democrats were willing to end 
obstructionist tactics to allow the passage of civil rights legislation if the legislation only 
empower the courts to monitor violations of civil rights and the Justice Department to 
pursue violations of existing laws.  
 Eisenhower initially proposed civil rights legislation in 1956.  The House passed 
the bill but the Senate proved less accommodating.  Southern conservatives promised to 
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filibuster the bill so the Judiciary Committee allowed the measure to die without 
consideration.  However, just one year later, when Congress revisited the civil rights bill, 
Democrats from both sides of the Mason-Dixon line knew that a delicate balance was 
needed to avoid creating greater division in an already divided party, particularly with an 
election looming.  Such a balance was struck by watering down some of the legislations 
more stringent provisions and limiting new grants of power to the federal judicial 
apparatus.  This gave southern judges oversight of civil rights gains in the South and 
liberals a legislative victory.     
 The Civil Rights Act of 1957 contained five provisions.  First, it created an 
executive commission on civil rights that could investigate allegations of violations of 
suffrage rights.  Second, it created an assistant attorney general position to head the 
elevated civil rights division of the Justice Department.  Third, the measure expanded the 
jurisdiction of federal district courts to include civil litigation stemming from violations 
of civil rights.  Fourth, the law empowered the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief 
to abate interference with existing voting rights.  Finally, the law contained a few 
criminal penalties for violation of the act. 
 The Civil Rights Act was the first time Congress took a tangible step towards 
supporting the end of Jim Crow.  However, the Act probably had greater symbolic value 
than substantial effect.  The Act did not include the creation of new voter rights.  It did 
not provide any administrative agency new powers to coerce resistant southern states into 
changing segregated conditions.  Any benefit that would derive from the Act would either 
have to come from a civil rights commission investigationand since the commission 
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only had investigatorial power, the commissions real power lied in its ability to publicize 
civil rights violationsor through the judicial action.  Of course, southern lawmakers 
took comfort from southern judges hearing challenges to segregation in southern states.  
Local influence in the federal district and circuit courts provided sufficient protection for 
Jim Crow so that southern Democrats could compromise with their northern brethren 
without jeopardizing core social commitments or risking fallout in the electorate.  
 Southern conservatives faith in southern judges proved true.  Southern federal 
judges ruled in favor of African American plaintiff civil rights claims at a rate of well 
under 50% during the period following Brown (Vines 1964, 341; see also Peltason 1961, 
244-54).  Southern judges proved no more able or willing to overcome local social and 
political pressures than southern elected officials.  Southern lawmakers did not fear 
federal judges who lived and worked in the South so empowering the federal courts made 
for a relatively safe compromise when compared to empowering federal bureaucrats in 
Washington DC.  Therefore, southern lawmakers accepted the cost of federal judicial 
power in exchange for the benefit of abandoning an administrative superstructure to 
combat southern segregation that could have created greater protection for minority 
voting rights. 
 So the judiciary was a tale of two systems.  The federal judiciary in the South 
accepted token change and other means of feet-dragging in desegregation while the 
appellate courts, particularly the Supreme Court, made bold assertions regarding the 
authority of the national judiciary to order desegregation.  In Cooper v. Aaron,214 the 
Court, in an opinion signed by all the justices, roundly declared resistance to 
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desegregating the Little Rock school system by the city school board and state lawmakers 
unconstitutional Brown.  In one of its most unequivocal declarations, the Court asserted, 
[Marbury v. Madison] declared the basic principle that the federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and 
that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country 
as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.  It 
follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated 
by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI 
of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States . . . 215 
 
Judicial supremacy may not have been settled doctrine 216 as the Court asserted, but 
there is little doubt that Democratic prospects in the congressional elections of 1958 gave 
the Court significant confidence that it would have ample support among members of 
Congress for such assertions.  
 The 1958 congressional elections brought significant demographic change to the 
Democratic Party.  In the Senate, Democrats picked up 12 seatsall of them from the 
North.  Moreover, [t]hey were a markedly liberal group and ideologically . . . 
heterogeneous (Sinclair 1989, 31).  The election effectively lowered southern 
membership in the Democratic Senate from approximately forty percent to thirty percent.  
The crucial southern filibuster that kept civil rights legislation from passing the Senate 
for decades was still viable but increasingly vulnerable.217  In the House, Democrats 
picked up 50 seats, with the majority from northern and western districts.  The Democrats 
picked up six seats in both Connecticut and Indiana and three in California, Illinois, 
                                                                                                                                            
214 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
215 Ibid. at 18. 
216 Ibid. at 17. 
217 During the 1950s, it took a two-thirds vote in the Senate to invoke cloture. 
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Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania (Polsby 2004, 21).  The slow liberalization in the 
Democratic Party that Truman started in 1948 accelerated tangibly in 1958.   
 Evidence of the increasing liberalization came in 1960 with the passage of a 
second Civil Rights Act.  In 1959, Eisenhower cited Americas faltering international 
image as mandating further civil rights legislation.218  Southern filibuster still made 
passing highly progressive legislation unlikely so northern and southern Democrats once 
again turned to the courts as a vehicle for compromise.  The compromise legislation was 
quite similar to its predecessor insofar as the laws most important provision empowered 
federal judges to appoint special referees to assist African Americans in registering to 
vote and exercising the franchise.  Liberal Democrats hailed the bill as a yet another 
victory in providing greater civil rights protection to their African American constituents 
while southern Democrats comforted themselves with the reality that challenges to 
segregated conditions had to go through southern judges rather than through a federal 
bureaucracy. 
While southern conservatives certainly did not favor these issues, passage of such 
measures guaranteed little.  The only significant improvement for civil rights advocates 
was the inclusion of criminal penalties for bombings or threatening such action and a 
provision that bolstered African American political power by increasing access to the 
                                                
218 Eisenhower, Dwight D. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union. January 9, 1959. 
Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11685&st=&st1=.  (Visited on January 18, 
2005)  Eisenhower declared, If we hope to strengthen freedom in the world we must be ever mindful of 
how our own conduct reacts elsewhere. No nation has ever been so floodlighted by world opinion as the 
United States is today. Everything we do is carefully scrutinized by other peoples throughout the world. 
The bad is seen along with the good.  Because we are human we err. But as free men we are also 
responsible for correcting the errors and imperfections of our ways . . . We are making noticeable progress 
in the field of civil rights--we are moving forward toward achievement of equality of opportunity for all 
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ballot upon application for judicial protection.  However, one political scientist noted, 
welcome as they were to the proponents of the egalitarian revolution, neither the Civil 
Rights Act of 1957 nor that of 1960 significantly handicapped the backlash activities of 
the Massive Resisters (Wilhoit 1973, 203).  In other words, full southern integration 
would require more than perfunctory legislation.   
The debate and passage of the civil rights laws could easily have splintered the 
Democratic Party.  However, compromise provisions empowering the courts were 
sufficient to ease intra-party tension such that the Democrats once again consolidated 
power in the 1960 election.  Interesting, a highly progressive civil rights plank in the 
1960 Party platform caused relatively little electoral fallout.219  It appears as if legislative 
practice over the past two congressional sessions trumped concerns that the liberal wing 
would break from the liberal-conservative compromise paradigm.  Initially, it appeared as 
if the compromise would indeed hold throughout the Kennedy Administration.  
Unwilling to shatter the partisan coalition that brought him to power in 1960, President 
Kennedy dedicated a good deal of public rhetoric to civil rights and the end of 
segregation in the South but little legislative action.  Rather, during the first two years of 
his administration, Kennedy relied on Trumans court-centered strategy of changing civil 
rights policy through the courts.     
                                                                                                                                            
people everywhere in the United States. In the interest of the nation and of each of its citizens, that progress 
must continue. 
219 Nixon managed to carry only Virginia, Tennessee, Florida, and Oklahoma in the South.  Alabama 
named Harry Byrd as their Democratic nominee for the presidency and he successfully carried the state. 
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 In Baker v. Carr,220 several citizens of Tennessee contested their states 
legislative apportionment scheme as a violation of equal protection.  For most of the 
Courts jurisprudential history, the Court had held that apportionment was the exclusive 
authority of the House and any remedy rested with that body according to Article I, 
Section 4 of the Constitution.221  However, the Kennedy Administration submitted a brief 
arguing, Neither [Article I, Section 4], nor any other part of the Constitution, gives 
exclusive authority to Congress or to state legislatures to decide whether state legislatures 
are so discriminatorily apportioned as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.222  The 
Administration also refused to accept the assumption that the federal courts possess no 
appropriate remedy, among their broad and flexible equitable powers, to prevent a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment arising from state legislative 
malapportionment.223  Finally, the Administrations brief noted the centrality of the 
courts to its civil rights agenda by asserting that the Civil Rights Act of 1960 showed that 
Congress . . . emphasized, once again, the national policy of relying on the Judiciary as 
the organ through which the right to vote is to be made fully effective.224  
                                                
220 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
221 The Court signaled a new concern over voting rights jurisprudence in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339 (1960), wherein it examined an Alabama law that had redrawn Tuskegee city boundaries in such a way 
as to exclude almost all of the citys African American (former) residents.  Since the action was an obvious 
attempt to undermine the 15th Amendment, the Court ruled that the state action in question violated a 
federally protected right and was therefore unconstitutional.  Justice Whittaker wrote a concurring opinion 
in which he argued that the Court should have found the act unconstitutional based on Equal Protection 
grounds and not the 15th Amendment.  He argued that it does seem clear to me that accomplishment of a 
State's purpose -- to use the Court's phrase -- of fencing Negro citizens out of Division A and into 
Division B is an unlawful segregation of races of citizens, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . .  (at 349).  This line of argument would be used two years later in Baker v. 
Carr. 
222 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae.  1961 WL 64791, at 42 
223 Ibid. at 13. 
224 Ibid. at 32-33. 
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 Due, perhaps, to the Courts growing comfort with the notion that the political 
branches of government looked to it as the national policy-making organ for civil and 
political rights, it agreed with the governments position.  This seems particularly clear in 
the votes of Justices Stewart and Clark.  Justice Stewart had indecisively abstained from 
voting the first time the Court heard arguments in Baker but, after re-argument, he 
adopted the governments position that the state could give no rational explanation for the 
system of apportionment.  Moreover, Justice Clark changed his vote to side with the 
growing majority after researching the issue at greater length (Powe 2000, 201).   
Taking a similar argument as the Solicitor Generals brief, Justice Brennan, 
writing for the majority, argued that the federal courts did indeed have jurisdiction over 
apportionment cases and such a finding was consistent with precedent.  Moreover, 
Brennan asserted that the Court had no reason to doubt the District Court will be able to 
fashion relief if violations of constitutional rights are found . . . 225  Again, the Court 
acted prudentially insofar as it limited its opinion to acknowledging jurisdiction.  
However, the Court waited two years to announced the constitutional requirements of 
apportionment schemes by coining the now-famous one person, one vote standard in 
Reynolds v. Sims.226 
  Reynolds v. Sims was yet another example of the Court acting with the explicit 
support of the Kennedy Administration.  The Court invited the Solicitor General to 
participate and the Administration pushed hard . . . to advocate as egalitarian a position 
as possible (Powe 2000, 246).  This time, the Court did not merely reflect the 
                                                
225 369 U.S. 186, 198. 
226 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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Administrations positions, it extended and expanded beyond what the government 
requested.  The Court articulated a standard under the Equal Protection Clause that 
required states to provide apportionment schemes that would treat the population as equal 
as possible; that the upper chamber must be apportioned much in the same way as the 
lower chamber; and that popular ratification of voting schemes would not satisfy the 
constitutional requirement of one person, one vote.  The Courts egalitarian, individual-
rights based jurisprudence and the sizable support from the political branches of 
government enabled it to move beyond its prudential phase and into an aggressive 
posture against inegalitarian institutions.  
  Liberals within the Democratic Party increasingly demanded greater 
legislative action but Kennedy, initially, only supported a limited measure designed to 
protect voting rights (Braver 1977, 222).  However, the civil rights demonstrations during 
the spring of 1963, a series of violent incidents against African Americans in the South, 
and intensified pressure from large liberal wing within his Party led Kennedy to craft and 
submit an omnibus civil rights bill (Lichtman 1969, 363).  The bill included  
a prohibition upon the denial of equal facilities to any person in 
restaurants, hotels, and the like; authorization for school desegregation 
suits to be instituted by the attorney general; a ban on job discrimination 
because of race; statutory creation of an Equal Employment Opportunity 
commission; a prohibition on racial discrimination in all federally funded 
programs; the establishment of a Community Relations Service to advice 
on the adjustment of racial conflicts; and a new and more comprehensive 
system of federal voter registration (Kelly, Harbison, and Belz 1991, 598). 
 
Some wrangling occurred between the House and the President regarding the strength of 
the bill but it became clear that this bill was much stronger bill than any of its recent 
predecessors and it enjoyed significant support due to liberal dominance of Congress. 
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 The story of the civil rights bills passage is one of tragedy and triumph.  The 
assassination of President Kennedy undoubtedly helped galvanize support for a civil 
rights bill.  In his address to a joint session of Congress four days after Kennedys 
assassination, President Johnson declared, 
no memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President 
Kennedy's memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill 
for which he fought so long. We have talked long enough in this country 
about equal rights. We have talked for one hundred years or more. It is 
time now to write the next chapter, and to write it in the books of law. 
I urge you again, as I did in 1957 and again in 1960, to enact a civil rights 
law so that we can move forward to eliminate from this Nation every trace 
of discrimination and oppression that is based upon race or color.227 
 
When Kennedy lived, the prospects of passing a strong civil rights bill were good; his 
death added a measure of inevitability.   
 This is not to say that southern Democrats merely stepped aside.  Once it became 
clear that the liberal wing of the Party would not compromise as they had in 1957 and 
1960, southern conservatives waged one of the most vigorous obstructionist campaigns in 
legislative history.  The most intense fighting took place in the Senate where 
conservatives had the opportunity to filibuster the bill to death.  Led by Majority Leader 
Richard Russell (D-GA), southern conservatives waged an 82 day filibuster before 
Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-IL) could persuade enough Republicans to join the 
cloture vote to achieve the two-thirds majority needed to end the filibuster.  Upon 
invoking cloture, the civil rights bill was virtually guaranteed to pass and it did, after a 
few minor changes, by a vote of 73-27.  Twenty-one of the 24 senators from southern 
                                                
227 Johnson, Lyndon B. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress. November 27, 1963. Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25988&st=&st1=.  (Visited on January 20, 2005) 
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states voted against what became the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  President Johnson signed 
the bill into law on July 2, 1964. 
 The impact of such a tangible sign of the Democratic Partys liberalization was 
immediate, if not obvious.  Examining the landslide presidential victory of 1964 shows 
troubling fissures within the Democratic political order.  While the election was an 
overwhelming victory for the Democratic Party as they picked up 37 seats in the House, 
one seat in the Senate, and Johnson won 44 out of 50 states, the South began to dessert 
the Party in its presidential voting.  For the first time since 1928, more than two southern 
states dedicated their electors to the Republican candidate.228  Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina went for Barry Goldwater, the Republican 
candidate.  Moreover, across the South, the rate of partisan defection among Democrats 
rose to a new high of 19 percent (Beck 1977, 479). 
 As Johnson and the liberal Democrats continued to enact voting rights and pro-
integration policies, such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965, rates of defection among southern Democrats in the 
electorate continued to escalate.  In 1968, the Great Society had irreparably damaged the 
old New Deal coalition such that southern defection rose to 39 percent in the presidential 
election (1977, 479).  By 1972, Democratic defection in the South topped 50 percent.  
Direct legislative action greatly escalated the rate of partisan defection in a way that 
reliance on the national judiciary for civil rights policy never did.  Rates of defection 
were relatively stable throughout the 1950s but rose rapidly following the passage of 
                                                
228 Prior to 1928, the only presidential election to see more than two southern states go to the Republican 
candidate was 1876 when Rutherford B. Hayes won three (Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina).  
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sweeping civil rights legislation.  There is little doubt that the 1964 and 1968 elections 
were transformative to the political order as it effectively ended Democratic dominance 
(Sundquist 1983, 289-91).  In its stead, a new era of divided government occurred that 
saw a movement to curtail the growing welfare state and caste skepticism on the role of 
the government in remedying societal ills. 
 Once the South became as much the electoral territory of Republicans as 
Democrats in national elections, the Democratic Party lost its ability to hold the three 
branches of government.  Republican dominance of the White House from 1968 through 
the present229 had the effect of making the national judiciary much more conservative, 
even if the ideological shift was tempered by a Democratic Senate.  Under the tenants of 
modern American politics, the presidency plays a unique role in setting the national 
agenda and this furthered the ability of the Republican Party to exercise control over the 
direction of national policy.  Republican presidents did not directly challenge the 
strictures of Roosevelts New Deal, but the post-1968 political order looked 
fundamentally different than its predecessor.  Even the Supreme Court, thought to be the 
bastion of liberal activism, quickly tempered some of its most liberal decisions and began 
a new campaign to constrain the federal government by reinvigorating state power. 
 Abandoning the court centric strategy can not bare all of the blame for the 
collapse of the Democratic political order.  Scholars have argued everything from the 
failure of foreign policy to the rise of statism (Plotke 1996, 338-41) are to blame for its 
collapse.  However, it is remarkable that once the Democratic Party moved away from its 
                                                
229 From 1968-2004, a Republican president sat in the White House 24 out of 36 years or 67 percent of the 
time. 
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court-centered attack on Jim Crow and took direct action through its pro-civil rights 
legislative agenda, only then did the South dealign from the Democratic Party and enable 
the Republican Party to have significant success controlling the White House.  The vigor 
with which southern conservatives fought civil rights measures reveals the salience of 
segregation.  Liberal Democrats who pushed civil rights legislation and sang the loudest 
praise of Supreme Court anti-Jim Crow rulings eventually pushed too hard on the civil 
rights issues to maintain the old New Deal alliance.  With the most significant civil rights 
legislation in the history of the country enacted in 1964 and 1965, southern conservatives 
would abandon their support of the national Democratic Party and forever change the 
make-up of the American political order. 
 
Conclusion 
 In the Democratic political order of the 1930s-1960s, the Democratic Party used 
the national judiciary in a variety of ways to maintain and transform the Party.  Liberla 
Democrats relied on the courts to realize egalitarian racial policy during a time when they 
were unable to overcome southern obstruction.  Southern conservatives relied on the 
courts as a way of protecting core segregationist practices once the prospects of 
preventing the passage of civil rights legislation diminished.  In both cases, the courts 
served to maintain and transform the Democratic Party in a way that would have been 
impossible without judicial intervention.  Both wings of the Party reaped electoral 
dividends through their continued hold over national power and the ability to both thwart 
and realize their and their constituents preferences.     
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 While both wings of the Party benefited, it is clear that the dominant, liberal wing 
ultimately gained more from judicial action.  The series of civil rights victories handed 
down by the Supreme Court facilitated the continued move of African Americans into the 
Democratic fold.  The results were transformative insofar as the Democratic Party 
secured significant legislative victories in 1958 and 1960 that liberalized the Party in the 
House and Senate.  With the strongest liberal-activist wing in the history of the 
Democratic Party, segregation was ripe for a frontal assault.  Interestingly, the liberal 
wing of the Democratic Party either overestimated their ability to hold power without the 
southern bloc or underestimated the effect of direct legislative action on southern voters.  
Absent the Solid South, the Democratic Party found winning national elections much 
more difficult.  Following 1968, the key to Democratic success in presidential elections 
was to win several southern states.  Absent a strong southern showing, the Democratic 
nominee failed to capture the White House.   
 In effect, the key to holding power over an extended period of time proved to be a 
function of judicial action.  The national judiciary, in its unique position outside the 
normal bounds of politics but still subject to political influence, served as a conduit of 
cooperation and transformation that enabled the Democratic Party to hold power and 
define the contours of American politics for nearly four decades.  Absent the national 
judiciary to diffuse intra-party tension, the New Deal political order would never have 
transformed into a Democratic political order that transcended economic activism and 
created the impetus for wide-scale social activism.  Moreover, without the help of the 
Supreme Court in winning African American voters in the North, it is unlikely that the 
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Democratic Partys liberal wing would have become sufficiently strong to engage in 
direct legislative action necessary to dismantle the caste system in the South.  Such 
dismantling may have been inevitable, but its form was not; nor was the vehicle through 
which it was delivered.  That the Democratic Party relied upon the courts for so long in 
attacking southern segregation, created an institutional path that resulted in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 relying heavily on legal mechanisms 
to alter existing conditions.  A new federal bureaucratic apparatus was not created to 
destroy segregation as it was to address other social and economic ills.  Rather, the 
Democratic Party relied on the courts, which were the only governmental institutions free 
to move aggressively against segregation.  
 Democratic reliance on the courts mattered because once the progressive 
Democratic political order was replaced by a more conservative one, the national 
judiciary was not well suited to continue liberal social policy.  With the commitment to 
equalizing conditions practiced with less vigor, the courts rendered decisions that 
seemingly ended the drive to Great Society egalitarianism and recognized limitations on 
state mandated equality.  While the retreat is regrettable regardless of its cause, the 
judiciary, as an institution, cannot be faulted because the retreat was consistent with the 
political order of its time.   
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Political Order 
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Introduction 
 The fall of the Democratic political order in the late 1960s was notable because, 
unlike the fall of the Republican political order that preceded it, no party-dominated 
political order immediately took its place.  A period of extended divided government 
followed the 1968 national elections.  Democrats tended to control the House and Senate 
while Republicans tended to control the presidency.  Of course, exceptions occurred like 
Republican unified control from 1981-1983 or Democratic unified control from 1993-
1995.  However, up until 2001, these periods did not define the political order and were, 
obviously, short-lived.  The persistence of divided government begs the question of 
whether we can coherently study partisan use of the courts to hold power during a period 
without a dominant political party. 
 I answer that question with a tentative yes.  The purpose of this chapter is not to 
prove that a partisan political order existed but rather to acknowledge that one party was 
able to operate in such a way that created conditions ripe for the rise of a new partisan 
political order.  Once again, the Supreme Court played a fundamentally important role in 
creating conditions suitable for one party control of the national government.  Fate, luck, 
and/or historical contingency gave Republican presidents a disproportional number of 
Supreme Court appointments from 1969 through 2001.  Of the thirteen appointments 
since 1969, Republican presidents nominated 11 of the justices.  This is particularly 
notable as Republican presidents only held power for 60 percent of that same period.  So 
while holding power 60 percent of the time, Republican presidents still managed 85 
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percent of the appointments.  Thus, despite divided control of the political branches, the 
Republican Party succeeded in creating a High Court that would serve its interests.   
 This is not to say that the Court was ideologically congruent with the Republican 
Party.  As Moraski and Shipan showed, periods of divided government temper the ability 
of presidents to secure the passage of a judicial nominee whose ideology is consistent 
with the presidents preferences.  Rather, the ideological position of the pivotal 
member(s) of the Senate largely decides how conservative or liberal a successful nominee 
can be (1999).  In other words, periods of divided control are more likely to produce 
moderates (i.e. Kennedy and Souter) than ideological extremists (i.e. Bork).  The 
prevalence of Republican presidents and Democratic senates resulted in a more centrist 
court with more chastened ambitions than what would have occurred had one party 
enjoyed unitary control over the national government (Tushnet 2003).  However, as will 
be detailed below, a moderate Supreme Court actually helped the Republican Party 
diffuse intra-party tension resulting from significant ideological disjunction on social 
issues such that it enabled the Party to unify control over the national government at the 
close of the 20th Century.  By keeping the median Supreme Court justice socially 
moderate, the Court has refused to render social policy that would create conditions ripe 
for libertarian defection from the Republican Party. 
In order to understand the role the Supreme Court played in creating conditions 
ripe for a Republican political order, I first detail the formation of the national 
Republican coalition at the latter third of the 20th Century.  Identifying the major intra-
party coalitions reveals competing visions for American social policy within the Party 
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and exposes the tension between two dominant factions.  I will then discuss the 
Republican Partys strategy of active issue deference on social issues and how this 
improved the Republican Partys opportunities for electoral success. 
Finally, I should note that this chapter does not postulate explanations of 
Rehnquist Court jurisprudence.  Numerous scholars have attempted to explain why a 
conservative Court would continue to act in activist ways despite conservative criticism 
of unelected judges substituting their will or preference for that of the democratically 
accountable political branches (see Keck 2004; Rosen 2000).  Rather than explain what 
the Court is doing, I detail how the dominant coalition within the Republican Party left 
the Partys social agenda to the Court.  With the Court playing the lead role in developing 
social policy, the Republican Party enjoyed high-levels of Party unitybolstered by 
avoided taxing intra-party disputes over the distribution of Party energy and political 
capitaland successfully devoted most of their legislative resources to realizing free 
market economic policy.   
 
The Rise of the Conservatives 
 As the Democratic political order reached its apex, the Republican Party made a 
dramatic shift that helped refocus Party politics and reform its political coalition.  In 
1964, the Republican Party nominated Barry Goldwater, the arch-conservative from 
Arizona, as their presidential candidate.  The nomination of Goldwater is particularly 
notable as it marks the first time since 1932 that the Republican Party nominated 
someone who refuted the economic and social welfare principles of the New Deal 
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political order.  Not only did Goldwater reject such principles but he also asserted 
principles consistent with the radical right, which is to say he not only wanted to roll back 
the size and strength of the welfare state but he also opposed exertions of federal power 
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Additionally, Goldwater was the first Republican 
nominee since Herbert Hoover to adopt strong states rights policies.  All of these 
positions placed Goldwater in stark contrast with the  Eastern Establishment that 
supported  me-too Republicans (Schlafly 1964).   
 The 1964 election saw the beginnings of southern dealignment from the 
Democratic Party.  Southerners jumped at Goldwaters conservatism.  The renewed 
advocacy of laissez-faire and tacit support of white supremacy cut into the conservative 
wing of the Democratic Party.  Southern conservatives were among the most likely to 
support Goldwater in both securing the Republican nomination230 and in the general 
election.231  At the Republican National Convention, Goldwater received 271 of 278 
southern votes on the first ballot (Cosman 1966, 40).  In the general election, Goldwater 
won the five states often labeled as the Deep South.232  While Goldwater had great 
success in the South, the rest of his campaign was an utter disaster.  Yet, in the long run, 
Goldwaters nomination marked the advent of a conservative shift within the Republican 
Party. 
 Following the 1960s, southern white Protestants gravitated toward Republican 
presidential candidates.  Only when a white southern Protestant was the Democratic 
                                                
230 Mohr, Charles. Aide to Goldwater Pledges to Deliver Souths Delegates. New York Times January 19, 
1964, 1. 
231 Mandate New York Times November 8, 1964. 
232 The Deep South is South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.   
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candidate did the Democrats win significant support in the South and, concurrently, the 
White House.  As Everett Carll Ladd observed, On only four occasions from the Civil 
War to 1976 did a Democratic presidential nominee lose majority support in the white 
Protestant South.  And these were four presidential elections between 1960 and 1976  
(1981, 139).  A fifth occasion occurred in 1980 when Ronald Reagan was able to unite 
southern rural Protestants and northern urban Catholics.   
 Over the next two decades, Goldwater Republicans successfully drove a wedge 
between class and political ideology such that many white, southerners from the middle 
and lower socio-economic strata defected from the socially and economically liberal 
Democratic Party (see Ladd 1981, 144).  However, this defection was not complete and 
southern voters continued to display preferences for southern candidates whenever they 
secured either partys nomination.  So rather than ushering in a new period of one-party 
control, or even a period of stable partisan control over one institution, the period from 
1968-2000 saw electoral outcomes that regularly altered existing partisan arrangements.   
 However, Ronald Reagan did more to entrench the class-ideology split than any 
other Republican up to that point.  By the late 1970s, overt attempts to undermine race 
relations fell outside the bounds of permissible politics.  As a result, conservative 
politicians needed an issue that would further the class-ideology divide.  Reagan and 
other conservative strategists found such a line of cleavage with appeals to traditional 
Judeo-Christian values.  As one of Reagans chief pollsters stated shortly after the 1980 
election: 
Our coalition expressed a strong commitment to established values, and a 
sense of deterioration in the standards and traditional patterns in modern 
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life.  This perception was combined with a strong inclination to refute the 
idea that old values are gone, and the belief that established standards are 
still worth maintaining.  The majority in our target groups also rejected the 
belief that values are relative and that decisions should be guided by 
circumstances rather than by established concepts of right or wrong . . . 
Furthermore, this group expressed a higher degree of what we call 
religiosity; namely, the belief that God exists in the form in which the 
Bible describes Him, and that this country would be better off if religion 
had a greater influence in daily life (Wirthlin 1981, 242). 
 
White southern Protestants, once solid members of the conservative wing of the New 
Deal coalition, found a new home in a Republican Party that not only espoused economic 
conservatism but also social conservatism (258-9).  In other words, many of the heirs of 
southern New Dealers were, at a minimum, Reagan Democrats, and increasingly, 
members of the Republican Party.  In fact, the 1980 election revealed that [t]he eleven 
states of the old Confederacy [were] the eleven most conservative states in the union 
(Schneider 1981, 211). 
 Reagan succeeded in uniting social conservatives in the South with economic 
conservatives in the North and West.233  However, merging social and economic 
conservatives resulted in two coalitions with competing preferences housed in the same 
party.  James Sundquist described the new coalition by noting this disjunction: 
At its heart . . . are political groups and forces that are quite distinct from 
the traditional conservatives of the Old Right, who had dominated the 
Republican party since the days of Lincoln.  The New Right is composed 
of the groups, organized or unorganized, who have been spawned by the 
crosscutting social and moral issues that arose in the 1960sright-to-life 
organizations that sprang up after the Supreme Courts 1973 abortion 
decision, religious groups mobilized to protest the same courts decision 
                                                
233 I do not mean to imply that there were not social conservatives in the North or economic conservatives 
in the South.  Indeed, the South has been both socially and economically conservative throughout much of 
the 20th Century.  However, in order to win southern states, Reagan needed to find a way to get 
conservatives from the lower economic strata to consider ideology first and economics second when 
casting their ballot.   
  194
barring organized prayer from public school classrooms, organizations 
formed to oppose gun control in any form, neighborhood groups opposed 
to busing for purposes of school integration, inheritors of the anti-civil-
rights forces of the 1960s who resented what was perceived as government 
favoritism toward minorities, and so on . . . The New Right was 
distinguished from the Old Right not only in its doctrinal views but in its 
heightened political zeal and in its geographycentered more in the South 
and the West than in the old Republican areas of the North (1983, 413-4). 
 
The Old Right that advocated economic nationalism in a distinctly pro-business tone was 
allied with moral conservatives that had little enthusiasm for the expansion of corporate 
power and the growth of international markets.  Making matters more difficult, economic 
conservatives preferred centrist social policy to hardline social conservatism.  Economic 
elites within the Republican Party did not support the politics of the Moral Majority 
(Wattenberg 1990, 165).   
Yet, the Old Right of economic conservatism was not old as much as it was 
established and, more importantly, entrenched.  As political events soon revealed, 
economic conservatives were still the dominant wing of the Party and, in matters of 
national domestic policy, the dominant wing exercised a near-monopoly on directing 
Party energy toward realizing its preferences.  Economic conservatives were willing to 
provide rhetorical support and limited political resources for social conservatism, but 
Party energy would focus heavily on the national economic agenda.  One need look no 
further than the Republican Party of 1980 for confirmation of this hierarchical 
arrangement.   
In order to grasp the rhetorical changes the social right brought to the Republican 
Party, you need only contrast the abortion planks of the 1976 and 1980 platforms.  The 
1976 plank is stunningly ambiguous. 
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The question of abortion is one of the most difficult and controversial of 
our time. It is undoubtedly a moral and personal issue but it also involves 
complex questions relating to medical science and criminal justice. There 
are those in our Party who favor complete support for the Supreme Court 
decision which permits abortion on demand. There are others who share 
sincere convictions that the Supreme Court's decision must be changed by 
a constitutional amendment prohibiting all abortions. Others have yet to 
take a position, or they have assumed a stance somewhere in between 
polar positions. 
 
We protest the Supreme Court's intrusion into the family structure through 
its denial of the parents' obligation and right to guide their minor children. 
The Republican Party favors a continuance of the public dialogue on 
abortion and supports the efforts of those who seek enactment of a 
constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for 
unborn children.234 
 
Weakly worded opposition to restrictions on parental notification and support for a 
constitutional amendment was the best the Party could muster.  Four years later, the Party 
was able to secure a less equivocal plank but hardly one that boldly supported the claims 
of the Religious Right: 
There can be no doubt that the question of abortion, despite the complex 
nature of its various issues, is ultimately concerned with equality of rights 
under the law. While we recognize differing views on this question among 
Americans in generaland in our own Partywe affirm our support of a 
constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for 
unborn children. We also support the Congressional efforts to restrict the 
use of taxpayers' dollars for abortion. 
 
We protest the Supreme Court's intrusion into the family structure through 
its denial of the parent's obligation and right to guide their minor children. 
 
By 1980, those of 1976 became we in support of a constitutional amendment that 
recognized the right to life.  The Partys platform also included support for other social 
                                                
234 Republican Party Platform of 1976. Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1976.  (Visited on March 11, 2005) 
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reform measures such as reining in affirmative action programs, strengthening and 
protecting families and paternal rights.   
However, the Party dedicated the vast majority of its time and attention to the 
subjects of reducing governmental spending, tax reform, promotion of national economic 
growth, and reforming or eliminating numerous features of the New Deal/Great Society 
welfare state.  The same can be said of Reagans inaugural address.  Although inaugural 
addresses are rarely heavy on policy, Reagan worked in a few lines on reducing the size 
of the national government235 and then called for economic renewal. 
[T]his administration's objective will be a healthy, vigorous, growing 
economy that provides equal opportunities for all Americans, with no 
barriers born of bigotry or discrimination. Putting America back to work 
means putting all Americans back to work. Ending inflation means freeing 
all Americans from the terror of runaway living costs. All must share in 
the productive work of this "new beginning," and all must share in the 
bounty of a revived economy.236 
 
Reagans focus would be on the economic agenda as articulated in the Partys platform.  
Social issues would play second fiddle to the Stradivari of economic concerns.  
 This is not all that surprising.  After all, every political party must establish 
priorities and allocate resources for the purposes of organizing its membership in 
government.  Yet, the Republican leadership did not simply rank economic matters ahead 
                                                
235 Reagan declared that government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem. From 
time to time we've been tempted to believe that society has become too complex to be managed by self-
rule, that government by an elite group is superior to government for, by, and of the people. Well, if no one 
among us is capable of governing himself, then who among us has the capacity to govern someone else?  
He continued, It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand 
recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal Government and those reserved to 
the States or to the people. All of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create the 
States; the States created the Federal Government. 
Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981. Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43130&st=&st1=. (Visited on March 11, 2005) 
236 Ibid. 
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of social concerns.  Rather, they signaled their desire to delegate much of their social 
agenda to the national judiciary.  This strategy of evasion was alluded to in the Partys 
plank on the judiciary.  We will work for the appointment of judges at all levels of the 
judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human 
life.237  Thus, the Republican Party embarked on a strategy of supporting a constitutional 
amendment and appointing judges sympathetic to social conservatism.  If the Party 
planned to storm the castle of New Deal/Great Society liberalism, it was to destroy the 
vestiges of a bloated welfare state, not to undercut much of the rights revolution.  As 
Lewis L. Gould noted,  Reagan was [c]areful not to push the agenda of the Moral 
Majority into substantive legislation, Reagan gave these groups and their leaders enough 
rhetorical endorsement to keep them reasonably contented throughout his administration 
(2003, 420).  The courts would be left to deal with the substance of social policy. 
 Reagans first six months in office confirmed his focus on the national economy.  
The president actively pursued economic recovery and reduction of the federal 
government through executive orders and budgetary cuts.  For example, Reagans first 
order was to declare a federal hiring freeze within the executive branch.238  Just a few 
days later, Reagan began a series of orders that deregulated and decontrolled various 
industries such as crude oil and refined petroleum.239  Yet, he only made one comment on 
abortion during a press conference in which he stated his belief that it was up to Congress 
                                                
237 Republican Party Platform of 1980.  Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1980. (Visited on March 11, 2005) 
238 See Reagan, Ronald. Remarks on the Signing the Federal Employee Hiring Freeze. Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43490&st=&st1=. (Visited on March 11, 2005) 
239 Executive Order 12287Decontrol of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products.  Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43901&st=&st1=. (Visited on March 11, 2005) 
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to figure out when life began.240  Additionally, Reagan was silent on school prayer and 
other social issues. 
But why did the Republican lawmakers, particularly economic conservatives, rely 
on the courts?  First, the federal judiciary facilitated this role by delving into national 
social policy throughout the 1960s and 1970s.  Some of the judicial policy-making was a 
function of New Deal/Great Society liberalism such as their rulings in church-state cases 
and criminal due process (Powe 2000, 358-411) while others seemed to occur without a 
direct invitation from political actors such as abortion (Graber 1993, 183-91).  However, 
entrenching social policy in the politics of rights helped cement the judiciarys role 
beyond the New Deal/Great Society order.  Second, the regime of judicially crafted social 
policy helped bring the Republican Party to power in 1981.  Elected officials have little 
incentive to change the conditions that brought them to power, particularly, when those 
changes threaten the cohesion of the Party.  Moreover, the costs to economic 
conservatives in the Republican Party were extremely low as the judicialization of social 
policy facilitated the rise of symbolic politics in these areas.  Thus, so long as no clear 
consensus formed within the Party, actively seeking continued judicial policy-making on 
controversial social issues served the interests of the dominant wing of the Party by 
displacing risky and depleting issues while simultaneously enabling the minority wing to 
address social ills, albeit through largely symbolic, juridical politics, which appeased 
their constituents.  Since the national judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, was apt 
to craft centrist policies because most jurists came to the bench during periods of divided 
                                                
240 Reagan, Ronald. The Presidents News Conference.  Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43505&st=&st1=.  (Visited on March 11, 2005) 
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government, moderate social policy would persist.  Maintaining the social status quo 
would not disrupt the alignment of the party system (Gates 1999, 105) and, thus, any 
political advantages gained by the Republican Party would be maintained.  As the United 
States neared the 21st Century, the Republicans advantage became increasingly evident.   
 
The Republican Supreme Court 
 As the Republican Party enjoyed its first period of control over the presidency and 
Senate under its new coalition, the Supreme Court was a centrist institution.  Seven of the 
nine Supreme Court justices were appointed during periods of divided partisan control.  
Of the two justices appointed to the Court during unified control, only Justice Thurgood 
Marshall is considered a faithful delegate of the liberal regime that appointed him.241  
While some of the seven remaining justices leaned either conservative (e.g., Rehnquist) 
or liberal (e.g., Brennan), most occupied the political center.  The result was a Court that 
looked quite conservative compared to the Warren Court of the 1960s but continued to 
uphold and expand certain civil liberties.242   
                                                
241 Byron White was also appointed when the Democrats controlled the presidency and the Senate.  
Throughout his tenure on the Court, White proved liberal when it came to the exercise of federal power 
over economic regulation but conservative when it came to rights-based social policy. 
242 The Courts most familiar example of expanding on Warren Court rights-based jurisprudence was Roe 
v. Wade (410 U.S. 113), which expanded the right of privacy to include a womans right to abort her 
pregnancy until the states interest becomes compelling.  This same line of cases would later be used to 
extend (after first being used to deny) protection to homosexuals.  The Court also refused to abandon 
efforts to force integration in the public schools even if it meant using the highly unpopular method of 
establishing racial quotas and enforcing them through court-ordered busing (Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Board of Education, 420 U.S. 1).  Additionally, the Court upheld use of affirmative action as 
the [s]tate . . . has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the 
disabling effect of identified discrimination. (Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
307)  The Bakke decision was hardly a wholesale victory for civil rights advocates but the Court did uphold 
the use of racial preferences.  Even when the Court issued conservative rulings on civil rights, it did not 
always act conservatively.  For example, following the Courts decisions in Miller v. California (413 U.S. 
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 Given the Burger Courts ideologically ambiguous legacy, it is somewhat curious 
that social conservatives believed that the institution that wrought the counter-revolution 
that wasnt (Blasi 1983) would dramatically reverse course and provide them with a new 
socially conservative jurisprudence.  Reagans first appointment to the Supreme Court 
should have done little to change social conservatives hopes for judicial transformation.  
While campaigning in 1980, Reagan promised, One of the first Supreme Court 
vacancies in my administration will be filled by the most qualified woman I can find one 
who meets the high standards I will demand for all my appointments (as quoted in 
Abraham 1999, 282).  Less than half a year into his first term, Reagan got the opportunity 
to keep his promise when Justice Potter Stewart formally announced his intention to 
retire.  Reagan eventually decided to appoint Sandra Day OConnor, a judge on the 
Arizona Court of Appeals.  The appointment sat well with economic conservatives within 
                                                                                                                                            
15) and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, (413 U.S. 49) the Courts efforts to find a workable approach to 
regulating obscenity diminished dramatically (Sullivan and Gunther 2001, 1078). 
 While the Court maintained rights largely associated with Warren Court social policy, the Burger 
Court also shifted its jurisprudence to accommodate conservative concerns in business and criminal justice.  
For example, the Court extended part of its free-speech jurisprudence to corporations.  The Court first 
changed its First Amendment jurisprudence in Bigelow v. Virginia (421 U.S. 809) by recognizing that 
advertising did more than simply propose a commercial transaction.  It contained factual material of clear 
public interest. (421 U.S. 809, 822)  In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, (425 U.S. 748) the Court refined its decision in Bigelow by making it clear that simply because 
the advertisers interest is a purely economic one . . . [t]hat hardly disqualifies him for protection under the 
First Amendment (425 U.S. 748, 762).  Virginia Pharmacy Board essentially welcome[ed] commercial 
speech into the 1st Amendment domain (McIntosh 2002, 21).  Corporate free speech claims quickly 
created the unusual arrangement of allying civil libertarian groups, media conglomerates, and conservative 
legal organizations (see Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654). 
 In certain areas of criminal justice, the Burger Court retreated from Warren Court jurisprudence.  
The Court largely gutted the exclusionary rule when it came to warrentless vehicle searches.  Essentially, 
the Court changed its approach from allowing police with probable cause to conduct a warrantless vehicle 
search under exigent circumstances . . . to allow[ing] warrantless searches of vehicles when police easily 
could have obtained a warrant (Hjelmaas 1986, 1161).  Such jurisprudence was consistent with 
conservative calls to [a]ppoint[] judges whose respect for the rights of the accused is balanced by an 
appreciation of the legitimate needs of law enforcement (Republican Party Platform of 1972). 
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the Republican Party but social conservatives did not feel the same.  As Henry Abraham 
recounts: 
Although members of the Old Right (most significantly its guru Senator 
Goldwater) professed their support for Judge OConnor, leaders of the 
New Right, who had backed President Reagan so fervently in his 1980 
campaign, unleashed a wave of protests against his first Supreme Court 
nominee.  The Reverend Jerry Falwell, head of the fundamentalists Moral 
Majority, encouraged all good Christians to express concern over 
Connors nomination . . . Anti-abortion groups also criticized OConnor 
for several pro-abortion votes during her career as a state legislator 
(1999, 284). 
 
Potter Stewarts retirement provided the Reagan administration with an opportunity to 
change a pro-Roe vote243 to an anti-Roe vote.  Yet, they opted instead for a center-right 
conservative who appeared unlikely to support an outright assault on Roe or other social 
rights.  Moreover, this was not simply an error by the Administration.  The Reagan 
Administration was well aware of OConnors support for certain abortion rights (Yalof 
1999, 139).  If the Administration was serious in its efforts to transform radically the 
Courts social jurisprudence, it could have opted for a nominee who articulated a more 
hostile position to abortion and other social issues.244   
 Immediately following OConnor, Reagan sought to appease angered social 
conservatives by elevating William Rehnquist to chief justice and appointing the equally 
conservative Antonin Scalia.  Liberal Democrats made their concern for the degree of 
                                                
243 Justice Stewart wrote a separate concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade.  Stewart articulated a position that 
made clear that states can regulate abortion practices as it does other surgical procedures when health 
and safety of the pregnant woman, and protection of the potential future human life within her make a 
states interest able to pass particularly careful scrutiny.  410 U.S. 113, 170. 
244 As will be noted below, OConnors approach to social issues is mixed.  In the area of affirmative 
action, OConnor seems to find constitutional difficulty with gender and racial quotas.  Yet, she voted to 
uphold numerous other preference schemes.  She has been willing to scale back certain reproductive rights 
but these have largely been at the margins of abortion policy.  Additionally, governmental displays of 
religious symbols are constitutional if they do not endorse religion but prayer or moments of silence 
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conservatism known in the case of Rehnquists promotion.245  Senator Edward Kennedy 
strongly objected to Rehnquists social conservatism claiming he was too extreme on 
race, too extreme on womens rights, too extreme on freedom of speech, too extreme on 
separation of church and state, too extreme to be Chief Justice (as quoted in Abraham 
1999, 292).  Yet, unified control of the presidency and the Senate enabled Republicans to 
confirm both Rehnquist and Scalia despite serious objections raised about the formers 
commitment to a post-Brown understanding of racial egalitarianism and general 
conservatism. 
 By the time Reagans final appointment rolled around, social conservatives had 
fully bought into the judicialization of social politics and were demanding another social 
conservative.  Despite the potential impact of conservative social policy on the 
Republican national coalition, Reagan seemed to adhere to the social conservative 
understanding of the bargain by nominating a social conservative to the Court.  However, 
the nomination of Robert Bork floundered from the start.  The Democratically controlled 
Senate voiced immediate concerns over Bork and mobilized to oppose his confirmation.  
Borks skepticism regarding the right to privacy (the basis for reproductive rights) and 
certain aspects of equal protection also pushed several economic conservatives to oppose 
the nomination.246 
                                                                                                                                            
specifically for prayer in public school is unconstitutional. 
245 Scalia sailed through the confirmation process without receiving a negative vote in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee or on the Chamber floor.  Scalias success may have stemmed from the fact that Democrats 
were distracted by their efforts to prevent Rehnquists promotion.   
246 Taylor, Jr., Stuart. Bork Could Tilt Law at Once If Seated.  New York Times July 6, 1987, 8. 
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 Religious conservatives mobilized in support of Bork247 but they received only 
rhetorical support from the Administration.  More damaging, numerous economic 
conservatives failed to support Bork and a few openly opposed him.248  While Reagan 
nominated Bork and rendered public supported throughout the confirmation fight, he 
never utilized his waning political capital to secure Borks confirmation.  Social 
conservatives strongly criticized Reagans lackluster and detached efforts on behalf of 
Bork (Silverstein 1994, 123) and denounced the failure (McGuigan and Weyrich 1990, 
220-1).  But, as political commentator E.J. Dionne, noted, Some libertarians [in the 
Republican Party] . . . often disagree with the religious rights [and] opposed Judge Borks 
nomination.249  Simply stated, the support for a radically social conservative jurist such 
as Bork was not present in either party and economic conservatives were sufficiently 
uncomfortable with Bork to facilitate his defeat. 
 Much to the benefit of the Republican Party, Reagan learned the politics of the 
swing seat (Abraham 1999, 298) and, eventually,250 nominated Anthony Kennedy.  The 
nomination of Kennedy looked much like the nomination of OConnor. The Reagan 
Administration knew of his predisposition toward upholding abortion rights as his 
jurisprudence was marked by [a]n unpredictable streak of libertarianism (Yalof 1999, 
165).  Following the debacle over Bork, economic conservatives strongly desired a policy 
of judicial moderation on social issues when it came to Supreme Court justices.  
                                                
247 Noble, Kenneth B. Bork Backers Flood Senate with Mail. New York Times September 3, 1987, 16. 
248 Dionne, Jr., E.J. High Tide for Conservatives But Some Fear What Follows. New York Times October 
13, 1987, 1 
249 Ibid. 
250 Reagan nominated Douglas Ginsburg immediately after Borks rejection.  However, Ginsburg withdrew 
himself from consideration after the disclosure of marijuana use while at Harvard.  Ginsburg was quite 
conservative in his own right but he was an economic conservative, not a social conservative.    
  204
Kennedys appointment secured a moderate Supreme Court that would view altering its 
social rights jurisprudence with skepticism.  In refusing to abandon its social 
commitments, the Supreme Court rendered a significant service to the Republican 
coalition.  It is to that benefit we now turn.   
 Interestingly, economic conservatives held no such demands for the lower courts.  
At both the district and circuit court levels, socially conservative jurists were regularly 
appointed with the open support of economic conservatives (Goldman 1997, 309-22).  
Perhaps due to the sectionalism associated with social conservatism, appointing socially 
conservative judges to districts and circuits in the south and parts of the west appeased 
social conservatives in the electorate but did little to alter national social policy that was 
protected by a moderate Supreme Court.  Socially conservative judges at the local levels 
appeased social conservatives and gave them limited victories.  Socially moderate 
justices ensured that alignment of the partisan system would not suddenly shift in favor of 
the socially liberal Democratic Party. 
 In order to understand the benefits a socially moderate Supreme Court that upheld 
core social rights brought to the Republican Party, we need only turn to the fragility of 
the Republican Party.  Socially liberal economic conservatives within the Republican 
Party would not tolerate a socially conservative Supreme Court.251  Thus, Party elies 
needed to create equilibrium in both the Party and the Court.  By appointing two 
moderates and two conservatives, Reagan kept the pivotal vote on the Supreme Court in 
                                                
251 In a more contemporary example, when Jim Jeffords quit the Republican Party in 2001, one of the many 
reasons he cited was his opposition to President Bushs socially conservative judicial strategy.  See 
Johnson, Glen. Upheavals in the Halls of Power: GOP Losing Senate with Jeffords as Independent. 
Boston Globe May 25, 2001, A1. 
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line with Old Guard ideology.  Such equilibrium clearly favored the agenda of economic 
conservatives.  As Mark Silverstein observed: 
Until the judiciary was transformed, administration support for a pro-
family, Christian moral and social agenda would be mainly symbolic.  On 
the other hand, economic elites could easily support a Reagan presidency, 
secure in the knowledge that Supreme Court rulings on a host of privacy 
and First Amendment issues precluded enactment of the New Rights 
agenda.  Winking at the language of the devout was a tiny price to pay for 
a reduction in marginal tax rates (1994, 117). 
 
A judicially enforced status quo enabled Republican Party stability that could not have 
been achieved without the courts. 
Thus, for the Republican Party, judicial politics quickly became entangled in the 
language of judicial philosophy rather than legal substance.  This policy was indirectly 
articulated in the 1980 Republican Party platform, which stated: 
We pledge to reverse [Carters judicial policies], through the appointment 
of women and men who respect and reflect the values of the American 
people, and whose judicial philosophy is characterized by the highest 
regard for protecting the rights of law-abiding citizens, and is consistent 
with the belief in the decentralization of the federal government and 
efforts to return decisionmaking power to state and local elected 
officials.252 
 
 In 1984, the Republican Party sounded a familiar theme by pledging to continue to 
appoint Supreme Court and other federal judges who share our commitment to judicial 
restraint.253  The Reagan Administration made devolving power to the states and 
fostering judicial restraint its primary goals.  While it is possible that these issues were 
sufficiently vague to encompass social issues, the Republican Party desired a national 
                                                
252 Supra note 254. 
253 Republican Party Platform of 1984.  Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1984.  (Visited on March 5, 2005) 
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judiciary, first and foremost, concerned with reducing the size and power of the federal 
government.  These goals hardly announced the end of liberal social policy.254   
 We gain perspective on Rehnquist Court conservatism by examining the intra-
party tension within the Republican Party.  Devolving power back to the states fit the 
preferences of both wings of the Party.  Yet, the preferences of social conservatives met 
with, at best, fleeting success in the areas of abortion rights, affirmative action, and 
homosexual rights at the national level while gaining more significant, if limited, 
victories at the lower levels of the federal judiciary.  Although the Court from the 1980s 
                                                
254 True to form, the Rehnquist Court embarked on a quest to renew state power by placing limitations on 
sources of federal power.  United States v. Lopez (514 U.S. 549) and United States v. Morrison (529 U.S. 
598) placed greater restrictions on the ability of Congress to regulate non-economic activity through the 
interstate commerce clause.  The Court limited the ability of the federal government to direct the States 
(New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188) to implement administrative programs and conscript[] the 
States officers (Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925) to perform federally mandated action.  In New 
York and Printz, the Court resuscitated the Tenth Amendment and, thereby, placed limitations on expansive 
use of federal power.  In addition, the Rehnquist Court altered its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence to 
prohibit congressional annulment of state sovereign immunity (Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44) or mandating state courts hear suits against their respective states (Alden v. Maine, 528 U.S. 706).  
Legal scholars spilled significant ink either condemning the tenets of New Deal society or praising the 
Court for reinvigorating the American federal system (See The New Fedealism After United States v. 
Lopez, Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium, 1996).  Whether glorifying or castigating the so-
called new federalism, few of these scholars denied that a change occurred.   
 However, the Court once again engaged in a chastened approach to redefining the constitutional 
order.  Mark Tushnet described Lopez and Morrison as 
 
show[ing] that the Court is willing to pare back what it regards as the excesses of 
legislation adopted by Congresses that accepted the principles of the New Deal-Great 
Society constitutional order.  The Congresses of the new constitutional order are far less 
likely to engage in what the Court regards as excesses, in part because they will learn the 
lesson of Lopez and Morrison but, more important, because they themselves do not 
accept the older orders principles (2003, 42). 
 
Tushnets observation taps into the consistency of the Rehnquist Court with Reagan conservatism.  After 
all, the Republican Party recommended that non-essential federal functions [] be returned to the States and 
localities wherever prudent (Republican Party Platform 1984).  It was never the policy of economic 
conservatives (or social conservatives) to rebuke the New Deal regulatory state in its entirety.   Rather, the 
goal was to scale back regulatory control over certain areas of the national economy, reduce the tax burden, 
and decrease the size of the national government by devolving power back to state and local governments.  
Such a nuanced understanding of the Rehnquist Court helps explain why the Court handed the states a 
series of setbacks. 
 
  207
through the early 2000s granted certain wins to social conservatives in the areas of public 
funding of religious schooling and school desegregation,255 the Courts rulings coincided 
with economic conservative preferences.   
 Much as with the preceding political orders, issues that cut against the cohesion of 
the Party ended up before the national judiciary.  As with other ears, the dominant wing 
benefited from this judicial policy-making through its ideological congruence with the 
Supreme Court as well as its ability to gain and consolidate power over time.  Social 
conservatives did not fair as well, however, social conservatives in government benefited 
from Party unity, which eventually led to the consolidation of national power under the 
Republican Party.  Yet, to the detriment of the minority wing, national social policy 
hinged on judicial decree and a rhetorical commitment to appointing socially 
conservative jurists.  A socially conservative majority never materialized on the Supreme 
Court and members of the economic conservative wing did little to realize social 
conservative preferences other than espouse platitudes and pass the occasional (symbolic) 
law.   
To expose this pattern, I will detail the areas of abortion, gay rights, and religion 
and education256 and highlight both the legislative and judicial strategies engaged in by 
the Republican Party.  Such an analysis exposes intra-party dynamics and the role the 
courts play in easing intra-party tension and framing social policy. 
  
                                                
255 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), and Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. 
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
256 These three issues were identified by social conservatives as issue criteria on which they will vote above 
all other domestic issues.  See Salmans, Sandra. Christian Fundamentalists Press Own Campaign within 
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Religion and Public Education 
  As briefly noted above, Ronald Reagan successfully united two historically 
opposed groups: evangelical Protestants and Catholics (Fowler et al. 2004, 85).  His 
stance on abortion certainly helped facilitate this union but this was not the only social 
issue that united them.  The Republican Partys stance on prayer in school and religious 
access to public facilities appealed to evangelical Protestants in a way that public funding 
of parochial education appealed to Catholic voters.  Historically, Protestants in America 
opposed public monies funding religious education as it supported a predominantly 
private, Catholic education system.  Not only did funding go to Catholic institutions, the 
leading rival to Protestant hegemony in America, but it provided an alternative to public 
education, which presented secularism in a distinctly Protestant fashion.  However, as 
public education began to move away from Protestant-informed secularism to a more 
religious-neutral form of secularized education, conservative evangelicals became less 
comfortable with public education socializing their children.  Court-ordered 
desegregation accelerated this trend as southern fundamentalists and evangelicals turned 
to (white) private Christian academies and soon found that these schools helped 
reestablish Protestant hegemony in education undermined by the triumph of secularism 
[in] public education (Jefferies and Ryan 2001, 282-3).  The financial difficulties that 
private schooling imposed caused evangelicals to drop their opposition to public funding 
for religious schooling; an institution once, and still, dominated by the private Catholic 
education system.   
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 In order to understand Republican successes in this sphere, we must bifurcate the 
analysis into religious observance in public schools and public financing of private 
(religious) schooling.  The Republican Party has been willing to support policies that 
either coincide with the secular preferences of economic conservatives or take the form 
of largely symbolic action with little tangible policy impact.  Those areas that do not 
accord with the preferences of economic conservatives are defaulted to the courts.  
Absent support among economic conservatives, the courts, specifically the Supreme 
Court, have responded in ways largely antagonistic to the preferences of social 
conservatives. 
 Starting in 1972, the Republican Party asserted that voluntary prayer should be 
freely permitted in public placesparticularly, by school children while attending public 
schools . . . 257  The timing of the Partys assertion was somewhat curious in that, a 
decade prior, the Supreme Court declared that nondenominational prayer and voluntary 
readings from the Bible in public schools both violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.258  Yet, Nixons efforts to capture southern votes and the growing 
political strength of southern social conservatives within the Republican Party resulted in 
the addition of a plank affirming a place for prayer in public schools.  All subsequent 
Republican Party platforms contained similar pronouncements.259   
                                                
257 Republican Party Platform of 1972.  Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1972. (Visited on March 15, 2005) 
258 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and Abington School District v. Schempp , 374 U.S. 203 
(1963). 
259 See the Republican Party platforms from 1972 through 2004.  Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php.  (Visited on March 15, 2005) 
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The inclusion of support for school prayer should not be confused with copious support 
for the practice.  Republicans did little to alter national policy until 1982, when Reagan 
proposed a constitutional amendment that would restore the simple freedom of our 
citizens to offer prayer in our public schools and institutions.260  The proposed 
amendment read:  Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual 
or group prayer in public schools or other public institutions. No person shall be required 
by the United States or by any State to participate in prayer.261  The rhetorical strength 
of the amendment gave it limited support in Congress, but, the measure failed 
nonetheless in the Senate nearly two years after Reagan initially proposed it.262  What 
seems clear is that Reagan did not spend much political capital in securing its passage.  
Rather, he proposed it and left it to Congress.  This is not to say that Reagan did not take 
credit for proposing the amendment.263  This issue was just subservient to the supremacy 
of economic matters.264   
                                                
260 Reagan, Ronald. Message to the Congress Transmitting a Proposed Constitutional Amendment on 
Prayer in School, May 17, 1982.  Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42527&st=&st1=.  (Visited on March 15, 2005) 
261 Ibid. 
262 Senate Roll-Call Vote on School Prayer New York Times March 21, 1984.  The amendment failed to 
make it through the Senate.  The final vote was 56-44; eleven votes short of passage.  Of the 18 Republican 
Senators who voted against the amendment, only two were from the Southboth border stateswhere the 
evangelical movement was the strongest.  Most of the remaining opposition came from northern, 
Midwestern, and Pacific states. 
263 On March 8, 1983, Reagan spoke to the National Association of Evangelicals and spun the proposed 
amendment into evidence of his ideological accord.   
 
Last year, I sent the Congress a constitutional amendment to restore prayer to public schools. Already this 
session, theres growing bipartisan support for the amendment, and I am calling on the Congress to act 
speedily to pass it and to let our children pray.  Available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=41023&st=&st1=. (Visited on March 15, 2005) 
264 One Reagan loyalist summed up Reagans legislative focus at the beginning of 1983: [Reagan] is 
going to hold the course, with the same supply-side emphasis  and keeping taxes in line and cutting them 
this next fiscal year, increasing taxes only if Congress comes along with some other cuts in spending. 
Cattani, Riachrd J. GOP grows restive as 84 nears. Christian Science Monitor January 28, 1983, 10. 
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Social conservatives tried a secondary tactic but met similar resistance.  In 
September of 1982, the Republican-controlled Senate considered a bill, sponsored by 
Jesse Helms (R-NC), that proposed stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear 
voluntary school prayer cases.  The bill gained strong backing by members of the social 
right but failed to gain the support of economic conservatives.  As one commentator put 
it, the bill was about as conservative as tearing up a copy of the Constitution on the 
Senate floor.265 Senator Helms recognized the problem of passing socially conservative 
legislation shortly after the bills defeat when he label the Senate, Conservative it aint, 
Republican it is.266  Absent the support of economic conservatives, socially conservative 
measures were doomed to failure in much the same fashion as Helms school prayer 
jurisdiction bill, which failed 50-39.   
Following these failures, Reagan resigned the resolution of prayer in school to the 
courts, stating, The courts themselves can restore a more balanced view of the first 
amendment . . . 267  Such resignation indicates the majority wing of the Republican Party 
did not desire changing national school prayer policy.  If the economic conservatives had 
favored such a change, party leaders could have made the vote on jurisdiction stripping a 
test of Party loyalty or, in the alternative, aggressively pursued constitutional amendment.  
While passing a constitutional amendment was exceedingly unlikely due to the 
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266 Roberts, Steven V. Senate Makeup on Social Issues: Conservative it Aint. New York Times 
September 25, 1982, 9. 
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difficulties of Article V amending procedures, the commitment of the Republican Party 
to securing school prayer was questionable at best.   
Yet, wholesale abandonment of the issue would have angered the minority wing 
in an election year, something the Party wished to avoid.  Thus, Reagan took up the issue 
of equal access to public facilities for religious and non-religious groupsan issue that 
touched on religion in school.  The equal access legislation gained support from both 
libertarians and social conservatives as it was widely advertised that the bill would have 
negligible impact on substantive education policy but was seen as pro-religion.  The 
bill was seen as so innocuous that even liberal Democrats supported it.268  By passing the 
Equal Access Act, Republicans shored up their national coalition in an election year as 
the social right had few victories in the first four years of the Reagan administration.  
True to form, the Party made sure it claimed credit for its passage.269  
Around the same time the Republican Party praised its efforts to open up public 
facilities to religious groups, the Administration joined several socially conservative 
groups270 in their efforts to persuade the Supreme Court that an Alabama statute that 
authorized a one minute moment of silence dedicated to meditation or voluntary prayer 
was constitutional.  The amicus curiae brief filed by the Solicitor Generals office 
argued, 
                                                
268 See Taylor, Jr., Stuart. School Prayer Bill: A Trojan Horse? New York Times July 27, 1984, B11. 
Safire, William. Reagan as Pandora. New York Times July 30, 1984, A21. 
269 The 1984 Republican Party Platform declared. We have enacted legislation to guarantee equal access to 
school facilities by student religious groups. Mindful of our religious diversity, we reaffirm our 
commitment to the freedoms of religion and speech guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and 
firmly support the rights of students to openly practice the same, including the right to engage in voluntary 
prayer in schools.  Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1984.  
(Visited on March 15, 2005) 
270 These socially conservative groups included the Christian Legal Society, the Legal Foundation of 
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provision for a moment of silence in the public schools is not an 
establishment of religion, but rather a legitimate way for the government 
to provide an opportunity for both religious and nonreligious introspection 
in a setting where, experience has shown, many desire it.  It is an 
instrument of toleration and pluralism, not of coercion or indoctrination.271 
Yet, the Court outwardly rejected the Governments argument in Wallace v. Jaffree.272  
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, rejected the idea that the moment of silence 
served a clear secular purpose and roundly declared that a moment of silence no secular 
purpose.273  Stevens noted that the sponsoring legislator openly espoused his hoped to 
return voluntary prayer back to public schooling.274  Since the law was passed with the 
intent to convey a message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer, the practice 
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.275 
 Reagans then-sole appointee to the Court concurred with the result.  In a separate 
opinion, OConnor took a more benevolent view of the moment of silence.  OConnor 
argued that moments of silence in public schools may not violated the Establishment 
Clause, depending on the intentions of the state.  To OConnor, The crucial question is 
whether the State has conveyed or attempted to convey the message that children should 
use the moment of silence for prayer.276  Simply [b]y mandating a moment of silence, a 
State does not necessarily endorse any activity that might occur during the period.277   
OConnor left the door open to the possibility that such practices could pass 
constitutional muster.  However, by requiring a careful examination of the history, 
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271 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants Rex E. Lee, 1984 WL 564160.  
272 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
273 Ibid. at 56. 
274 Ibid. at 57. 
275 Ibid. at 59. 
276 Ibid. at 73. 
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language, and administration of a particular statute, OConnor precluded the possibility 
that fundamentalist interest groups could use such practices as a means of re-entrenching 
Protestant hegemony in the public schools.  Secularizing moments of silences seemingly 
assuaged wary economic conservatives while enabling the practice to continue in a 
carefully monitored form.278 
 After Reagan and George H.W. Bush appointed five justices combined, media 
commentators and academics predicted that the Courts religion jurisprudence would 
likely shift.  Linda Greenhouse noted at the beginning of the 1991 term that the Court 
would soon test the dimensions of the conservative counterrevolution that gathered force 
during the term that ended three months ago.279  However, rather than abandon nearly 
thirty years of precedent, the Supreme Court, in Lee v. Weisman,280  continued to prohibit 
prayer in school and expanded the prohibition to include religious activity at public 
school ceremonies.  Commentators labeled the opinion as [d]efying almost all 
expectations281 and critics decried the Court as destroy[ing] the tradition of 
nonsectarian prayers at high school graduations . . . 282  The rulings may have been a 
surprise in light of the rhetoric of the Republican Party but the Partys failure to secure a 
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278 See Brown v. Gilmore, 533 U.S. 1301 (2001).  Linda Greenhouse hinted at the similarities between the 
Senate debates over a Constitutional amendment on school prayer and the likely disposition of Wallace  by 
the Supreme Court.  See Justices to Decide on Silent Prayer in Public Schools. New York Times April 2, 
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Courts New Majority.  New York Times October 7, 1991, 1. 
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York Times Jun 26, 1992, 1. 
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socially conservative majority on the Court meant that key decisions would be made by 
jurists unwilling to radically alter existing First Amendment jurisprudence.283   
In Lee v. Weisman, Justice Anthony Kennedy followed a pattern akin to the 
Courts decision in Wallace.  Kennedy rejected the Administrations urging to overturn 
Engel284 and Schempp285 and struck down the constitutionality of nonsectarian prayer at 
public school graduations ceremonies.  Kennedys opinion is particularly striking in light 
of his reliance on public and peer pressure in his analysis of state action.   
The undeniable fact is that the school districts supervision and control of 
a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer 
pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain 
respectful silence during the Invocation and Benediction.  This pressure, 
though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.286 
 
Not only had the Court upheld its Establishment Clause jurisprudence but also it 
conceptualized state compulsion in a sufficiently amorphous way to cast significant 
skepticism on the constitutionality of any kind of prayer activity in public education.   
 The response to the Courts rulings was similar to other restrictive Establishment 
Clause rulings.  Areas of the country with large, active evangelical communities protested 
the decision and pledged to resist.287  President Bush released the obligatory statement of 
disappointment with the Courts ruling, which undoubtedly appeased social conservatives 
                                                
283 Supra note 316. 
284 Supra note 293. 
285 Supra note 293. 
286 Ibid. at 593. 
287 Students Challenge Ban on Prayer at Graduation. New York Times May 26, 1993, A14.  L.A.  Powe, 
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during a tightly contested electoral campaign.288  However, the Courts opinion was met 
by relative ambivalence  throughout the rest of the country and, subsequently, the Court 
expanded the prohibition against prayer activity at public educational extra-curricular 
activities.289   
Similar ambivalence occurred when Congress again attempted to adopt a 
constitutional amendment that would secure the peoples right to acknowledge God 
according to the dictates of conscience.  The Religious Freedom Amendment, proposed 
by Rep. Ernest Istook (R-OK), enjoyed significant support among the social right, 
including groups like the Christian Coalition,290 the Family Research Council, and Focus 
on the Family (Fowler et al. 2004, 239).  Despite what constitutes largely symbolic 
action, given that 38 state legislatures would have to pass the proposed amendment, the 
social right could not prevent defections within the Republican Party or secure the 
requisite votes to pass the House.291  The votes were simply not there. 
 While the Supreme Court refused to allow religion to seep into secularized public 
education, it had little problem finding secular reasons for permitting public educational 
facilities and monies to support and fund nonsecular activities, including education.  As 
mentioned above, the Equal Access Act of 1984 permitted noncirriculum-related student 
groups to hold religious meetings in public high schools during periods outside regular 
                                                
288 Bush, George. Statement on the Supreme Court Decision on the Lee v. Weisman Case. July 24, 1992.  
Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=21139&st=prayer&st1=.  (Visited on 
March 16, 2005) 
289 Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).  In Doe, the Court struck down a 
policy that permitted student-led and student-initiated prayer at public high school football games.   
290 The Christian Coalition spent over $500,000 to run radio ads in 50 legislative districts to bolster the 
possibility of passage.  See Torry, Jack. School Prayer Amendment Falls Short. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
June 5, 1998, A14. 
291 Votes in Congress. New York Times June 7, 1998, A14. 
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school hours.  Republican Senator Jeremiah Denton, one of the bills sponsors, argued 
that the bill was a means of overcoming the censorship of religious speech.292  This may 
have been the objective of the social right but the law opened school facilities to all 
student groups, including political groups, which thrilled civil libertarians.293  Moreover, 
the voting in the House and Senate revealed both support between the economic and 
social wings of the Republican Party and overwhelming support among Democrats.294 
 Given the laws wide applicability and sweeping political support, it came as no 
great surprise that the Supreme Court ruled to uphold the Equal Access Act.  In Westside 
Community Board of Education v. Mergens,295 Justice OConnor, writing for the 
majority, interpreted noncurriculum-related student groups to mean any student group 
that does not directly relate to the body of courses offered by the school,296 which 
includes religious groups.  As such, the Court held that denial of respondents' request to 
form a Christian club denies them equal access under the Act.297  Interestingly, 
OConnor used the wide, bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate to 
reflect consensus on a broad legislative purpose298 and used this broad application and 
purpose as evidence of its constitutionality.299  The Court expanded this accommodation 
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throughout the 1990s, requiring public schools to permit religious groups to use their 
buildings outside of normal class hours if that school offers its facilities to other 
community groups.300 
 Neither economic conservatives, which formed the dominant wing of the 
Republican Party, nor the Supreme Court were willing to support most social 
conservative preferences on school prayer.  However, social conservatives have faired 
better on the issue of school choice and voucher programs.  Both economic conservatives 
and the Supreme Court proved willing to accommodate public monies going to private, 
religious schools for secular purposes.  At first glance, this issue seemingly cuts across 
the same coalitions as school prayer.  However, on the private school choice issue, free 
market libertarians and religious conservatives stood united (Cookson 1994, 17-37).  
James D. Ryan and Michael Heise argued that Republican leaders jumped at 
opportunities to support [] market-based educational reform [through voucher programs] 
that would operate largely within the confines of urban school districts (2002, 2085).  
Economic conservatives favored school choice because of its roots in free market choice 
and the possibility to minimize government expenditures.  Social conservatives favored 
voucher programs due to their allegiance to Christian academies and their desire to 
alleviate the financial burden [private education] places on devout parents (Jefferies 
and Ryan 2001, 283).  
 The Court has long held that public funding for certain secular components of 
private, religious educationthe states so-called benevolent neutrality does not 
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violate the Establishment Clause.301  The Court expanded this accommodation relatively 
early in the Reagan presidency by upholding an annual tax deduction for parents of 
children in private schools, both religious and nonreligious.302  In 2002, the Court further 
extended its jurisprudence to permit grants of tuition aid to individuals who can chose to 
use it to send their children to private school.  Justices OConnor and Kennedy once more 
cast their votes in the majority.  OConnor wrote a separate concurring opinion, which, 
among other things, articulated her position that the Courts decision was consistent with 
Everson and did not announce a new Establishment Clause jurisprudence.   
  In late June 2002, the Supreme Court issued its most significant ruling on using 
public money for private education.  In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,303 the Court upheld 
Clevelands school choice program, which enabled children to use vouchers to attend 
private schools.  The major sticking point was that 82 percent of the private schools 
participating in the voucher program were religiously affiliated and 96 percent of students 
using the vouchers enrolled in religious schools.  Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that 
the sizable percentage of parochial schools was not constitutionally significant304 and 
that the Constitution only requires a genuine choice.305  While critics labeled this 
maneuver an advanced yoga twist,306 Rehnquist clearly emphasized the benefits of 
parental choice in the educational marketplace.  In a separate concurring opinion, Justice 
OConnor echoed the value of market-driven choice: 
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In my view the more significant finding in these cases is that Cleveland 
parents who use vouchers to send their children to religious private 
schools do so as a result of true private choice . . . I find the Court's 
answer to the question whether parents of students eligible for vouchers 
have a genuine choice between religious and nonreligious schools 
persuasive. In looking at the voucher program, all the choices available to 
potential beneficiaries of the government program should be 
considered.307 
 
Social conservatives quickly hailed Zelman as a victory and a tipping point in 
Establishment Clause doctrine.  Yet, this has not been the case.  In Locke v. Davey,308 the 
Court upheld the State of Washingtons constitutional prohibition on funding religious 
institutions.  Thirty-six additional states have similar constitutional provisions (Fowler et 
al. 2004, 237).  So Zelman looks less like the tipping point and more like a 
constitutional affirmation of free market experimentation.  The permissibility of choosing 
a free market educational system did not equate to a states obligation to offer such a 
system.   
 When it came to religion and education policy, economic conservatives only 
supported social conservatives preferences when it overlapped free market values, such 
as school choice, or had no significant impact on national education policy.  Key 
economic conservatives reinforced the idea that the courts must play a central role in 
redefining the contours of church-state relations in public education.  And, Reagan 
appointees, Justices OConnor and Kennedy, repeatedly created moderate judicial 
opinion that maintained the preferences of economic conservatives to the detriment of 
social conservatives.  In other words, preferences of the dominant wing trumped 
preferences of the minority wing in both Congress and the Court.  Following the defeat of 
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social conservative religion in education preferences in Congress and before the Court, 
the issue has largely faded from public prominence.  By monitoring the contours of 
religion in education, the Supreme Court removed an issue that divided the Republican 
Party and, thereby, enabled the Party to have greater unity.  Absent judicial intervention 
and moderation on social issues, the Republican Party would have been forced to address 
this intra-party disjunction in a much more direct and, most likely, divisive way.  
 
Homosexual Rights 
 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the issue of extending gay, lesbian, and 
transgendered Americans civil rights protections rose to a new level of prominence and 
became increasingly problematic for the Republican Party.  Gay rights do not fit as neatly 
into the crosscutting issue paradigm as many of the other issues addressed to this point.  
First, the issue slowly gained salience throughout this but did not readily appear on the 
national agenda until the early 1990s.  Second, as gay rights gained salience, the degree 
to which statutory and constitutional protection of homosexuals cut across the Republican 
coalition increased.  Throughout much of the 1980s and into the 1990s, the gay rights 
movement gained wider acceptance among Americans.309  Social conservatives 
increasingly became isolated in their resistance to homosexual rights as free market 
libertarians grew increasingly uncomfortable with governmental regulation of sexual 
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behavior among consenting adults.  While this steady change has yet to transform into 
sweeping egalitarianism, it has placed economic conservatives at odds with social 
conservatives who actively attempt to prevent or undermine civil libertarian gains made 
by homosexuals.  
 As with most other social issues, the Republican Party has attempted to leave a 
good deal of the policy-making on gay rights up to the courts.  This is not to say that 
significant legislation and executive action has not been attempted or achieved; simply 
that such action has not met with broad support by the Republican Party.  During the late 
1980s and early 1990s, several states passed gay rights laws that protected against 
discrimination in employment, housing, education, public accommodation, and credit.  
However, most of these states were northern states, like Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, and Vermont, where the citizenry is socially liberal, even where it is 
economically conservative.  The Bible Belt has not been nearly so accommodating. As 
Dan Pinello explains:  [T]he appellate courts of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Texas, and Virginia decided lawsuits involving child custody, visitation, adoption, and 
foster care at rates about 50 percent less favorable to homosexual parents than the rest of 
the nation (2003, 144). So, while homosexuals gained certain protections in socially 
liberal areas of the country, these gains have not been universal. Moreover, protection 
against discrimination is hardly the same thing as affirmative equality and both the states 
and national government have been relatively reluctant to enter into this area to craft 
substantive policy. 
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 Most legislative and legal victories occurred following the successful political 
mobilization of the gay community.  In contrast to all national elections that preceded it, 
the 1992 election saw gay and lesbian issues [] being raised  and fought over.310  All 
five major contenders for the Democratic nomination for the presidency promised to 
permit gays in the military, as did Ross Perot.  During this same period, gay rights groups 
began actively and openly contributing to national campaigns and lobbying national 
officials.  In turn, national officials began seeking out their contributions.  However, with 
this mobilization and increasing acceptance with social liberals came a growing 
countermovement among the social right. 
 The debate over Robert Borks nomination to the Supreme Court opened the 
floodgates to an anti-homosexual advocacy previously unseen in American politics.  
Christian Voice, an evangelical political organization, published a four-page letter 
supporting Judge Borks nomination, which included a direct link between the 
appointment of Bork and the end of gay rights.  The letter stated, Robert Bork does not 
support the idea of a constitutional right to engage in sodomy.  He may help us stop the 
gay rights issue and thus help stem the spread of AIDS.311  Of course, Bork helped fuel 
this rhetoric by appearing anti-gay as a matter of policy preference312 and constitutional 
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interpretation.313  Needless to say Borks nomination centered on social issues314
including gay rightsand his defeat, in part, stemmed from the failure to reframe his 
social conservatism and emphasize issues that would play with economic conservatives, 
such as his law and order jurisprudence.315  Borks defeat also marked the rise of gay 
organizations as a powerful lobbying force in Washington.316  The failure to secure 
Borks confirmation and defeat the pressure mounted by gay organizations was heralded 
as a victory for pro-civil libertarian forces.317    
 A few years prior to Borks nomination, the discomfort with homosexuality 
within the Republican Party, and even the population as a whole, undoubtedly 
contributed to the Supreme Courts adoption of a social construction averse to protecting 
homosexual activity.  Rather than extend the Griswold-Eisenstadt-Roe line of privacy 
protection to consensual, homosexual activity in the privacy of the home, the Court 
adopted a traditionalist framework and recognized a social tradition in criminalizing 
homosexual activity.  In Bowers v. Hardwick,318 the Court ruled that Georgias criminal 
prohibition against sodomy was constitutional as it was constantly based on notions of 
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under 
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the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.319  Of course, by 
constructing the ruling as such, Justice White built the moralists house on a foundation 
of sand.  If contemporary morality changed, then it follows that the law, even 
constitutional law, must change concordantly.  The religious right lauded the 5-4 decision 
as a victory but, based on their support for Bork and his hostility toward homosexual 
rights, social conservatives clearly recognized the vulnerability of the Bowers ruling and 
the precarious position of denying homosexuals minimal legal protections. 
 The social right was correct to fear the vulnerability of Bowers.  Shortly after the 
Court rendered its decision, the American polity moved in a libertarian direction 
regarding homosexuality.  As Americans became more tolerant, both the left and the right 
mobilized to realize or protect their preferences.  This rising debate was made abundantly 
clear during the 1992 presidential campaign.  In some ways, social conservatives picked a 
perfect time to voice their concerns over the moral degradation of society.  George H.W. 
Bush was floundering in the polls based on weak economic performance and arguably 
weak leadership, at least when contrasted to Reagan, the great communicator.  In order to 
bolster support within his Party, Bush increasingly embraced the socially conservative 
wing of the Party.  Ironically, upon entering the White House, Bush was much less 
socially conservative than Reagan, yet, by the end of his four years, the social right 
enjoyed more executive pandering than any time to date.  The 1992 Republican platform 
reflected this effort to cast Bush and the Republican Party as the party of traditional 
values and uncompromising morals: 
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 . . . we oppose efforts by the Democratic Party to include sexual 
preference as a protected minority receiving preferential status under civil 
rights statutes at the federal level, State, and local level.  We oppose any 
legislation or law which legally recognizes same-sex marriages and allows 
such couples to adopt children or provide foster care.320 
 
While such unambiguous support for the social rights agenda certainly helped Bushs 
standing with evangelical Christians, it also isolated Party centrists uncomfortable with 
the increasing moralism of the Party.  Pat Buchanan published advertisements criticizing 
the Bush Administration for being too indulgent of homosexuality.321  Buchanan also 
made clear that he believed there was a religious war going on in our country for the 
soul of America.  It is a culture war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as 
the Cold War itself.322  While President Bush steered clear of fundamentalism in his 
speech, he made veiled references to traditional values and the damage had been done.  
As one commentator noted,  
Vehement attacks at that convention by speakers like the Rev. Pat 
Robertson and Pat Buchanan  as well as from the Bushes and the Quayles 
under the rubric family values  seem to have backfired, engendered less 
support for the G.O.P. according to polls, than sympathy for gay men and 
lesbian.323 
 
Moderate Republicans in the electorate faced a choice between a Republican Party 
teetering on the brink of social conservatism or more socially liberal candidates.  Both 
Bill Clinton and Ross Perot adopted more liberal social policies, including extending 
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greater protection to homosexuals in the workplace.  Moderates in the electorate did 
indeed defect as Ross Perot, who adopted a more liberal social policy, siphoned a sizable 
portion of votes away from Bush by also appealing to the preferences of economic 
conservatives.324 
 The rejection of a socially conservative Bush Administration may have actually 
helped economic conservatives in the Republican Party over the long term.  President 
Clinton appointed two Supreme Court justices, both moderate liberals who favored 
liberal social policy.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg took the place of the socially conservative 
Byron White.  Steven Breyer replaced social liberal Harry Blackmun.  The two Clinton 
justices helped shift the Courts social jurisprudence slight to the left, which was 
sufficient to change constitutional protection for homosexuals.325   
 The first indication of a shift in the Supreme Courts gay rights jurisprudence 
came in 1996, when the Court ruled on the constitutionality of an amendment to the 
Colorado state constitution in Romer v. Evans.326  Amendment 2, a popularly ratified 
amendment, read as follows: 
No protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual 
Orientation.  Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or 
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities 
or school districts, not any of its agencies, political subdivisions, 
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, 
regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual 
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise 
be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim 
any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of 
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discrimination.  This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects 
self-executing.327 
 
Justice Kennedy, writing for a six-member majority, strongly criticized the events in 
Colorado, even going so far as to quote Justice Harlans famed dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson:   
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the 
Constitution neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.  
Unheeded then, those words now are understood to state a commitment to 
the laws neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake.  The Equal 
Protection Clause enforces this principle and today requires us to hold 
invalid a provision of Colorados Constitution.328 
 
The Courts opinion in Romer was hailed as a victory for homosexual equality in the 
United States.  Additionally, several legal scholars argued that Bowers was overruled 
sub silencio in Romer (Estin 1997, 366; see also McDonnell 1998, 300).  The national 
media was more ambiguous as to Romers standing vis-à-vis Bowers but they noted that 
Romer was a significant victory for gay rights329 and that the Courts jurisprudence 
now opposed tough social policy [that] defy the norm.330 
The reaction of social conservatives was vociferous, if unsurprising.  Gary Bauer, 
president of the Family Research Council, declared that the Supreme Court was an out-
of-control unelected judiciary that send[s] chills down the back of anyone who cares 
whether the people of this nation any longer have the power of self-rule.331  A leading 
official of Focus on Family said the Court disparage[d] the moral views of the people of 
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Colorado.332  However, their economic conservative counterparts made no protest.  In 
fact, moderate Republican lawmakers were notably muted in their criticism of the Courts 
decision.  So what explains the disparity? 
In his work on homosexual rights and American law, Daniel R. Pinello observed, 
environmental variable[s are] the most important influences in courts of last resort 
(2003, 82).  Such environmental variables reflect the permissibility of homosexuality and 
homosexual rights.  As homosexuality became increasingly acceptable in American 
society, libertarian economic conservatives have also grown increasingly acceptant of 
homosexuality.  This is not to say that the Republican Party embraced homosexual rights.  
Far from it.  The Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA) passed relatively 
untrammeled through the Republican-controlled House and Senate.  However, the 
measure did not take away pre-existing (or at least pre-recognized) rights and the bill was 
of sufficiently suspect constitutionalitysomething recognized throughout the floor 
debatesthat it was unlikely that DOMA would pose an obstacle to gay marriage should 
such a policy gain popular support.  Moreover, numerous lawmakers noted that the 
suspect constitutionality of the bill should not prevent its passage as courts bear the 
ultimate responsibility for deciding the bills fate.333  Such observations are consistent 
with legislative deference to the national judiciary on matters of social policy. 
Given the growing social moderation of economic conservatives, it came as no 
great surprise that when the Supreme Court considered a case with facts remarkably 
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similar to Bowers, many commentators predicted the demise of Bowers.334  In Lawrence 
v. Texas,335 the Court reversed its decision in Bowers and recognized a broader social 
tradition in due process protection against intrusive governmental action.  Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, opted not to craft a narrow decision based on the 
Equal Protection reasoning he employed in Romer, which would have only prevented 
discriminatory regulation targeted against homosexuals.  Instead, Kennedy argued, 
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for 
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in 
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both 
interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so 
remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain 
even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. 
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that 
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons 
to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.336  
 
Not only did the Court undermine the validity of class-based legislation, as Romer 
mandated, but it also extended a liberty interest in private sexual conduct among 
consenting adults.   
Many have wondered why the conservative Rehnquist Court would render such a 
socially progressive decision, particularly when a Reagan appointee wrote the opinion.  
The answer undoubtedly lies with the growing skepticism of sexual paternalism and the 
greater acceptance of homosexuality in American society and politics.  If the Courts 
decision was truly out of step with the American polity, then more would have been made 
of the decision in mainstream American politics.  Rather, decriminalization of sodomy, 
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homosexual or otherwise, did little to upset the vast majority of American people.  Such 
unconcern no doubt stems from the fact that most Americans support some sort of 
protection for gays.337  By the time the Court rendered Lawrence, nearly nine out of ten 
Americans thought gay Americans should have more progressive protections than the one 
the Court rendered.338   
The due process victory, however, did not translate into greater support for all gay 
rights.  Particularly notable is the issue of gay marriage.  Americans across the political 
continuum have been particularly slow to embrace same-sex unions, particularly 
marriage.  Nearly 70% of Republicans oppose gay marriage, which helps explain why 
gains in this area have come exclusively at the state level.339  Gay marriage does not cut 
across the Republican Party as other areas of gay rights did and do.  As such, gay 
marriage is still a legitimate target for legislative redress.  However, if the preferences of 
economic conservatives shift to accommodate same-sex civil unions and/or gay marriage, 
it is likely that the Court will intervene as it did in Romer and Lawrence.  
Evaluating homosexual rights over the past two decades reveals a largely court-
centered strategy that benefited the Republican Party.  Following the electoral failure of 
1992, which saw the Republican Party actively embrace its socially conservative wing, 
the economically conservative wing of the Party eschewed anti-gay rhetoric and policy-
making in most areas save gay marriage.  Moreover, by appointing socially moderate 
                                                                                                                                            
336 Ibid. at 576-77. 
337 Supra note 341. 
338 See Booth, Michael. When Hate Became Resolve.  States Amendment 2 led to gay protections. 
Denver Post September 29, 2002.  Booth wrote, Nearly 9 out of 10 Americans now think gay people 
should have equal job and housing opportunities, after steady increases since Gallup started asking the 
question in 1977. 
339 Bumiller, Elisabeth. Cold Feet: Why American Has Gay Marriage Jitters. New York Times August 10, 
  232
jurists to the High Court, the dominant, economically conservative wing of the 
Republican Party helped create a Court unsympathetic to illiberal governmental 
regulation of sexuality.  While the Court has not recognized those rights that remain 
outside of majoritarian preferences, such as the right of homosexuals to wed, it has 
removed socially conservative policy that is unpopular among socially libertine 
Americans, including the dominant wing of the Republican Party.  By leaving recognition 
of homosexual rights to the courts, the Republican Party has avoided addressing the 
inherent tension between socially libertine economic conservatives and social 
conservatives, all the while securing the preferences of economic conservatives.   
 
Abortion 
 The party-court dynamic noted for religion in public education and gay rights 
applies to Republican abortion policy.  In fact, other scholars have observed a pattern of 
displacing abortion policy (Graber 1993, 54) while maintain policy that appealed to the 
economic conservative wing of the Republican Party (Graber 1996, 4).340  Yet, despite 
the long-standing pattern of legislative deference to judicial policy-making in the area of 
abortion policy, social conservatives maintain great faith that the Republican Party will 
appoint justices that will overturn Roe v. Wade and its progeny.341  Such hope is 
                                                                                                                                            
2003, 1. 
340 Since other scholars have noted this phenomenon, this section is designed only to highlight the 
consistency of Republican abortion policy with other social issues rather than provide a comprehensive 
account of abortion policy development vis-à-vis parties and courts. 
341 For example, the Christian Coalitions number one priority on its Agenda for the 109th Congress is 
securing sufficient votes to confirm all of President Bushs nominees to the circuit court of appeals.  This is 
striking given that it precedes support for a bill that would criminalize taking minors across state 
boundaries to abort a pregnancy, support for a constitutional amendment that protects traditional 
marriage, and several bills that seek to promote the exercise of religious faith in the public sphere.  See 
http://www.cc.org/issues.cfm. (Visited on April 5, 2005) 
  233
predicated on the assumption that the Republican Party would be best served by yielding 
to the demands of its minority wing.  As a matter of electoral politics, this assumption 
helped keep social conservatives firmly entrenched in the Republican Party without 
having to aggressively alter abortion policy.  Again, the Republican Party avoided 
appointing five socially conservative jurists to overturn the core of Roe.  As such, social 
moderates within the Party could vote their economic preferences while relying on the 
Supreme Court to safeguard national abortion policy. 
 Ronald Reagan made anti-abortion rhetoric a fixture of his domestic policy 
speeches.  Early in his presidency, Reagan declared, I have been one who believes that 
abortion is the taking of a human life.342  He actively espoused such pro-life discourse 
throughout his presidency even though he openly abandoned his social agenda whenever 
his economic agenda needed the Administrations full attention.343  Reagans successor 
continued the anti-abortion rhetoric and even took a more aggressive posture close to the 
1992 election.  But President Bush maintained Reagans policy of appointing a moderate 
median justice to the High Bench.  
 The rhetorical strength of the abortion issue stems largely from its importance as a 
tool for electoral success.  Since the Supreme Court removed a substantial portion of 
abortion policy-making from state and national lawmakers with its ruling in Roe v. Wade, 
political rhetoric and judicial appointments have taken center stage in the debate over 
abortion policy.  Republicans have used this issue to pay electoral dividends by tapping 
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an active pool of single-issue voters that cast their ballot on a candidates anti-abortion 
advocacy (Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox 1992, 183).  However, because pro-choice members 
of the electorate outnumbered anti-abortion members, taking the abortion issue away 
from the courts would be highly detrimental to the Republican Party.  While abortion 
politics is currently limited to low-cost political rhetoric, if lawmakers were forced to 
take real action, the current Republican Party coalition would collapse.  Thus, keeping 
abortion policy under the control of the courts by upholding Roe was (and is) in the best 
electoral interests of the Republican Party (1992, 170).   
 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court increased the power of states and national 
government to regulate abortive practices.  In many of these cases, the Administration 
submitted a brief requesting that the Court overturn Roe.  However, the Courtmore 
specifically, the median justicerefused to overturn the core of Roe.  As two leading 
constitutional scholars observed 
Justice OConnor has never questioned Roes central premise that liberty 
to choose abortion is fundamental nor accepted Chief Justice Rehnquists 
and Justice Whites [in Webster] view that any state interest at any point in 
pregnancy may, if a state legislature chooses, outweigh a womans right to 
choose (Estrich and Sullivan 1989, 133).   
 
Yet, the Akron-Thornburgh-Webster344 line of cases casts sufficient skepticism on Roes 
durability that many speculated that the next abortion case would render an unmitigated 
victory for the social right.345 
                                                
344 Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh v. American College 
of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 (1986);  Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
345 For observations regarding the downfall of Roe, see Kamen, Al. Supreme Court Restricts Right to 
Abortion, Giving Wide Latitude for Regulation. Washington Post July 4, 1989, A1; Marcus, Ruth. 
Abortion-Rights Groups Expect to Lose. Washington Post April 22, 1992, A1. 
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 The Courts opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey346 ended such speculation.  The moderate center of the CourtOConnor, 
Kennedy, and Souter, all Republican appointeesacknowledged that the protection of  
constitutional liberty includes a womans right to decide to terminate her 
pregnancy.347  Of particular note, Justice Kennedy switched his position from Webster, 
wherein he sided with a plurality that Roe should be overturned to strongly recognizing 
the right to choose in Casey.  Yet, the switch may be less surprising if one examines the 
regulatory scheme Kennedy designed.  His opinion declared that certain forms of 
regulation including delaying an abortion for 24 hours and parental or judicial consent for 
teenagers were permissible.  But, the Court stated it would strike down any regulation 
that placed a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the 
fetus reached viability, including spousal notification.  Thus, Casey largely reflects 
centrist Republican ideology, which favors regulation but not abolition of abortive 
options. 
Throughout the 1980s, American public opinion was marked by significant 
skepticism over Roe.  However, by the early 1990s, public opinion had stabilized and was 
overwhelmingly supportive of Roe.348  Most notably, despite being the anti-abortion 
party, the vast majority of Republicans in the electorate do not support the social rights 
agenda (Fiorina 2005, 41).  In fact, only approximately 20-25% of the Party took the 
position that abortion should be illegal in all circumstances (2005, 41).  The more 
                                                
346 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
347 Ibid. at 922. 
348 By 1992, Gallup polls indicated that well over 60% of Americans supported Roe v. Wade (see Fiorina 
2005, 36). 
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libertine economic wing of the Republican Party clearly supported the essence of 
Roe[]349 and the economic conservatives on the bench crafted an opinion largely 
reflective of this trend.   
 Following Casey, the salience of abortion politics faded considerably.  Undoubtly, 
the Democratic Partys success in 1992particularly Bill Clintons successful bid for the 
White Househelped reduce pressure to change national abortion policy by assuring 
presidential veto of overly conservative abortion policy.  The appointment of Justice 
Ginburg to replace the socially conservative Justice White also helped concretize Roes 
standing.  Yet, the Republican Party also backed off the push to overturn Roe350 and the 
debate shifted to the periphery of abortion policy.  President Clinton repealed Reagans 
global gag rule that ended U.S. funding of global NGOs that provided, referred, 
counseled, or advocated abortion.  Clinton subsequently compromised with House 
Republicans to create a modified gag rule in order to secure the $1 billion the U.S. owed 
the United Nations.   The gag rule has important implications for international foreign 
policy but it hardly retains the salience of domestic abortion policy.   
Throughout the mid and late 1990s, a similar détente occurred on the Court as it 
shifted its attention from abortive practices to abortion protestors.  In 1994, Congress 
passed the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, which criminalized threatening, 
obstructing, and destructive conduct intended to injure, intimidate or interfere with any 
person because that person is or has been . . . obtaining or providing reproductive health 
                                                
349 Supra note 381 at 869. 
350 The lynchpin of the Republican Revolution of 1994, The Contract with America, did not mention 
abortion (Gillespe et al. 1994).   
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services.351  The federal courts consistently rebuffed challenges to the Act and the 
Supreme Court upheld several state-created limitations on abortion protestors around 
clinics.352  Essentially, the Court balanced the privacy interests of clinic workers and 
patients with the free speech interests of protestors, with the former consistently trumping 
the latter. 
This period also saw multiple attempts to ban the practice of partial-birth 
abortions, a practice widely unpopular with the American people.  The House passed four 
different bans in 1995, 1996, 2000, and 2002 but the measure was either unable to muster 
sufficient support in the Senate or overcome presidential veto.  However, public opinion 
polls showed that 70% of Americans favored such a ban so long it included an exemption 
when the health of the mother was in jeopardy.353  The latter provision is central to the 
support of the ban.  In 2000, the Supreme Court re-entered the debate regarding abortion 
policy by striking down a Nebraska law that banned partial-birth abortions without an 
exemption for the health of the mother.  In 2003, President Bush signed into law a partial-
birth abortion bill that accounted for the Courts correction by including an exemption for 
the life of the mother.  Given the level of support in the electorate, the measure passed 
with wide support among Republicans.  However, as leading social conservatives noted, 
the ban had little impact on the number of abortions performed354 and, as such, was 
largely symbolic, designed to appease the social right. 
                                                
351 18 U.S.C. 248. 
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By leaving the most substantial portion of abortion policy to the courts and 
enabling the socially conservative wing to secure a few symbolic victories,  the 
Republican Party has managed to avoid formulating national abortion policy and, 
thereby, risking electoral rebuff.  Based largely on the constitutionalization of abortion 
politics, the Republican Party has successfully sold judicial appointees as a proxy for 
abortion policy.  However, appointing key moderates to the bench while maintaining the 
need for conservative jurists resulted in maintaining a coalition of social libertines and 
social conservatives, both in government and the electorate.  Absent the courts, the 
Republican Party would have to address an issue that cuts across their national coalition 
and would likely cause serious electoral difficulties.  National electoral success for the 
current Republican Party depends on the courts continuing to craft moderate abortion 
policy.  Given the fragility of the national coalition, a Republican president would be best 
served by appointing a social moderate should the median or swing position on the Court 
become vacant.  Counterintuitive though it may be, the Democratic Party may be better 
served electorally if a Republican president were to appoint a social conservative as the 
electoral repercussions of judicial conservatism in the area of national abortion policy 
would likely result in sizable Democratic victories.   
 
Conclusion 
 In 2000, George W. Bush won a controversial and contested presidential election.  
Despite losing the popular vote, his 271 electoral votes carried the Electoral College and 
unified Republican control over the national government.  Two years later, the 
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Republican Party increased their hold over the national government.  The events of 
September 11, 2001 certainly played a role in the victory355 but, whatever the impetus, 
the Republican national coalition grew in strength nationwide.  The 2004 election saw the 
Republican Party maintain their hold on power despite a faltering national economy, 
tepid support for the Iraq War, strained relations with many western allies, and a highly 
mobilized Democratic Party still smarting from the 2000 election.  Bush became the first 
president in American history to win re-election after failing to secure a popular victory 
his first term.  While both the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections were close, the result 
was unified control over the national government and, possibly, the advent of a 
Republican political order. 
 In what may prove to be the ratifying election of the new Republican political 
order, evangelical Christians turned out in record number to support Republican 
candidates.356  Political observers widely credited the social right with carrying President 
Bush to victory,357 particularly, in key swing states, like Ohio and Florida.  Despite nearly 
two decades of frustration or, at best, highly limited success, social conservatives 
continue to back the Republican Party in overwhelming numbers.   
Much as before, the Republican Party responded by actively moving on its 
conservative economic agenda.  Within the first three months of 2005, the Republican 
Party passed laws that extended greater protection to corporations against class action law 
                                                
355 Van Drehle, David. Democrats Payback for 2000 Must Wait. Washington Post November 6, 2002, 
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356 Eisenberg, Carol. Election Aftermath: Religious Political Revival.  Newsday November 5, 2004, A28. 
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suits358 and reduced the ability of families to gain bankruptcy protection against their 
creditors but left corporate bankruptcy untouched.359  Moreover, the Party is actively 
moving to create personal social security accounts that could push billions of dollars 
into corporate reinvestment and attempting to open up the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge to oil drilling.360  The only efforts made by Republicans for their social 
constituency was granting the federal courts jurisdiction to hear claims by the parents of 
Terri Schiavo in their attempt to reinsert her feeding tubes.  But this action was symbolic 
as it did not change substantive policy and was designed primarily to play with social 
conservatives at virtually no cost.361 
 Despite serious division, the Republican Party managed to consolidate power 
after nearly three full decades of divided government.  The ability of the Republican 
Party to win national elections depends in no small measure on the role of the courts as a 
moderate social policy maker.  Absent the courts, the Republican Party would be forced 
to directly address the inherent tensions between social conservatives and libertine 
economic conservatives.  Embracing greater religion in school, the exclusion of 
homosexuals from certain civil liberties, and severely curtailing a womans right to 
choose would likely push social moderates into the Democratic Party, which in addition 
                                                
358 The Class Action Fairness Act removed most class action law suits from state to federal courts, which 
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to social liberalism became more appealing to corporatists during the 1990s.362  Similarly, 
if the Republican Party simply dismissed or ignored the social rights demands, the social 
right would, at best, support the Republican Party in lower numbers, and, at worst, defect 
and seek a third party option.363  In short, the courts have stabilized the Republican Party 
by offering an alternative policy-making institution that renders moderate policy on an 
issue that threatened to divide the Party.  In so doing, the Court has created conditions 
suitable for a Republican political order. 
 This is not to say that a new political order is inevitable.  If Bush moves to 
embrace the agenda of the social right and push it through traditional policy avenues, 
then the coalition will have to adapt to a new distribution of Party energy to policies the 
Old Guard finds odious.  Or, if one of the socially moderate members of the Supreme 
Court retires and Bush opts for a social conservative, a significant shift in social 
jurisprudence could push centrists to defect from the Republican Party.  Scholars have 
noted that the abortion issue has the potential to realign the national party system and 
could do so if the Court overturns Roe.  The Democratic Party may move to 
accommodate a greater share of the American center.  Or, a new issue may arise that 
cleaves the Party system in a way inconceivable at present. The possibilities are endless 
but they all depend on maintaining the status quo on the Court and within the Republican 
national coalition. 
                                                
362 See Torricelli, Robert G. Is GOP still the Party of Business? The Record July 21, 1998, L09. 
363 Pat Robertson was urged to run as an independent in 1988 as many Evangelical Christians believed 
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 While a Republican political order may not occur, all indicators seem to point to a 
continued alliance between economic and social conservatives.  Even after the social 
right mobilized in record numbers to ensure that Bush did not meet the same electoral 
fate as his father, the Republican Party agenda has been strikingly economic in nature.  
Of course, this is not surprising if we look at the Reagan years as a model.  Reagan 
pushed his economic agenda at the cost of the social agenda and was rewarded by being 
made the icon of the modern Republican Party.  George W. Bush has largely followed 
this pattern and continues to rely on the Supreme Court in the same fashion.   
 A testament to the success of the Republicans court-centered strategy may well 
be the fact that there appears to be more problematic fissures within the economic 
conservative wing than between the economic and social wings.  As Bush continues to 
press for making tax cuts permanent despite the growing national deficit, balanced-
budget Republicans and tax-cutting Republicans are increasingly at odds over national 
economic policy.364  The national judiciary will not be able to facilitate compromise over 
national budgetary or tax policy so the Party will have to deal with this one on their own.   
However, the media discusses this fissure little while continually focusing on the 
social issues associated with socially conservative Republicans.  Media coverage of 
divisive issues like abortion and tragic stories like Terri Schiavo make more compelling 
stories than the nuances of national economic policy.  By portraying the entire 
Republican Party as in step with social conservatives, the media perpetuates the 
misconception that the Republican Party will appoint conservative jurists to the bench 
who are likely to change American social jurisprudence.  While socially conservative 
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jurists do make it onto the national judiciary, it is in the best interests of the majority 
wing of the Republican Party to continue to place moderates on the Supreme Court and 
then decry the Court when it crafts moderate social policy.  Judging by past action and 
the composition of the Republican Party, it is highly unlikely that the Court will be used 
as a conduit through which to achieve conservative social policy in line with the desires 
of the social right. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
364 Nagourney, Adam. Squabbles Under the Big Tent. The Nation April 3, 2005, 1. 
  244
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
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 Throughout the 20th Century, political parties empowered and entreated national 
courts to do things the parties could not do on their own.  Concurrently, courts stabilized 
the party-in-power by addressing issues that threatened to undermine partisan unity.  
Whether the task was to retrench threatened commitments, change social conditions, or 
facilitate maintenance of the status quo, the courtsparticularly the Supreme Courtdid 
what the party-in-power could not do on its own and performed the task without great 
difficulty.  The courts regularly responded to the party with the greatest influence over 
judicial appointmentsusually the party that held power over an extended period of 
timeby securing the preferences of the partys dominant wing.  Members of the 
dominant wing in government rarely get exactly what they want (e.g., the Court refused 
to overturn the Hepburn Act of 1906 as certain conservative Republicans desired and it 
did not overturn Plessy as quickly as requested by liberal Democrats), but they frequently 
get more of their collective preferences by simultaneously avoiding a split in the party 
and enabling the courts to protect and/or realize their preferred policies.  Members of the 
minority wing can secure limited victories in lower federal courts, although national 
policy usually runs counter to their preference.  However, minority wing lawmakers in 
government benefit by judicial stabilization of the party through the ability of the party to 
gain and hold power.  
 The three case studies show how courts can extend the life of parties-in-power, 
transform party coalitions to maintain their hold on power, and, in periods of divided 
government, create conditions ripe for the rise of a new political regime.  The 
multifaceted role courts play in American partisan politics results in relatively healthy 
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regime politics despite a party system insufficiently strong to carry out the task on its 
own.  This means that courts are an important source of power not regularly associated 
with judicial power.  The nature of this power helps courts extend the life of parties-in-
power, which makes the judiciary a vital component of American party government.  
Thus, scholars of American politics and constitutional theory would be well served to 
analyze the role courts play in realizing political commitments and partisan visions of the 
good society.  Because the party-court dynamic has important implications for judicial 
power, party government, and constitutional theory and practice, it is to each of these I 
now turn.  
 
Judicial Power in Partisan Context 
 A better understanding of the role courts play in regime politics elucidates the 
nature of judicial power in American politics.  For too long the exercise of judicial review 
was associated with countermajoritarianism (see Bickel 1986).  As the case studies 
illustrate, the court can exercise its powers of review in ways normatively problematic for 
democratic theory, yet, not easily categorized as countermajoritarian.  Congressional 
majorities can pass legislation inconsistent with the will of popular majorities that courts 
subsequently strike down.365  Parties can use courts to circumvent veto points that 
consistently protect minority preferences at the cost of majority will.366  Yet, this is not to 
say that courts never act in ways that are countermajoritarian.  In fact, courts may be 
predisposed to operate in countermajoritarian ways but do so because they are requested 
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to fill that role by well-positioned political coalitions.367  Rather than cling to normatively 
and empirically problematic labels, judicial scholars must scrutinize political coalitions 
and the role they ask courts to play within political regimes.     
 If we shift our analysis from asking what do courts do to asking what do 
political regimes ask courts to do, then we expose the layers of judicial power.  First, the 
judiciary has formal institutional powers.  Courts regularly assert authority through 
statutory interpretation and constitutional review.  Courts also have the power to remedy 
harms against the state and private citizens.  Such formal institutional powers are 
relatively uncontroversial as either empirical or normative propositions.368   
 Second, we can conceptualize judicial power through the lens of political regimes.  
Courts gain power by enabling political parties to stabilize and/or transform their national 
coalitions.  Prolonged periods of partisan stability can result in a political order.  In other 
words, courts exercise a sort of regime power by providing a forum through which 
crosscutting issues can be resolved with minimal electoral cost to the party-in-power.  
Most political parties recognize the role the courts play and continue to provide the courts 
with the institutional powers and autonomy necessary to bring about this stability.  Parties 
grant courts varying degrees of political space in which to make policy whenever 
operation within that political space jeopardizes the unity of the party.  Judicial scholars 
conceptualize the Rehnquist Court as particularly active in large part because the 
Republican Party (and, perhaps, the Democratic Party as well) requires the Court to 
handle a wide swath of social issues that would otherwise divide the Party.  Thus, the 
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Rehnquist Courts significant regime power flows from the Republican regimes inability 
to manage a large dimension of salient policy-making space.  Regimes depend on the 
courts and courts enjoy power as a result. 
 Third, the courts enjoy a functional power derived from what the regime asks the 
courts to do.  In other words, when parties-in-power need courts to take on issues that cut 
against their national coalition, the judiciary develops policy within that policy 
dimension.  This means that the courts will be directly involved in any of the following: 
defining institutional powers, protecting old political commitments, extending civil rights 
and liberties to certain pivotal groups, maintaining the status quo, and numerous others.  
The case studies above show the courtsparticularly the Supreme Courtexercise 
significant policy-making authority over highly salient issues and parties-in-power 
welcome it.  When parties empower courts to hear certain issues or defer such issues to 
the courts, the national judiciary derives policy-making authority as a function of its role 
within the political regime.  Of course, whenever the courts operate as a policy-making 
institution, American constitutional and/or political development is affected.  Choices on 
one dimension preclude alternative paths and dimensions (see Silverstein forthcoming) so 
we cannot understand political and constitutional development without understanding 
how courts exercise this functional power within the wider political order. 
Looking at judicial power through the lens of regime politics adds dimension to 
judicial review as a constitutional enterprise.  As the case studies reveal, the ordering of 
institutions within a constitutional system creates recurrent patterns in politics.  Political 
outcomes are by no means predestined but the likelihood that certain institutions will 
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attempt to resolve certain types of policies (e.g., policies that cut against the party-in-
powers national coalition) is assured by features of the American constitutional order.  
First-past-the-post voting districts tend to create two-party systems and two-party systems 
depend on large (often heterogeneous) coalitions to secure political victories.  Reducing 
internal tension within a party helps it compete for and hold national power.  Diffusing 
such tension is facilitated by the existence of auxiliary policy-making institutions, such as 
the courts.  As the case studies show, this pattern was present throughout the 20th 
Century.  Other scholars have observed instances of it in 19th Century America (Graber 
1993; 1998), which may indicate that regimes have relied on the national judiciary to 
stabilize their national coalitions throughout American political history. 
Moreover, placing the exercise of judicial power in the context of regime politics 
reinforces the relative consistent exercise of the power despite the fact that the courts 
engage in distinct forms of policy-making during different historical periods.  The 
dominant wing of the party-in-power tends to secure preferred policies by enabling and 
utilizing judicial power.  Of course, the results of such judicial policy-making can be 
strikingly different in outcome and ideological direction.  Hardline conservatives used the 
courts to temper progressive regulatory schemes throughout the Progressive Era while 
liberal New Dealers depended on the courts to bring about progressive change.  Such 
policy-making looks incongruous if examined in isolation but, when viewed through a 
longitudinal perspective that accounts for institutionally motivated patterns, the nature of 
the policy-making looks similar. 
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Finally, this analysis indicates that judicial power is less vulnerable than certain 
scholars imply.369  Since political regimes depend on the courts for stability, certain intra-
party coalitions will be invested in judicial power.  Whenever the exercise of judicial 
review serves the interests of pivotal members of the political regime, the courts will 
enjoy protection from those who seek to reduce the power of the courts.  Thus, the 
Progressive Era saw hundreds of proposals to reduce the authority of the national 
judiciarymany of them coming from the Republican Partybut these assaults never 
materialized into law because of strong conservative resistance.  Rather, the Republican 
Party eventually bestowed the Supreme Court with greater authority and autonomy 
through the Judges Bill of 1925.  So long as the courts buttress the stability of parties-in-
power the way they have for much of the 20th Century, robust judicial power will 
continue to be a feature of American politics. 
 
Party Government 
 Examining the dynamic between parties and courts also explains features of party 
government otherwise inaccessible.  As E.E. Schattschneider famously quipped,  . . . 
political parties created modern democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in 
terms of parties (1942, 1).  American democracy depends on political parties as the 
primary vehicle for collective political action in the electorate and in government.  Parties 
establish national priorities, advance policy commitments, and serve as a vital link 
                                                
369 Scholars have noted that Supreme Court justices act strategically when they move off their ideal point 
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between the people and lawmakers.  Parties can also create a certain unity of control 
over the national government (Croly 1914, 346) and have successfully done so 
throughout much of the 20th Century.  Yet, in order for political parties to be successful in 
achieving even a small portion of their vision for a good society, they must remain 
unified.  Since the natural tendency of national parties is to unite coalitions with 
competing or inconsistent preferences, maintaining party unity can be highly elusive.  By 
using courts in the manner illustrated in the case studies, parties-in-power have 
successfully found a way to extend the life of their respective coalitions.   
Scholarship on political parties and political regimes tends to neglect any role for 
the courts.  Yet, the courts serve a vital role by enabling political parties to hold power 
longer than would otherwise be possible.  Adding to the importance of the courts in the 
life of a political regime, the courts can serve as alternative policy-making institutions 
when it becomes necessary to circumvent well-placed opposition coalitions.  The New 
Deal/Great Society used the courts as the primary vehicle for civil rights policy as it was 
acceptableor less offensiveto both wings of the Party.  Judicial victories also aided 
the liberal wing by binding African American voters to the Democratic Party.  In this 
way, courts enable parties-in-power to do that which they otherwise could not do.  The 
courts role in stabilizing parties is rarely associated with the judicial function or judicial 
power but, absent the courts, it is difficult to see how a party could hold power long 
enough to realize much of its political commitments.370 
                                                
370 The inability of the Republican Party to survive the tariff issues in the early 1910s resulted, largely, from 
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national tariff policy and, as such, the Republican Party dealt with it on its own.  The resulting electoral 
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 Of course, minority wing preferences tend to suffer when the Supreme Court acts 
to secure dominant wing preferences as national policy.  As such, while making policy on 
a highly divisive issue can stabilize the party-in-power, the Court is not simply propping 
up one party to the disadvantage of the other.  Rather, by transforming political questions 
into legal ones, the courts end up making policy and, often, taking the blame for 
controversial policy outcomes.  Thus, the tendency is for minority wings of parties-in-
power to view the courts with disdain.  Both insurgent Republicans in the Progressive Era 
and socially conservative Republicans at the end of the 20th Century actively lobbied for 
reducing judicial power despite their respective parties appointing the majority of federal 
judges during these periods.  Hostility toward the Supreme Court grew among southern 
Democrats once the Court began to dismantle Jim Crow institutions in the South.  Yet, 
members of the minority wing, whether in government or in the electorate, are extremely 
slow to defect from their party when the courts play the primary role in formulating 
policy that cuts against their preferences.  For example, social conservatives in the 
Republican Party turned out in record numbers to support George W. Bush in the 2004 
presidential election despite significant loses on many of their most valued issues. 
As the recent 2004 election shows, the ability to hold power over an extended 
period or to create conditions ripe for such an occurrence should not be taken lightly.  
Political parties that hold power over a series of elections can significantly alter the 
direction of American public policy and successfully promulgate new constructions of 
constitutional meaning.  With its recent success, the Republican Party altered American 
fiscal policy in ways that benefit corporations and the upper socio-economic strata.  The 
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previous Democratic political order did just the opposite.  In both cases, absent a loyal 
minority wing, the political party would not have succeeded in altering preexisting 
economic policy.  The New Deal regulatory state has been reduced and replaced with a 
global free market paradigm because social conservatives remain in the Republican Party, 
not because they necessarily endorse the benefits of free markets.  In fact, there is reason 
to believe that many members of the conservative right would be better served through 
greater governmental regulation of the national economy.371  However, the social rights 
preoccupation with the courts and judicial policy-making seemingly distract it so that 
social conservatives remain in the Party.   
Situating judicial decision-making in light of party politics elucidates intra-party 
conflict and the mechanisms employed to control competing coalitions.  Studying 
political orders without examining judicial function within a political order misses the 
fundamental importance courts play in regime politics.  The courts not only play a role in 
developing public policy but they also can extend the life of a party-in-power so that it 
can further realize and entrench its political commitments.  Applying a regime politics 
perspective reveals the impact of judicial decisions on political coalitions and, often, 
reveals where the true focus of the party-in-power lies. 
 
Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Practice 
 The case studies reveal a cautionary tale regarding constitutional theory.  Legal 
scholars frequently theorize that the nation would be infinitely better off if the Supreme 
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Court would maintain the commitments of the Warren Court and, to those ends, provide 
judges with better interpretive theories or historical narratives through which to achieve 
those ends.  More recently, suggesting alternatives to judicial supremacy came into 
vogue.  Departmentalism (Burt 1992; Alexander and Schauer 1997) and/or popular 
constitutionalism (Kramer 2004; Tushnet 1999) are the trendiest alternatives to judicial 
supremacy currently promulgated.  These arguments are normatively sophisticated and 
intriguing propositions.372  However, as attractive as these theories are from a normative 
perspective, they seemingly overlook that Supreme Court decision-making flows largely 
from grants of authority by political institutions (see Landes and Posner 1975; Graber 
1999; Whittington forthcoming).  As illustrated above, political parties rely on the courts 
because first-past-the-post electoral districts in the United States make small defections 
from heterogeneous parties detrimental to electoral success.  Thus, the Constitutions 
incentive structure inclines toward judicial empowerment.  Rather than attack judicial 
power, scholars and practitioners would be better served by pushing institutional reform 
designed to better promote deliberation by political officials.  If electoral incentives 
favored addressing highly controversial political and constitutional issues, then ambitious 
office-seekers and -holders would more willingly seek out these issues rather than push 
them onto the courts. 
 In addition, forms of constitutionalism that place greater emphasis on dialogue
whether among institutions or by the politymay be better served by making the 
American electorate aware of how political parties can undermine preferences through 
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372 Admittedly, I am sympathetic to these arguments particularly as they pertain to enhanced constitutional 
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the courts.  Parties can play an important role in American constitutionalism but only if 
party members willingly recognize that the judicial strategies advocated by their party 
may signal a lack of commitment to certain preferences held by minority coalitions 
within the Party.  The state of coalition politics in the United States is such that political 
coalitions regularly place their faith in the courts to secure their preferences.  However, 
unless that coalition occupies a unique (dominant) position within the party-in-power, 
such faith goes largely unrewarded.  Minority coalitions in the party-in-power might be 
better served by leaving the party rather than continuing allegiance to a party that cares 
little for its preferences.  Coalitions testing their worth in a competitive political market 
system can gain greater voice in constitutional debate if parties must bid for their loyalty 
through tangible political victories.   
 On the flip side, should American party politics continue as is, parties-out-of-
power would do well to recognize the tensions inherent in the opposition party.  For 
example, the current Democratic Party expends significant political capital protecting 
against arch-conservative jurists.  However, making political stands on judicial issues 
takes energy and resources away from resisting other policy initiatives.  So, marshaling 
the necessary resources to defeat the likes of Miguel Estrada and Charles W. Pickering, 
Sr. takes political capital away from resisting the conservative economic agenda.  This 
strategy of resistance is likely unnecessary given that it is in the best interest of economic 
conservatives to maintain the social status quo and key Republican lawmakers will likely 
push for moderates on the Supreme Court, particularly when the median justices seat is 
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vacated.373  Even if social conservatives succeed in appointing a sympathetic jurist to the 
Court, socially conservative jurisprudence will likely cause a shift in the current partisan 
alignment so as to bring to power a socially liberal regime.  Either way, it is in the long 
term interest of the party-out-of-power (the Democratic Party) to be attentive to the 
nature of intra-party tension in the party-in-power (the Republican Party).  
 By focusing on the role the courts play in constitutional interpretation and largely 
ignoring how normal politics informs constitutional meaning, constitutional theorists 
have underappreciated the impact of political parties on constitutional politics.  In fact, 
constitutional theory largely ignores extra-constitutional institutionsthose institutions 
not constructed through the constitution-making process.  This oversight is not terribly 
surprising given the greater constitutional authority vested in institutions like the 
presidency, Congress, and the judiciary.  However, if constitutional theorists began to 
look at the development of political institutions and account for how and why these 
institutions changed over time and what role they serve in constitutional politics, then 
theorists will be better equipped to address the appropriate roles of institutions, like 
political parties, within a constitutional order and the best way to achieve their vision of 
the good society. 
 In the context of the American Constitution, the inner workings of political parties 
help determine the distribution of ideological preferences on the federal bench (especially 
on the Supreme Court), what types of cases the courts will be asked or empowered to 
hear, and the degree of policy-making space afforded the courts.  Not accounting for the 
                                                
373 Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, espoused such a philosophy, 
sparking strong protest from social conservatives.  See Hulse, Carl. Abortion Remark by GOP Senator 
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importance of parties (and other institutions) facilitates the erroneous assumption that the 
courts act largely independent of the political order.  Accounting for how courts 
consistently make policy on those issues that create the greatest intra-party tension within 
the party-in-power enables political strategists and constitutional theorists to develop 
strategies for protecting jeopardized constitutional commitments.  In addition, political 
coalitions with constitutional aspirations different than those of their current political 
allies can evaluate their chances of succeeding in changing constitutional meaning 
through the courts.  A greater emphasis on the roles various institutions play in 
developing constitutional meaning will help bridge the gap between constitutional theory 
and constitutional practice.   
 
Parties, Courts, and American Democracy 
 The dynamic between parties and courts has mixed implications for democratic 
outcomes.  At times, courts can act to overcome well-placed minority coalitions that 
obstruct change.  The Supreme Court served in this capacity throughout the 1950s and 
early 1960s when it pushed national majority preferences on racial equality over local 
(southern) preferences.  Yet, the Court does not always act in accordance with national 
preferences.  When a party-in-power must compromise on preferred policies to maintain 
party unity, the dominant wing of the party empowers the courts if they believe the 
majority of justices on the Court sympathize with their values and preferences.  For 
example, hardline Republicans compromised with progressive insurgents only when 
regulatory legislation contained statutory language that guaranteed judicial oversight.  
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Legislative compromise created sufficient incentive for progressives to remain in the 
Party despite continued frustration with achieving their vision of a progressive regulatory 
state.   
 In other words, courts are neither inherently majoritarian nor countermajoritarian.  
Judicial action frequently functions concordantly with partisan action (or inaction).  
While courts may promote political participation and pluralism (Peretti 1999), they do 
not always function to promote such democratic traits as Chapter 2 shows.374  Moreover, 
while we may want courts to act when other institutions refuse to act (Graber 1993), 
action is no guarantee that judicial policy-making will conform to majoritarian 
preferences.  In fact, it may promote a regime that realizes preferences not held by a 
majority of American voters.   
 The difficulty in analyzing the role of the national judiciary is that its role is not 
static.  The courts will operate as coordinate institutions within the larger political 
regime.  Scholars have recognized this relationship by elucidating how parties can use 
courts in different political settings (see Gillman 2002; McMahon 2004; Whittington 
2001; Graber 1998) and this study extends the analysis of the party-court dynamic 
through a longitudinal perspective.  However, the literature to date is merely the tip of the 
proverbial iceberg.  Scholars concerned with the functionality of American democracy 
will find employing a regime politics approach highly beneficial when analyzing how 
non-democratic institutions act within a democratic political order.  By employing such 
an approach, scholars can detail the conditions under which institutions with larger 
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and dialogue when it constitutionalizes certain policies (2004). 
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democratic deficits act to secure majority preferences and when they act in ways that 
privilege the values of minorities.  Courts likely protect both the interests of majorities 
and minorities simultaneously, simply on different policy dimensions.  By examining 
intra-party tensions, we will gain a better appreciation for why the courts act one way on 
one set of issues and the opposite way on another.  Such seemingly contradictory action 
becomes clear when we account for the political and ideological tensions inherent in 
political parties and the regimes they attempt to create. 
 Finally, the American polity would be better served if it began to evaluate 
Supreme Court decision-making in light of the wider political order.  Too often, the 
American people seemingly assume that the courts act as disinterested, apolitical 
decision-makers.  But judges clearly make some decisions based on ideological 
preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2002; Perreti 1999).  While such preferences do not 
predetermine case outcomes, they are useful for evaluating political interests served by 
judicial decisions.  Liberal Republicans during the Progressive Era would have benefited 
from examining Supreme Court rulings in light of their own political allegiances.  Social 
conservatives today continue to give their loyalty to a party that channels social issues 
through the courts, which consistently renders center-left social policy.  Clearly, the 
courts operate in ways that run counter to the preferences of minority coalitions within 
the party-in-power.  The persistence of voting for parties that appoint judges 
unsympathetic to minority wing preferences is a curious, yet, persistent feature of 
American politics that goes largely ignored.  Considering what courts do as a function of 
party politics can result in reconsidering political alliances.  Regardless of the results, the 
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ability to conceptualize judicial action as derivative of party politics will enable political 
coalitions within the polity to evaluate their chances of success through current 
arrangements.  Democratic practice will be better served through consistent evaluation of 
party commitments and court action. 
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